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Preface

On The Relevance Of This Study To Current Events, Historical Falsification,
And The Unfinished Twentieth Century
At the time of this research project’s completion (April, 2014) US troops are being deployed
to Poland, Ukraine is on the brink of civil war, and American / Russian relations are nearly as
strained as during the darkest days of the Cold War. Concurrently, in American universities,
Russian studies and the former ‘Sovietology’ field are of ever decreasing levels of importance,
enrollment, and funding; the thinking seems to be – ‘why study a failed system?’ Post-Cold War
US triumphalism has not only negated the achievements of the USSR but has also relegated an
entire chapter of world history to irrelevance. However, neoconservative faith in ‘the end of
history’ has proven, in recent months, to have been very shortsighted.
Understanding of the deep historico-cultural linkages between Poland and Russia, Poland’s
place in the former Soviet system, and Russia’s economic and geopolitical aims – both ‘noble’
and ‘dastardly’ – are more pertinent than ever as East Central European events take the world
stage. This study contributes, in a limited way, to the type of holistic understanding lacking in
many discussions of the current crisis. It invites further research on a variety of related topics –
for example, Pan-Slavism and the Roman Catholic / Eastern Orthodox ‘schism,’ politicaleconomic perceptions of former Soviet Bloc citizens per generational segment and the
weltanschauung of citizens per each nationality, nationalist ambitions in Ukraine and the ‘pull’
of the West in relation to Russian ambitions of ‘empire restoration,’ and Polish-US geopolitical
and economic strategies and ‘conspiracies’ (i.e., stated and unstated goals of the Eastern
Partnership Community). It also begs questions concerning recent geopolitical alignment in
relation to historical antecedents. For example, Poland has had very little ‘brotherly love’ for
Ukraine until recently, Ukraine being - unlike the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary - more
traditionally aligned with Russia, and more culturally, linguistically, and religiously similar (only
6% of Ukrainians are Roman Catholic whereas over 90% of Poles and some 60% of Slovaks and
Hungarians are Roman Catholic). The old saying ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ comes
to mind here.
Furthermore, this study refutes prevalent historical falsifications – common both in the
‘everyday understanding’ of average Americans and common also among some American
academics – concerning the nature of the Socialist system in the USSR and its Eastern European
satellites, and the goals inherent in this system’s transition. US right-wing narratives, steeped in
Reaganesque, neoconservative economic agenda-making, generally seek to justify world
capitalist ‘victory’ by way of a supposed Eastern European (and Russian, for that matter)
rejection of socialism and longing for unregulated free-marketism and an end to the ‘social safety
net’ which is portrayed by neoconservatives as a form of ‘dependence’ which negates personal
v

initiative. This study demonstrates, by way of first-hand interview data with high-level
Solidarność activists (for example, Jerzy Borowczak, current director of Fundacja Centrum
Solidarności), that the Solidarity Movement’s goal was establishment of a form of social
democracy very similar in philosophy to that of Sweden’s Social Democratic Party – not a
‘dictatorship of capital’ and an ‘every man for himself’ mentality as fetishized by America’s
Republican Party, its far-right factions, its wealthy ultra-conservatives, and its lower-class
supporters, in which have been installed a ‘false consciousness’ congruent with elite agendas.
Those such engaged in an effort to rewrite the past per mythologies spun from the 1989 – 1991
Soviet Bloc transition era, in an effort to influence the future in justification of impoverishment
and exploitation of the general public at the expense of a small, elite, privileged class, are in
denial of facts, willfully disregarding historical reality - or else they are entirely ignorant of the
observational evidence and interview data which substantiates the arguments of this thesis and
many other non-Westerncentric historical research projects.
Post-1989 Poland, per the Solidarność Party’s agenda, was similar to that of the ultra-liberal
Kerensky Government of Russia in 1917 (the Provisional Government before takeover by the
Bolsheviks), in its advocacy of worker’s rights, women’s rights, civil liberties, and powerful
progressive hopes for giant leaps forward in social justice, culture, science, and humane
economic growth. Solidarność also advocated free universal health care, affordable advanced
education, and continuity of the State-sponsored social security system. This study refutes both
the demonization of social democracy by Western historical falsifiers as well as the degradation
of Soviet Bloc-era individuals - industrial workers, union activists, and all common citizens per the inaccurate Western assumptions and outright falsifications that these individuals
somehow lacked self-initiative, creativity, ‘the work ethic,’ or self-agency. As demonstrated by
interview data, Soviet Bloc citizens, by very necessity, exhibited an abundance of each of these
qualities, far exceeding most US citizen’s experience in capacity for daily self-reliance, and
long-term survival innovations and strategizations.
This study also refutes Western assumptions which generalize all the events in Eastern Europe
and the USSR during 1989 – 1991 as ‘the collapse of communism.’ The aim of such reductionist
portrayals is usually an attempt to provide evidence of the certainty that capitalism was, is, and
always will be the best and only economic system for all humanity. The argument is then skewed
by its proponents in several ways following this ‘logic’: The Soviet Bloc collapsed because
communism failed > Therefore, capitalism is superior to communism > Therefore, not only a
rejection of communism is necessary, but also an intensification of capitalism. Two other
elements are then added: the economic systems of capitalism and communism become
synonymous with political systems: capitalism = freedom and democracy, and communism =
slavery and dictatorship. In fact, communism becomes an interchangeable word for dictatorship
and capitalism for democracy. Next, all gradations of either system are removed: Scandinavianstyle social democracies, for example, are lumped together with the most extreme socialist
regimes, such as the Khmer Rouge, and likewise, capitalist systems - regardless of their
vi

tendencies for human exploitation, environmental destruction, and imperialism - are lumped
together and branded as generators of prosperity for all. Bangladeshi sweatshop workers and
Wall Street hedge fund operators thus become brothers in a system that offers equal opportunity
for all if one will simply apply himself diligently; if you are poor, so goes the mythology, then
you have failed to apply yourself adequately.
This thesis demonstrates that all the above-mentioned assumptions are entirely false. The
Soviet Bloc was dissolved for a wide variety of reasons, economic issues being only one of
many. In fact, Poland’s economic dysfunctions – the everyday alternatives to which are a central
focus of this study – were, to a great degree, ‘self-inflicted’ by both Moscow and Warsaw as a
‘punishment’ for the rebelliousness of Solidarność, and then, in a ‘feed-back mechanism’
economic dysfunctions were amplified (State crackdowns on Solidarność through creation of
artificial shortages were answered by labor strikes which resulted in decreased production and
supply-chain bottlenecks, which in turn caused natural shortages). The true ‘economic collapse’
came after transition to capitalism, as global market forces caused rapid and massive
deindustrialization – a deindustrialization across 12 time zones and equivalent to the US
deindustrialization of the past 30 years compressed into 3 years! Other reasons for the
dissolution include: the centrifugal pull of nationalism and ethnic aspirations, political infighting,
rejection of ‘internal colonization’ of Eastern Europe by the USSR, the rejection of ‘ideological
orthodoxy’ and its accompanying economic implications, a generational shift and generational
disparity between citizens and leaders (a young, modern, educated citizenry was governed by a
gerontocracy), the longing of this younger generation for ‘the imagined West’ along with the
success of Western propagandists in creating and disseminating ‘the imagined West,’ and the
‘over-success’ of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost.
Additionally, per the previously mentioned Western assumption of lumping all forms of
socialism into one category – all forms being assumed equally dysfunctional and equally ‘evil’ –
this thesis demonstrates that the version of socialism which evolved in Lower Silesia worked
very well and was very much accepted by average citizens. The reality of this construct is that
both capitalism and socialism exist, in the real world, on continuums of ‘ideological orthodoxy,’
and are couched in widely varied political systems. The all inclusive demonization of every form
and function of socially beneficial public policy and all versions of socialism across time and
geography originates in Capital; everything that benefits the capitalist agenda is praised and
justified – everything that does not is condemned as unpatriotic, un-American, anti-religious,
immoral, degenerate, or an outright lie (consider, for example, issues as wide ranging as FDR’s
New Deal, ‘creationism,’ gun laws, minimum wage, climate change, or ‘Obama Care’).
Attempts at creation of a ‘false consciousness’ in the general public ensues in order to
operationalize the ‘approved mindsets’ most beneficial to Capital.
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Finally, closely related to the above-mentioned constructs, this study provides many examples
of ‘the power of the people’ to alter the course of history. This is evident in Solidarity’s mantra,
‘evolution not revolution,’ in the many alternative and parallel political, social, and economic
activities Poles devised (both in the 20th and 19th Centuries), in Gorbachev’s Perestroika –
perestroika ‘from below’ and ‘from above’ – and ultimately in the 1989 - 1991 transitions across
the Soviet Bloc. This ‘people power’ was based on a Marxist-inspired ‘fraternal proletarian
solidarity’ and was simultaneously used in opposition to a misguided version of MarxistLeninism, namely Stalinism, and its legacies. These ideas are very relevant and utilitarian to
current progressive concerns of America’s takeover by oligarchic capitalism and world
domination by multinational capital, and the apparent resignation of much of the general public
that change is impossible in light of powerfully embedded bureaucracies, privileged groups, and
propaganda-driven media. Poles and Russians drastically changed their societies in an era when
public communications were censored and opposition to ‘the system’ might mean exile,
imprisonment, or death. There is much Americans can learn from these ‘Marxist freedomfighters’ - Poles and Russians - many practical and theoretical lessons to be applied in
operationalizing a ‘21 st Century American Perestroika,’ and in revaluating the unfinished
ideological business of the 20th Century.
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Abstract
The aim of this study is to arrive at a holistic understanding of Poland’s place in the Soviet
Bloc, 1945 – 1989. Throughout, the study considers historical and cultural linkages between
Poland and Russia, drawing parallels and contrasts which have shaped the destinies of both
nations. It explains how Poland became part of the Soviet system, the successes and failures of
the system, and how common people adapted to and eventually altered the system. Special
emphasis is placed on the ‘lived experience’ of the last decade of socialism (1979 – 1989),
including oral histories of subsistence economic strategies, black market trading, alternative
employment scenarios, parallel political action, and underground communications (samizdat or
bibuła.) The study makes several contentions based on interview data, oral histories, and direct
communications with over 50 individuals, mainly in the cities of Gdańsk, on the Baltic Coast,
and Wałbrzych, 400 miles south on the Polish – Czech border. Among these contentions is that
survival in Poland’s dysfunctional economy during the last decade before the 1989 transition
depended on innovation, self-initiative, networking, and risk-taking - traits usually associated (by
Westerners) with entrepreneurialism within a capitalist economy - not with daily life in a
communist state. The study refutes other commonly held Western beliefs concerning socialistera Poland and the USSR, including negative assumptions about ‘socialist work habits,’
inaccurate generalizations about the uniformity of socialist economic and political orthodoxy,
and false interpretations concerning the 1989 – 1991 transition of the Soviet Bloc. In short, to
each of these three items respectively, the study demonstrates a prevalence of a ‘proletarian work
ethic’ rivaling any found in the West, two very different ‘versions’ of socialism (greatly
dysfunctional in Gdańsk while a ‘golden age’ in Wałbrzych), and a vast propensity for a
transition bringing social democracy, not unregulated ‘Wild East’ capitalism as fetishized by
Western neoconservatives in an effort to co-opt the Soviet Bloc transition to their service.
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Poland’s Place In The Soviet Bloc:
Historical And Cultural Linkages,
Political Transformation,
and
Everyday Economic Alternatives In Gdańsk and Wałbrzych

Introduction
This thesis is about how citizens of the Polish People’s Republic managed to survive major
economic upheavals as their political system collapsed around them. It explains how Poland
became part of the Soviet Bloc economic system, how the system succeeded and failed, and how
common people adapted to and eventually altered the system. Building on preliminary research
conducted in writing a sociology master’s thesis, A Synthetic Analysis Of The Polish Solidarity
Movement (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012), this study focuses on
alternative economic practices in Gdańsk and Wałbrzych from 1979 to 1989. Rather than a rigid
chronological narrative of world, national, or local events that contributed to the above
mentioned scenarios, the study aims for a wider conception which allows for a synthesis of lived
experiences (oral histories) and formal history (‘official history’) per published sources and
archival records.
The study fills a gap in published accounts on this topic per the following observation: In
conducting background research for the above-mentioned sociology thesis it became evident that
English language versions of local-level oral histories from former Soviet Bloc states are
relatively uncommon in academic literature. This may be due, in part, to translation issues, or to
the fact that until relatively recently (post-1989), limited access and travel in Eastern Europe and
1

the USSR hindered such projects. Prior to 1989, limitations to access encouraged a
preponderance of top-down research strategies, focusing on macro-level analyses and statistical
data – the results thereof only as accurate as the sketchy figures made available by central
planning committees. Likewise, post-1989 studies concerning the transition to capitalism and
restructuring of state economies generally focus on formal economics, macro-level politics, or
statistical analysis, these too perhaps skewed in the chaos of ‘Katastroika’ (the dark term
inferring ‘catastrophic restructuring’). Little attention has been given by Western researchers to
the lived experience of economic transition in the last decade of the Communist Era. This study
contributes to the topic as its primary research focuses on the lived and felt history of individuals
rather than analysis of macroeconomic trends as represented by graphs, charts, and equations.
The thesis contends that survival in Poland’s dysfunctional economic system of the 1980s
depended on innovation, self-initiative, networking, and risk-taking - traits usually associated
(by Westerners) with entrepreneurialism within a capitalist economy - not with daily life in a
communist state. In short, many residents of Gdańsk and Wałbrzych became involved in private
economic activities which were the seeds of a 'proto-capitalism' within a state-owned economy.
Such individuals, prepared by their informal entrepreneurial experiences under a dysfunctional
version of socialism, were thus 'pre-adapted' to the post-1989 market economy.
Dispelling common Western assumptions that life in a socialist system breeds laziness,
dependency, inefficiency, and incompetence, this thesis contends the opposite: In order to
simply survive in the late-stage socialist economy of Poland (and across the Soviet Bloc, for that
matter), an entrepreneurial spirit was necessary along with a wide repertoire of concrete,
economic strategies outside of the official economy. This was especially true for those
individuals marginalized by connections to the labor union, Solidarsość, and through dissident
2

activities related to the Solidarity Movement, but it was generally true for all non-Party members
across Poland.
Various forms of a shadow economy emerged throughout Poland as a solution to major
shortages of food, shortages of nearly all basic consumer items, and a general lack of common
consumer services. Work was traded, agricultural products were privately produced and traded,
deals were made to secure hard-to-get items, and small-scale, independent 'businesses' were
established; all of these were informal, 'off the record' and technically, illegal. It was not only
individuals that had been fired from jobs for dissident activities who participated in the shadow
economy. For example, individuals working 60 to 80 hour weeks in Stocznia Gdańska (the
former Lenin Shipyard), were also involved in alternative economics as this was necessary
regardless of income - and incomes were very much leveled regardless of occupation - simply
in order to obtain basic necessities and to stretch legally earned incomes. Thus, those entirely
without official employment as well as those working grueling hours in heavy industry both
participated in alternative economic activities.
This thesis also notes that many full-time workers, such as skilled tradesmen at Stocznia
Gdańska, were generally very dedicated and highly productive employees, regardless of external
commitments to shadow economies. Again, this conflicts with common Western misconceptions
in which workers in State-owned industries are imagined to be inefficient, uncommitted, or even
involved in acts of sabotage or deliberate production slow-downs. Interview data indicates a high
degree of long-term, even generational, commitment to the shipyard, which continues today.
This is not to say that workplace dedication was universal in Soviet Bloc industry – far from it.
Neither is it to say that Socialist industries were more efficient as compared to Western
industries – they were not. Rather, dedication to a particular craft and/or to a specific workgroup
3

often times made up for managerial incompetence, technological backwardness, systemic
dysfunctions, infrastructure limitations, and outright corruption on the part of the nomenklatura.
Again, this finding validates the overarching construct that individuals, as opposed to the
socialist system as it had evolved in Eastern Europe and the USSR, were generally, by necessity,
highly innovative and very dedicated to the capitalist notion of the ‘work ethic’ – that is, an
entrepreneurial spirit prevailed in a socialist world.
Additionally, in telling the story of 1980s Poland, the lived experiences of individuals in
Gdańsk and Wałbrzych are compared and contrasted. Although the entire nation suffered from
economic dysfunction during this period, generally speaking, Lower Silesia fared better than the
Baltic Coast. This can be attributed to the fact that major ‘socialist showcase projects’ in the
south, such as Nowa Huta, Katowice, and Koksownia Wictoria, were given ‘preferential
treatment’ by the State, whereas the rebellious Baltic shipyards – Stocznia Gdańska being the
birthplace of Solidarność – were ‘punished.’ Interview data supports this notion, and it is
reflected in the fact that Wałbrzych residents generally reported less variation in alternative
economic strategies and participated less in informal economic practices in comparison to
residents of Gdańsk. Thus, southern Poland was, to some degree, pacified by the State and
rewarded for its loyalty to the existing socialist system. In fact, outright hostility toward
Solidarność was expressed by some Wałbrzych interviewees who blamed the union for closure
of local coal mines, an attitude never encountered in interviews on the Baltic Coast.
The thesis also continually refutes its antithesis and several related assumptions stemming
from the 1989 – 1991 transition of the Soviet Bloc. As argued and reinforced throughout, the
transition of Eastern Europe and the USSR came about as a result of many factors which
accumulated over decades, not by oversimplified single causes or grand generalizations such as
4

‘the inevitable failure of communism.’ The thesis actively points out common assumptions,
usually made by critics of any form of planned, rational state intervention in an economy with
the aim of developing natural and human resources, in defense of the notion that unregulated
global capitalism is the highest and ‘end form’ of human socioeconomic evolution. The daily
economic strategies of working class citizens in Poland’s socialized economy, by necessity,
entailed much ‘informal entrepreneurialism.’ However, this fact was not an indication that
Poland’s citizenry or Solidarność - the independent labor union that opposed Soviet interference
in Poland’s political and civil affairs - were yearning for a 180º turn from socialism to ‘Wild
East Capitalism,’ the post-Soviet equivalent of American Neoliberal free market anarchism. 1
The general political stance and long-term goal advocated by Solidarność, as the labor union
evolved into a political party, was creation of a social democracy, with a government organized
more along the ideological lines of Sweden’s Social Democratic Labor Party, rather than a
Reganesque, laissez faire, ‘law of the jungle’ free-for-all, as posited by some Neoliberal
observers. The mythology disseminated in the West of the ‘triumph of capitalism over socialism’
was accompanied by a Neoliberal backlash advocating ‘maximum privatization of everyday life’
as opposed to the early Stalinist era construct of ‘maximum socialization of everyday life.’ In
reality, the Soviet Bloc transition was not ‘The End Of History,’ ‘The End Of Ideology,’ ‘The
Death Of Marx,’ or an affirmation of the ultimate triumph of the ‘good’ unregulated capitalism
over the ‘evil’ social democracy. 2

1

David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth And Power In The New Russia (New York: Perseus Books Group,
2002). Hoffman popularized the term ‘Wild East Capitalism’ in reference to the mad dash for ownership of
privatized State property and enterprises by Russia’s ‘new oligarchs,’ most of them former nomenklatura.
2

Francis Fukuyama, The End Of History And The Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992). Some authors,
politicians, journalists, and academics jumped to conclusions in the 1990s assuming that an Americentric liberal
democracy and globalized unregulated capitalism were the highest and ‘end forms’ of human socioeconomic
evolution; the ‘collapse’ of the Soviet Bloc was supposed to be evidence of this construct. Soon thereafter,
refutations began to emerge, ranging from Samuel P. Huntington’s cultural arguments in The Clash Of
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Rather, the transition was driven more by the centrifugal pull of nationalism, personal political
ambitions, legitimacy issues against a stagnated geriatric leadership, and the desires of a welleducated, politically sophisticated, modern middle-class to overturn the ‘paternalistic hand’ of
its ruling bureaucracy. ‘Economic dysfunction,’ as so often incorrectly cited by Western
academics and political pundits as the sole reason for the ‘collapse’ (more accurately, secession
of states from a union and end of single party domination in the union’s sphere of influence), was
but one of many factors in the transition, and to a great degree, an effect of long-term political
disintegration rather than a cause. The concluding chapter of this thesis briefly addresses these
issues as they are complex, integral, and essential components of any discussion of Soviet Bloc
transitology. It summarizes points made throughout the thesis in an attempt to clarify the
contradicting makeup of the underlying economic and political order of the former Soviet Bloc –
constructs that are often grossly distorted or entirely misunderstood in the West.
By the same token, a generalization of ‘the West’ as being dominated by views generally held
in the United States alone (or trumped-up in the US to validate Neoliberalism) is also inaccurate.
For example, the German interpretation of the 1989 – 1991 transition is not based on the notion
of ‘the triumph of capitalism over socialism,’ but rather on the triumph of détente in reducing
geopolitical antagonisms and the success - rather, ‘oversuccess’- of perestroika in releasing the

Civilizations (1993), to Jacques Derrida’s ‘anti-neocon triumphalism’ in Specters Of Marx (1993) with its ‘Ten
Plagues Of Global Capitalism.’ In popular journalism, the trend for free market neo-con evangelization continued
long after most academic observers had reconsidered the deeper meaning of the 1989 – 1991 transitions. For
example, Thomas L. Friedman’s ‘psuedo-economics’ books, The Lexus And The Olive Tree (2000), and The World
Is Flat (2005), posited a bright new world made prosperous by unregulated global capitalism, seemingly oblivious
to counter-forces in the Islamic World, the rise of China and other ‘Asian Tigers,’ the recovery of Russia and its
trend toward authoritarianism, the downward spiral of Africa into the chaos of ‘privatized violence,’ and the
growing dissatisfaction over vast economic inequalities in the US, high unemployment and un-survivable
underemployment.
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pent-up frustrations of a ‘civil society’ or ‘public sphere’ stifled (except in Poland) since Stalin’s
time.3

Methodologies and Fieldwork
The research for this thesis has been conducted using local-level, ethnographic and
sociological techniques in conjunction with conventional use of published historical sources and
a limited number of archival materials. Four methods have been used to explore the lived
experiences of individuals during the last decade of communism in Poland, especially in relation
to everyday economic alternatives: (1) oral histories have been gathered from persons living
through this period – from individuals as well as focus groups; (2) ‘expert interviews’ have been
conducted with key informants who worked in local industries, were members of local unions,
or otherwise had access to information or experiences not typical of the general public; (3)
informal conversations with individuals knowledgeable of this topic have been recorded and
analyzed; (4) direct observations in and around Gdańsk and Wałbrzych have been undertaken,
informed by locals knowledgeable of the past and up-to-date with current trends.
The interview process has been informed by published academic accounts and adjusted
accordingly to focus on specific topics per the expertise of individual subjects. Unique personal
documents (scrapbooks, memoirs, hand written essays, samizdat publications, Solidarity
newsletters, publications from Stocznia Gdańska, photographs, etc.) have been given to the

3

Stefan Meister, ‘Putin Has Berlin In A Tight Spot,’ Aljazeera America, 3/13/2014,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/13/germany-russia-ukraine.html Poland was the only Soviet Bloc state
to retain a vibrant ‘civil society’ even under Communist Party domination, economic subjugation, and Martial Law.
This is a ‘cultural tradition’ stemming from the Partitions, reinforced by the ‘Polish Enlightenment,’ and
operationalized by such institutions as the Polish Catholic Church, ‘Flying Universities’(informal itinerant schools),
samizdat writers (bibuła), and a strong, defiant, inteligencja tradition stretching back to Copernicus and beyond.
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author by some interviewees, and further contribute to holistic understanding of the late-Socialist
Era and transition to a market economy.
In total, twenty three individuals from Wałbrzych and thirty one individuals from Gdańsk
contributed data to this study. The Gdańsk interviews were conducted in March and December,
2010, and the Wałbrzych interviews were conducted in June 2011 and June 2012. The first
group of interviewees was located by chain reference starting off from initial contacts at the
Solidarność union hall in Gdańsk and at Uniwersytet Gdański. The author was assisted in PolishEnglish translation by Andrzej Falkowski and Marta Rutkowska, local business operators in the
Gdańsk area, and by Marta Skibinska and Aleksandra Kristiansen, under the direction of Dr.
Paula Gorszczynska of Uniwersytet Gdański. Similarly, the Wałbrzych interviewees were
located by chain reference from initial contacts by Zofia Rudnicka and Tadeusz Drzewiecki,
former residents of Wałbrzych, who arranged the interviews and translated them to English. Of
the total fifty four interviews, fifteen were conducted entirely in English.

Ethical Considerations and General Structure of the Thesis
An open-ended interview questionnaire was constructed in 2009, approved by the Marshall
University Office of Research Integrity, and updated and modified for continued use in 2010,
2011 and 2012 (IRBNet ID # 146051 – 6). Copies of the interview schedule and other relevant
documents in both Polish and English are included in the appendix. In order to protect the
privacy of interviewees, per the prescribed IRB protocol, fictional names are used throughout
this thesis, in both the vignettes that open each chapter and in the bodies of the chapters
themselves. Only those individuals quoted or discussed in the text of the thesis are referenced in
the bibliography. When fictional names are used they appear in quotations (for example:
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Interviewee ‘Maciek’ joined Solidarność in 1990). In certain cases actual full names have been
used, by permission. These include names of professionals consulted or interviewed, such as
university professors, labor union leaders, translators, and also certain ‘key informants’ consulted
multiple times, in-person or by email, telephone, or Skype.
Each chapter opens with a vignette based on personal experiences of the author while
conducting fieldwork in Poland and/or on narratives told the author by interviewees. The
vignettes are intended to convey subtle observations which often carry deep meaning, thus
contributing to a holistic understanding of the research topic. The content of each vignette is
linked to the subject matter of the chapter it precedes. The vignettes are also meant to humanize
the thesis, as the rather ‘lyrical’ nature of the narratives set the stage for more academic
discussions in the bodies of each chapter.
The opening chapter of the thesis is devoted to setting up deep background history and the
cultural constructs that tie together Poland and Russia. The author’s philosophy is that the roots
of contemporary history are found in a deeper past and that the study of history should therefore
inform our understanding of the present. Likewise, in regard to the particular subject matter of
this thesis, the interaction of traditional cultures with ‘foreign’ ideologies have produced
monumental societal upheavals; Marxist-Leninism is very much a Western European ideology
derived from Enlightenment thought and classical social liberalism (the individualist branch of
liberalism usually being associated with capitalism and the collectivist branch usually associated
with socialism), and its application beyond its culture of origin – be it in Poland, Russia, China,
or Cuba, for that matter – has resulted in ramifications that can be understood only in
consideration of the cultural context in which they evolved. The opening chapter sets this
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cultural tone, and likewise, the second chapter ties together culture, ideology, and economy in an
historical context.
Chapter three describes how the accumulated layers of culture, ideology, and economic theory
were operationalized in historical praxis, resulting in the dysfunctional ‘Soviet Legacy,’ and
how dissent and radicalization against this legacy came to be. It also describes the formation of
Solidarność as an alternative to the failings of the system.
Next, chapters are devoted to description of daily life in Gdańsk and Wałbrzych during the
1980s, emphasizing the historical events that led to economic dysfunction on a grand scale and
alternative solutions to the faltering system. Interview data concerning specific alternative
economic strategies is woven into the general narrative. Descriptions by ‘key informants’ from
Stocznia Gdańska and Koksownia Wictoria are used to construct a narrative portraying the lived
experience of workers in state-managed heavy industry during this period – workers who were
not justly rewarded for their work and found it necessary to supplement their incomes by any
means available. Space is devoted to the stories of individuals entirely excluded from the formal
economy by virtue of their association with Solidarność. Similarly, the story of how
Solidarność, the Catholic Church, and Western labor unions aided those in need is included.
Chapter seven gives a very condensed history of the actual state transition to a market
economy in Poland and ties the local lived history of interviewees to the broader spheres of
economic change – globalization, deindustrialization, and marketization. Throughout, a constant
consideration is given to linkage of lived history and formal history, local change and global
change.
The final chapter includes a discussion of the many factors that contributed to the collapse of
the Soviet Bloc, again, per the theme of this thesis, emphasizing the importance of historical
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events, structural flaws, and systemic failures as opposed to typical Western assumptions that
place primary blame on ‘theoretical’ characteristics and behaviors of Soviet Bloc workers or on
the ‘inevitable collapse doctrine.’ In this regard, the thesis contends such ‘theoretical constructs’
should rather be labeled ‘imaginary’ as they are based more on projection of Western values onto
stereotypically imagined individuals in non-Western, non-Capitalist societies, in lieu of actual
‘on the ground’ investigation.
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1. Mythology And Reality
_________________________
Poland And Russia In Historico-Cultural Perspective
Synopsis
A summary of the deep historical and cultural connections between Poland and Russia opens the
thesis, necessary in light of their 20th Century linkage in ‘fraternal proletarian solidarity.’ The
two nations are best understood together, yet ‘mythology’ has often obscured ‘reality’ in the
formal historical record. For example, Poland has been portrayed as a ‘sheep to the slaughter,’ or
as ‘the Christ among nations’ sacrificed for Europe's redemption. Russia has been portrayed as
brutal and mindlessly expansive. In fact, the true ‘aggressor states’ have been Western European;
Russia’s two main agendas have been resistance to Western aggression, and attempts at
modernization. Russia always lagged behind the West, and always feared the West (with good
reason). Although they have common ‘ancestral roots,’ Poland and Russia began diverging early
on in several ways: While Poland developed a modern economy, and a sophisticated private
financial sector by the second half of the 18th Century (during and despite Partitions), Russia
remained primarily an agricultural nation until the early decades of the 20 th Century. Poland was
a leader in European industry and commerce, as well as a pioneer of civil liberties, while Russia
remained locked in its Medieval, agricultural past. Yet, the agricultural commune of Russia was
as traditional, and as functional per its intended purpose, as the Hanseatic trading ports on
Poland’s Baltic Coast. Thus, Russia’s eventual modernization took a different path than had
Poland’s. With little tradition of private entrepreneurialism, a poorly developed financial
system, low population density, and vast geographical territory, Russia’s industrialization took
Statist form. Russia chose a different economic path than did Poland for functional
considerations. It made as much sense to centrally organize this vast, capital-poor region of
scattered peasant communes as it did to decentralize and deregulate the crowded, subdivided lots
of Poland. Two different but simultaneously functional paths had been taken by Poles and
Russians, both choices being rational, considering the conditions. Different material conditions
and differing phases of economic development affected Polish and Russian modernization, and
both came to be expressed in societal differences as well. In a nutshell, Polish progressivism
often clashed with Russian traditionalism, but both were functions of material conditions and

circumstances. There existed no inherent ‘flaw’ in Russian character anymore than there existed
‘nobility’ in Polish character; rather, their different paths to modernity were determined by
different demographic, geographic, and climatic set-points, in conjunction with different historic
trajectories.

Mythology and Reality

Mr. Motyka takes great pride in his garden and he shows off fruit trees as an art connoisseur
would show a Picasso. “The variety of gooseberry bushes we grow here is called Chekov’s,” he
commented, and I wondered if they truly came from Chumbaroklov Waste. The bushes were
blooming profusely along a rickety wooden fence made of discarded shipping pallets that
divided the front yard from the barnyard, but the air smelled more of souring rye silage than it
did flowers.
“This is the time of year
to plant beets and to put
manure around the
horseradish plants,” he
said, “how can you have
ćwikła z chrzanem
alongside the Christmas
Eve ham if you neglect now
this work of spring? Here,
I will show you how to
make come up fast the
beetroot seeds: soak them
in water overnight, and
after you sow them in rows,
press down the soil with a

“…it was tedious to listen to the story of that poor devil of a clerk who ate gooseberries.” Mr.
Motyka seemed a character straight out of Anton Chekhov’s novel Gooseberies, and he attributed
the varietial names of his prized plants to literatry references. Like Nikolay Ivanych, he was lord
of a tiny estate and philosopher of cosmic proportions, a cherished Slavic archetype in both
Poland and Russia. Above: his cherry trees and gooseberry bushes.

Anton Chekhov, Gooseberries, 1898
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board as wide as your hand and as long as your leg. Press down the board heavily; the seeds
like to feel
themselves very
snug in the soil as
do we in our home.
Remember,
“Szlachcic na
zagrodzie równy
wojewodzie (The
noble on his estate
is equal to the
governor of the
province).”
I thought to
myself, how
Three-quarter-acre ‘Polish Pondersoa.’

literally petitbourgeois, is this

‘estate,’ this farm of three-quarters of an acre, its noble szlachta owner a true farmerphilosopher – a regular Thomas Jeffersonski, he is! As Stalin said, ‘Communism fits Poland like
a saddle fits a cow.’
After touring this Polish Ponderosa we went inside and sat around a creaking wooden table –
I think Lenin had built it as a school boy – and drank tea brewed in an iron pot from Stalin’s
foundry. Above the table hung an old brass lamp that filled the kitchen with a warm, opaque,
red glow. So the legend goes, it was bought at Mrs. Khrushchev’s yard sale. The quality of light
it produced was very complementary to the icon of Our Lady of Częstochowa on the wall,
behind the table. It gave the image a near life-like look. The tin-box of an oven, manufactured the
year Gerick proclaimed he would ‘build a new Poland,’ appeared so shoddily made that I
wondered what kept it from setting fire to the house. But out of that oven Mrs. Motyka took a
beautiful pan of hot, dark, brown bread. She topped each huge chunk with a pat of butter
shaped like a lamb – while family and friends argued whether it was Lech Wałęsa or Mikhail
Gorbachev who had sown the wheat to make the flour to bake the bread. However, all were in
14

agreement that John Paul had lit the fire in the oven, not only to bake bread, but to warm the
house; General Jaruzelski, half snow-blind from a decade in a Siberian work camp, had gotten
too accustomed to cold.
It was June 22 - środek lata – midsummer’s eve or Noc Świętojańska (St. John’s Night). Mr.
and Mrs. Motyka’s teenage granddaughters had made wreaths of yellow and white wildflowers
to toss into the lake.
Each wreath had a
lighted white candle
and together with
many other girls’
wreaths they would
float in hopes a
young man would
find them. Bonfires
would be lit at
midnight and
celebrations would
continue till dawn.
The Motyka homestead, near Wałbrzych.

This old preChristian Slavic

tradition has been resurrected - and modernized to include ‘totally epic’ partying and rock
concerts - in the past decade. Popularized more through the internet than through revival of
local customs, it has found a new place in young Slavic identity. June 22 is also The Day Of
Memory And Sorrow in Russia, the remembrance of the beginning of The Great Patriotic War.
Flowers are placed at the Eternal Flame Of Our Memory at the Leningrad Memorial, and at the
feet of Mother Russia on the gigantic burial mound of Stalingrad. It is also customary for newly
married Russian couples to balance their personal joy with the collective sorrow by laying
flower wreaths at war memorials immediately after their wedding. The past is never far from the
present in a place where tradition, culture, and ideology intertwine with history.
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______________________________________

One cannot understand Poland without understanding Russia; clarification: you must
understand something about them both in order to put in context the economic ramifications of
their linkage in ‘fraternal proletarian solidarity.’ The clarified aim is possible but the general aim
is deceptive, because the more one comes to know, the greater is the realization of how little is
understood. The best an outsider can hope for is the etic perspective, even if one visits the
countries, meets the people, reads the history, and sees the places where it all happened. Even if
the outsider was told stories of ‘Slavic heritage’ and horrific stories of family members’
experiences of World War II, it is nothing at all towards understanding what Eastern Europeans
felt when armies marched, when States were torn apart by revolution, when cities starved, and
when abstract ideology took the place of proletarian common sense.
In living memory of the oldest generation of Poles and Russians is Hitler’s war of
extermination, reconstruction and starvation afterward, Stalin’s terror, Solidarity’s rise,
Jaruzelski’s martial law, Communism’s disintegration, and the Capitalist resurrection. The postwar generation of Poles - the age cohort equivalent to US ‘baby-boomers’ - learned the Russian
language as school children, sang ‘happy birthday’ to Lenin (Sto Lat! They said – may he live
100 years), and dreamed of making a trip to West Germany to buy jeans and Coca Cola. By
1992, ‘Gen-X’ Russian girls were dreaming of escaping the chaos of the crumbling Vechnoe
Gosudarstvu (The Eternal State) with an “American Boy” (Американ Бой), the title of a catchy
song by pop group Kombinaciya, while their parents alternately cursed and blessed Mikhail
Gorbachev for liberating/impoverishing the nation. The side effects of Lech Wałęsa’s Ewolucja
nie Rewolucja (Evolution not Revolution) were as devastating for Silesian coal miners as they
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were for Magnitogorsk steel workers – as the former Soviet Bloc entered the global economy its
workers got a taste of good old fashioned American Rustbelt deindustrialization. Be careful what
you wish for, you just might get it, and in an interconnected world it might cause a seismic
economic shift. But such dramatic shifts are really nothing new in Polish and Russian history.
In the collective memory of generations now gone - the Polish and Russian archetypal
memory, if you will – is Poland’s partition, as Caryca Katarzyna (Czarina Catherine - ‘Beloved
Yekaterina,’ to the Russians) sought to ‘recover what was torn away’ (she wore a gold medal
around her neck congratulating herself on doing this) by means of her lover, Stanislaw August
Poniatowski, the final king of pre-partition Poland.1 Remembered also is the revenge by Prince
Adam Czartoryski, who later pursued in the court of Czar Alexander I the idea of reconciliation
of Polish/Russian identity within the framework of a single Pan-Slavic super state, while he
simultaneously befriended the Czar and fathered a child with the Czarina. Czartoryski's methods
were complex, pragmatic, and a bit Machiavellian, but above all, strategic, perhaps a forerunner
of Zbigniew Brzezinski's notion of 'strategic diplomacy’ with a touch of soap opera melodrama
thrown in for good measure. Czartoryski was determined to create a ‘Slavic Union’ - if not by
politics then by genetics.2
Also remembered are the decades of praca organiczna, literally, ‘organic work,’ when during
the partitions Polish bankers, industrialists, farmers and entrepreneurs of all sorts worked quietly
and cooperatively to build the Polish economy through expansion of the private sector,
infrastructure improvements, modernization and mechanization. ‘Russian Poland,’ Zabór

1

Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History Of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 60.

2

Paul Brykczynski, "Prince Adam Czartoryski As A Liminal Figure In The Development of Modern Nationalism
in Eastern Europe." Nationalities Papers. Vol. 38, No. 5 (2010): 648 – 662.
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Rosyjski – the Russian Annexation, was not going to be an object of their efficient German
neighbors’ condemnation and reproach. The liederliche polnsche wirtschaft - the ‘slovenly
Polish economy,’ as the German Partitioners called it 3 - was transformed by Poland’s
indigenous burzuazja zajęcia (the enterprising bourgeoisie classes) while simultaneously the
Polska inteligencja kept alive Polish language, culture, and prawdziwa historia (true history) in
‘uniwersytet latajacy’ (‘flying universities’).4 These underground schools counterbalanced
linguistic Russification and лакаровка (lakarovka) - the ‘official’ meddling with facts and
history - so common in Russian culture and later in Soviet bureaucracy that the practice earned
this specific name.5
Love and hate, friendship and intrigue, brotherhood and betrayal – these extend far into the
past between Rodacy nasza Ojczyzna Polska (the Family which is Poland) and Mир Oбшссына
Родина (the Communal Refuge of our Motherland). The outsider is hard pressed to grasp the
emotional significance of this Polish/Russian relationship, but we can talk about it in historical
terms and hope to convey a semi-accurate rendering of the lived and felt experiences. For our
immediate purposes, we could start with WWII, as the modern Polish economy – and all its
dysfunctional chaos – emerged directly from Soviet annexation. However, there are historical

3

William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict In The Prussian East, 1772 - 1914
(Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1980), 41.
4

Dr. Barbara Wejnert, interview by author, 1/23/2010. Dr. Wejnert, a former member of Solidarność and scholar
of Polish history, provided extensive firsthand information concerning uniwersytet latajacy in the 18th, 19th, and
20th Centuries. Dr. Wejnert participated in uniwersytet latajacy in Poznań in the 1980s.
5

Dr. Jeffra Flaitz, interview by author, 10/3/2008. So common was the practice of 'manipulating facts' in
Russian culture that the practice had a specific word to describe it, 'лакаровка' (lakarovka).This holds true
throughout Russian and Soviet history (post-Soviet also?) and the practice probably has Byzantium roots. The term
is usually applied to 'official' manipulation for the benefit of the State. Лакаровка was practiced in diplomacy, State
communications (in Soviet Russia by Pravda), and in Statecraft in general. Dr. Flaitz observed the practice first-hand
in Leningrad and Moscow prior to the 1991 transition. A common form was obvious and blatant discontinuity
between observed reality and/or Western news reports in relation to Pravda reporting.
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antecedents necessary to understanding how and why the USSR made the Lublin Committee the
nucleus of post-war Polish government even before the Red Army entered Warsaw on January
17, 1945.6 There are also cultural connections and dissimilarities between the two nations, some
of which helped shape the historical trajectory that led to creation of The People’s Republic of
Poland. Briefly examining some high points of the long background history of Poland and
Russia will set the stage for elaboration of the 20th century topics that are the focus of this thesis.
In the late 1500s the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was the largest state in Europe and
one of the most prosperous. It encompassed what is now Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania,
Belarus and much of Ukraine. It was created on July 1, 1569, from The Act Of Union (The
Union of Lublin) in which Zygmunt Augustus, last of the Jagiellons, was elected by Polish and
Lithuanian szlachta as monarch of the combined kingdoms. The Act was both politically
expedient and a rational security measure – the ‘Great Gathering’ of Ivan the Terrible was
underway and some 6000 of his оприцчники (oprichniki - the modern equivalent of ‘death
squads’) were at work operationalizing Ivan’s personal will as ‘The Hand Of God.’7 The
oprichniki saw to it that Ivan’s enemies - and potential enemies – were boiled in oil, roasted
alive, impaled, crucified upside down, had their tongues cut out, or had their limbs torn off by
charging horses; the oprichniki took their job very seriously. With Poland’s Zygmunt Augustus
heirless, and the magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania losing sleep over Ivan’s plans for
6

M.K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party Of Poland: An Outline Of History (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1976), 184. The headquarters of the pre-war Polish Communist Party was at Lublin. On
December 31, 1944, The Lublin Committee declared itself to be the provisional Polish government, this act
protested by Warsaw but supported by Moscow. Of course, Moscow had its way as the Red Army began liberation
of Poland from Germany and simultaneously its own occupation.
7

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, A History Of Russia (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 140 – 149. ‘The Great Gathering’ is the semi-legendary accumulation of the vast Siberian
empire by Ivan IV. Most of the expansion was into sparsely populated regions inhabited by unorganized, indigenous
groups. There was much less legitimate threat to the West.
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expansion (and the possibility of meeting up with the oprichniki), combining the Seyms and the
military resources of the two countries made perfect sense. 8
Now, traditional world history textbooks often strike the difference between Poland and
Russia at this particular point in time. Russia is portrayed as mindlessly expansive, with a
succession of insanely brutal dictators bent on world domination proceeding in a direct line from
Ivan the Terrible to Joseph Stalin and beyond. This sort of perspective perpetuates Ronald
Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ notion and grossly simplifies and distorts historical reality. 9
Conversely, Poland is often portrayed as a ‘victim’ - a sheep to the slaughter - and even
authors with the best of intentions sometimes inadvertently insult Polish pride in this context.
Timothy Garton Ash’s The Polish Revolution, while highly sympathetic to the Solidarity
Movement and to the movement’s agenda, introduces the subject via this type of background. He
begins with a rather emotionalized discussion of the 'betrayal' of Poland at the Yalta Conference
("...their country was delivered up by their western allies, Britain and America, into the famously
tender care of Uncle Joe Stalin"), and continues this 'messianic theme', citing Adam

8

Adam Zamoyski, The Polish Way: A Thousand-Year History of the Poles and their Culture (New York:
Hippocrene Books, 1994), 93 – 96. These general background facts concerning the Commonwealth are taken from
Zamoyski.
9

Not only entry level textbooks are guilty of this. The well known eleven volume series, The Story of
Civilization, by Will and Ariel Durant (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967) is overtly anti-Russian – that is, in
the fifty pages devoted to Russia out of a total of nearly 10,000. Chapter XVII (Volume X: Rousseau and
Revolution), titled “Russian Interlude,” opens with Frederick the Great bemoaning the necessity to cultivate the
friendship of barbarians, that is, Russians. Durant and Durant concur, stating in sickeningly elitist terms that the fate
of the average Russian was to be defeated by his own masters and government, and those who survive, “…crept
back to their task of fertilizing the women with their seed and the soil with their blood” (423). The authors’ blatant
racism continues on page 425 in discussion of alleged common Russian characteristics: “Among the people
language was coarse, violence was frequent, and cruelty correspondent with the strength of the frame and thickness
of the skin. Everyone gambled and drank according to his means, and stole according to his station…” After a few
kind, but rather condescending, words for Catherine the Great, the chapter following is titled “The Rape Of Poland.”
Monstrous Russia, peopled by ignorant barbarians, is hungry to gobble up noble Poland and all the world – this is
the Durant take on the subject.
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Mickiewicz's notion of Poland as "the Christ among nations" sacrificed for Europe's
redemption.10
More carefully researched histories paint a much different picture, especially those written in
the post Cold War era and lacking a covert political agenda. For example, Marshall T. Poe’s The
Russian Moment In World History contends that the Russian agenda has continually been
focused on defense against the West rather than on conquest of it.11 Again, this perspective flies
in the face of ‘conventional’ US accounts, especially those written between 1945 and 1991. The
idea deserves brief elaboration as it is a key in understanding the background leading up to
Poland’s annexation by the USSR in 1945.
Poe reminds readers that Poland once conquered and annexed a great part of the Russian
empire, actually occupying Moscow from 1610 – 1612. Additionally, he notes that Russian
expansion was generally eastward into lightly populated regions inhabited by indigenous people
lacking formal organization; he cites Siberia as an example. As with all early states, expansion
and conquest was part and parcel of their existence. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
expanded into Russia during a period of Russian vulnerability – ‘The Time Of Troubles,’ as it is
called, after the death of Ivan the Terrible and before the Romanov Dynasty was established. 12
Political disarray along with civil war, drought and famine had weakened Russia and the
10

Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 3 – 5.

11

Marshall T. Poe, The Russian Moment In World History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

12

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, The USSR, And The Successor States (Oxford: The
University of Oxford Press, 2011), 3 – 5. Suny’s chapter on “The Imperial Legacy,” (3 – 46) describes ‘The Time
Of Troubles’ as being from Ivan’s death in 1584 to the establishment of the Romanov line in 1613. Complex
political intrigue was the order of the day during ‘The Troubles,’ with two ‘False Dmitris’ appearing to claim the
Russian throne. Both claimed to be Ivan the Terrible’s sons, but were instead Polish impostors. Their aim is said to
have been not only to gain political control of Russia for the Commonwealth but also to steer Russia away from
Orthodoxy and toward Roman Catholicism. The famous play ‘Boris Godunov’ recounts this time – it is said to
have been Joseph Stalin’s favorite play.
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Commonwealth simply exploited the situation to its advantage. This was ‘standard operating
procedure’ for dynastic states in this era, the point being that neither Poland nor Russia was
‘obsessed’ with expansion at this stage of its existence any more so than were other European
states.13
Poe continues this theme, arguing that the differential in wealth and material development
between Russia and Western Europe was a primary factor in generating Russia’s anxiety toward
the West. The central idea here is that Russia, even after its recovery from ‘The Time Of
Troubles,’ continued on as a pre-modern, agricultural state in competition with the rapidly
advancing, proto-industrial, militarily-driven, ‘super states’ of Western Europe.14 These were
the true ‘aggressor states,’ and it was Russia’s misfortune to find itself next door to the most
technologically, economically, and militarily advanced nations on earth. Russia’s history from
this point forward can be seen as a continual game of ‘catch-up’ with the West, culminating in
the 20th Century with Stalin’s foresight in forcing industrialization, the pyrrhic victory of WWII,
and then the Cold War. From the ‘Time of Troubles’ to December 25, 1991, the primary struggle
for Russia (and later the USSR) had been an economic struggle – and for any modern state this
entails also a military/technological struggle. Eastern Europe was pulled into the USSR’s sphere
of influence after World War II and thus into Russia’s economic troubles. Poland and Russia’s
paths to modernity had diverged 500 years earlier and their short ‘partnership’ in the 20th
Century would be a stormy one.
Early on, Poland’s economy was structured very differently than Russia’s, and to a great
degree this stemmed from political and ideological differences. In simplest terms, Poland was an
13

Poe, The Russian Moment, 1-3.
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Ibid., 42 – 45.
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‘open society’ and Russia was ‘closed.’ Adam Zamoyski notes several highly significant
indicators of this. 15 For example, a Polish royal decree granted absolute freedom of the press in
1539, and in 1791 the Sejm ratified the first purely constitutional government in Europe. In 1630
Poland recognized six different languages for legal purposes: Polish, Latin, Ukrainian, Hebrew,
German, and Armenian. The old Hanseatic city of Gdańsk had large populations of German,
Dutch, and Scandinavian traders, and Elbląg had large colonies of English and Scots. Kraków
and Wilno had large Hungarian and Italian communities. Not overwhelmingly Roman Catholic
until after the Partitions (and as a result of resistance to the religions of the Partitioners),
Poland’s religious tolerance drew large Jewish communities in nearly every city. No Polish
monarch or government ever decreed an ‘official’ religion by officially outlawing another;
loyalty to a particular faith was always a personal matter for Poles, not the realm of public
legislation. Thus, by the standards of the time, Poland was highly cosmopolitan, a melting-pot of
languages, cultures, and ideas, not unlike the modern US.
In economic terms, such diversity is highly desirable as it is an indicator of commercial interest
beyond the borders of the country. New populations bring innovation and competition, thus
stimulating economic growth. Again, as described by Zamoyski, pre-partition Poland seems to
have been nearly as ‘neo-liberal’ as Reagan-era Washington. Zamoyski contends that while the
Hapsburgs, the Bourbons, and the Tudors were attempting to impose ever increasing control over
their populations through growing bureaucracies, Poland’s Sejm continued to decentralize
government and liberalize its economic policies. Zamoyski summarizes,
The Poles had made an article of faith of the principle that all government is undesirable,
and strong government is highly undesirable. This belief was not based on some kind of
inherent love of chaos, but on a deeply felt conviction that one man had no right to tell
15
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another what to do, and that quality of life was impaired by unnecessary administrative
superstructure… These attitudes – the rejection of authority for its own sake, the rejection
of the theory that the public good could be served by exerting pressure on the individual,
and the belief in the inalienable rights and dignity of the individual – were not new in
Poland. They had been evidenced throughout the Middle Ages…and in the sixteenth
century they became institutionalized…16

‘Polish-ness’ has thus been traditionally defined by Enlightenment standards of liberalism,
pluralism, democratic rule, respect for human rights, and separation of church and state. By
contrast, Russia’s notion of ‘Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality’ was traditionally heavyhanded to say the least, more akin to Byzantine traditionalism than Philosophe progressivism.
Ash simplifies the differences as, "...the clash of Polish democracy with Russian despotism,
Polish individualism with Russian collectivism, and Polish Catholicism with Russian
Orthodoxy.”17 To a great degree, Orthodoxy seems to have influenced the political culture of
Russia, its traditionalism maintained and even amplified over time, 18 whereas Roman Catholic
Poland was able, very early on, to separate Church from State. In Russia, Church was State and
the Czar was head of both, this a throwback to Byzantium customs.
The traditional belief in the all-powerful Czar, and all that such belief entails, is aptly
illustrated in a description by Robert Massie.19 Speaking of pre-20th century Russia, Massie
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states, "From infancy, Russians have been taught to regard their rulers as god-like creatures.
Their proverbs embodied this view: ‘Only God and the Czar know,’ and, ‘Tis death for anyone to
reveal what is spoken in the Czar's palace.” Massie even ties these attitudes to ideational
constructs beyond religion, stating that, “…as Western Europe moved through the Reformation
and the Renaissance and into the Enlightenment, Russia and her church remained pure - petrified
in their medieval past."20
Additionally, William Taubman provides a modern example of this persistent cultural attitude
toward Czarism. In 1945 Nikita Khrushchev was assigned by Joseph Stalin the job of overseeing
the rebuilding of war-devastated provinces of Ukraine. When he arrived in decimated villages to
survey damages and offer help, villagers would sometimes say to him, "You are our Czar," to
which he would reply, "No, I'm only the "Czarovich" (son of the Czar), thus referring to his boss,
Joseph Stalin, as the People’s Czar.21 ‘Father Stalin’ cultivated this paternalistic notion,
replacing Orthodoxy with the religion of Marxist-Leninism.
According to Ronald Suny, this traditional Russian paternalism was manifested in the
everyday economic conditions of peasants in imperial Russia. 22 The Czar was imagined as God’s
equal on earth - all powerful and all knowing – with all earth and sky belonging to him. Peasants
worked the Czar’s land and did not imagine personal ownership of it. Collectivism was natural in
this perspective, as peasants perceived themselves as the Czar’s children and he their Great
Father. Labor conveyed the right of all to partake in a share of whatever the communal property
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produced, and indeed, according to Suny, personal accumulation of wealth was socially
condemned. As with Massie’s quoted Russian proverbs, above, Suny adds these to make his
point: “God smiles upon him who is satisfied with what he has.” “Wealth is a sin before God,
but poverty is a sin before people.” “What the Mir ordains is what God has decreed.” 23
The point here is that Russian traditionalism, steeped in Orthodox beliefs, is postulated to
have produced a common mindset concerning economic values nearly the polar opposite of those
that evolved in the West. Whereas the Poles perceived even the smallest landowner as a szlachta
of sorts - a ‘mini-noble,’ if you will - endowed by his Creator with the inalienable right to turn a
profit, traditional Russian beliefs disdained such a notion, ‘kulaks’ (the Russian equivalent of
the szlachta) being labeled as “…the village extortioners, the ‘skinners alive,’ those who ‘eat up
the commune’…”24 This traditional negative mindset concerning ‘rural capitalism’ was
effectively exploited by Lenin (and even more ruthlessly, later, by Stalin) in the process of
‘dekulakization’ and collectivization of agriculture. Stalin’s notorious frustration with attempts
to collectivize Polish farms is legendarily condensed in his well-known saying, ‘Communism fits
Poland like a saddle fits a cow.’
The ultimate manifestation of this dissimilar economic outlook between East and West between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism (which seems, in Poland’s case, to have rubbed
shoulders with ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’), between liberal
constitutionalism and conservative autocracy – is that the West modernized exponentially faster
than the East. Returning to the formerly mentioned thesis of Marshall T. Poe (this being that
Russia’s main objective has historically been defending itself from Western domination), we can
23
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note the threat posed to Russia by the ‘European Miracle’ in both its economic and military
ramifications.
Poe states that Russia was the only ‘extra-European empire’ to resist European domination
throughout the early modern period.25 He cites the cases of the New World; the Aztec, Inca, and
Maya being conquered by Spaniards and the rest of indigenous American civilizations entirely
displaced by the English, French, and Portuguese. In the Middle East and Orient, nearly the
same; the British colonized India, forced trade on China’s coast, dismissed the Ottoman’s ‘sick
man of Europe,’ and ran roughshod over the Safvid, Mogul, and Qing empires. The ‘Scramble
For Africa’ was more nearly a ‘status symbol game’ than meaningful expansion; Western
European nations played the game because they could. Again, by Poe’s terminology, Russia was
a pre-modern, agricultural civilization throughout all this, thus a potential target for Western
imperialism which they effectively resisted. He cites a list of invasions of Russia by the West
from the 16th to 20th Centuries to demonstrate his point:
Early on, the Poles, Swedes, and Prussians invaded multiple times. The British, French, and
Ottoman Empire invaded Crimea in 1853, and the US headed a multinational invasion force of
no less than fifteen different countries in attempt to intervene during the Russian Civil War in
1918. Germany’s notorious invasions during both world wars are as well known as Napoleon’s
famous 1812 fiasco; of course, his defeat was due more to ‘General Mud’ and ‘General Winter’
than to the skills of Marshall Kutuzov.
Poe summarizes by stating that in all the above cases Russia was on the defense against an
aggressive West; the myth of Russia as the ravenous wolf is as inaccurate as is the myth of
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Poland as the sacrificial lamb. Russia was vulnerable to the West because it was economically
and technologically less developed than the West. It held off invasions – just barely, usually,
and at great cost – because of its enormous human and material resources, World War II being
the prime example of a longstanding and highly destructive trend. 26
Russia was rich in natural resources but poor in capital and infrastructure, a colossus created in
the Medieval Era that did not evolve a modern financial system as did its smaller Western
neighbors. Russia remained overwhelmingly rural, with only 17% of its population living in
towns and cities as late as 1917, the majority of this number centered around two cities, Saint
Petersburg and Moscow.27 It lacked a middleclass of any size or importance, and thus an
entrepreneurial base and a private financial sector until very late in the imperial age – just as this
class was emerging, revolution liquidated it.
Poland, by contrast, was nearly Russia’s opposite in this respect. A financially progressive
state that looked to the West and to the future, Poland’s large middleclass modernized the
domestic economy even when dominated by Russia during the Partitions and despite a ‘capital
drain’ caused by exile of many Polish business magnates. In fact, Polish banks had excess capital
to invest overseas even during the Partition. For example, during the 1860s, Peter Zaleski, a
Warsaw banker and financial manager, invested what would be the current equivalent of one
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billion dollars in the iron and coal industry of Vinton County, Ohio. Zaleski’s Warsaw clients
reaped investment returns on the Ohio venture which they used to further develop Polish
infrastructure, this being a relatively common practice during the Partition Era. 28 By contrast,
one year after Zaleski’s initial investment in Ohio, in 1861, Czar Alexander II freed Russia’s 23
million serfs - about 40% of the total population, the majority of the remainder communal
peasants with no concept of finances beyond the immediate concerns of survival on the Mir.29
The point here is, as partitioned Poland modernized with the help of interest payments from
foreign investments, much of Russia was just escaping the Middle Ages.
The realization of Russia’s deficiencies in contrast to Western Europe, and Russia’s accurate
perception of its need to rapidly address these deficiencies, came very late indeed. England, for
example, was moving into a second phase of industrialization as Russia was embarking on its
first. As noted by Suny, it was not until the 1890s that Russia undertook industrial development
28
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in any meaningful way, and when it did, the projects were mainly state-financed rather than
privately initiated.30
Czar Alexander II is credited with helping establish a version of state-capitalism, a ‘joint
venture’ of sorts between private entrepreneurs and the Czarist state. With little available capital
(on the scale necessary for constructing industrial infrastructure) and no experience in managing
industrial facilities, few existing Russian entrepreneurs were willing or able to undertake
investment and operation of heavy industrial plants. In effect, the Czar and a small group of
advisors appointed by him took the role usually played by private investors in the West, bringing
in foreign engineers and managers, financing and overseeing industrial start-ups from beginning
to end. No liberal opposition to government taxation or regulation evolved in Russia as the small
bourgeoisie class gladly aligned itself with the Czar, who financed development and protected it
from foreign competition. Thus, statism rather than private entrepreneurialism characterized the
earliest industrial development in Russia – when these developments finally did emerge. 31
This statist approach was as much a result of Russia’s particular geographic and demographic
situations as it was cultural tradition. Russia was a vast, undeveloped wilderness, capital-poor,
with the smallest entrepreneurial and merchant class in Eurasia. It had no ‘bourgeoisie tradition’
from which to build a capitalist base – neither in the raw economic sense or the social sense of
building a vibrant capitalist class. In effect, the constellation of Czarist-Orthodox-collectivist
traditions that had served Russia well for centuries did so because of Russia’s particularly rural
and agrarian nature; form followed function.
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Per the theories of Karl Marx, capitalism emerged in the towns of the early Middle Ages – the
‘burghers’ originally being displaced peasants who came to town and eventually elevated
themselves to challenge the aristocracy. Suny makes some interesting and very telling
demographic observations along these lines concerning Russia and its late attempt to enter the
modern Western capitalist system. 32 Suny notes that as late as the eve of World War I, the
average distance between Russian towns (west of the Urals) was fifty-five miles, whereas in
Western Europe towns averaged five to nine miles apart. East of the Urals, into Siberia, towns
averaged an unbelievable 307 miles apart. Other than Moscow and St. Petersburg, the next eight
largest cities were all in non-Russian, ethnic borderlands: Warsaw, Odessa, Riga, Łudź, Kiev,
Kharkov, Tiflis, and Vilna. Lack of cities equates to lack of potential for economic
modernization, the dense population centers of Central Europe being the birthplace of Northern
European capitalism.
Obvious climatic differences also contributed to Poland’s dense population and rapid
economic development as opposed to Russia’s sparse settlement and subsistence economy.
Poland’s winters are far from mild, yet they pale in comparison to the legendary Russian winters,
so extreme that they provide a natural defense from invasion – so extreme also that modern
commercial agriculture failed to develop to any degree until the Stalin era of collectivization. By
contrast, Gdańsk was a major export center for wheat and rye by 1500, Polish grain from the
plains along the Wisła feeding Western Europe during the 200 years of its Commercial
Revolution and beyond.33 Thus, in regards to commercialization of agriculture, historically the
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first step in the economic modernization of most nations, it can be said that Russia lagged behind
Poland by some 500 years.34
Russia remained in the early 20th Century, to a great degree, what it had been when Ivan the
Terrible ‘gathered together’ its great landmass – an empty wilderness. One can imagine
population density and economic development on a negative continuum, both beginning to
decline east of Warsaw, falling rapidly east of Saint Petersburg, and fading into oblivion in the
empty expanses beyond the Urals. Russia chose early a different economic path than did Poland
simply for functional considerations. It made as much sense to centrally organize this vast,
capital-poor region of scattered peasant communes as it did to decentralize and deregulate the
crowded subdivided-subdivisions of Poland; the ‘mini-nobles’ clinging to their half-acre farms,
and the multi-ethnic traders of the Baltic port cities neither needing or wanting anyone regulating
their economic lives. Early on, two different but simultaneously functional paths had been taken
by Poles and Russians, both choices being rational, considering the conditions.
Polish and Russian culture and religion simultaneously supported and affirmed their respective
economic systems which emerged as functions of demography, geography, and climate. At
various times, the two nations were merged, ‘Polish Russia’ and ‘Russian Poland’ being
descriptors of dominance in various eras. Several attempts were made at Pan-Slavic unification,
stretching at least from the days of the Commonwealth to Pope John Paul II’s 1985 advocacy of
a ‘Slavic Union’ from the Baltic to the Pacific. Too many obstacles stood in the way of this half34
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hearted notion, more a political statement than a realistic plan. Russia always lagged behind the
West, always feared the West (with good reason), and after 1945 made for itself a barrier against
the West. Eastern Europe became both an ‘exploited periphery’ of the Russian core state, to use
Emmanuel Wallenstein’s terminology, and also a buffer zone against potential Western military
threats. Eastern European history took a sidetrack for 45 years (from the end of WWII to the
Perestroika Era), co-opted by the Russian plan for modernity, but ultimately Russia changed its
direction as it became obvious that restructuring was imperative for economic survival.
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2. From Under The Rubble1
________________________________
Post-War Poland Enters The Soviet Sphere Of Influence

Synopsis
Chapter two explains how Poland entered the Soviet sphere of influence in the final months of
WWII. It also begins to refute commonly held notions that the Soviet system was ‘inherently
flawed,’ a theme clarified and expanded upon as the thesis progresses. By the 1930s, Czarist
Russia’s old modernization dilemma had been solved by Stalin’s application of economic
strategies based largely on British and German WWI ‘wartime socialism tactics.’ In effect, a
Medieval agricultural kingdom populated by subsistence farmers was transformed to a
technologically advanced global superpower in less than 30 years, despite the unprecedented
destruction of the Second World War. By the same token, the grand goals of Stalinism – to catch
up with Western Europe, to defeat Nazi Germany, to rebuild after the enormous set backs of the
war, and then, later, during the Cold War, to catch up with the US – strained the Soviet system
and its citizens tremendously. In order to achieve such goals and to maintain faith in the hope of
long-deferred rewards (ultimately, the Marxist ideal of ‘bringing the Kingdom Of Heaven to
earth’), Soviet ideological constructs were deployed on a massive scale. This entailed not simply
the perfection of a planned economy, but also a planned society with a positive theory of social
organization, in which announced collective goals would be achieved, with the utmost speed of
movement toward these goals, under a single, authoritarian leadership apparatus. During the
Stalin era, the USSR spent upwards of the equivalent of $500 million per year toward
ideological indoctrination in Eastern Europe alone, seeking to create ‘New Soviet Man,’ in
effect, the largest ‘social engineering project’ ever undertaken in world history. It was under such
conditions that the People’s Republic Of Poland was conceived, was set into motion, and was coopted into the service of the USSR. The prime agenda for Poland, as determined by its new
place in the Soviet system, would be maximum socialization of everyday life through
1
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nationalization of all means of production, urgent industrialization on a grand scale, and
collectivization of agriculture. These plans were both the antecedent of Communism’s success
and simultaneously the seeds of its eventual downfall, as preceding chapters will demonstrate.

From Under The Rubble
It was a deceptively warm day for mid-March. The south-facing slopes were bleeding a runoff
of dirty snow water but ice fishermen still smoked and dozed on three-legged stools on the frozen
delta of the Martwa Wisła. Behind the fishermen rose the vertical mansions of old Hanseatic
League merchants. Bathed in afternoon sunlight, the tall, narrow, structures took on an aura of
antiquity, their earthy beige, brown, and rust colored brick façades topped with red clay roof
tiles. Women with tall boots, long coats, and fur hats walked briskly along the granite cobbled
lane that followed the Martwa Wisła; they ignored the simple, retired fishermen but smiled and
silently nodded as they passed white-haired businessmen wearing stylish black cloaks, tailored
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in Milan. A few brave souls forced early-season openings onto the sidewalk cafés, sipping
steaming hot tea while shivering and adjusting their chairs to maximize incoming sunlight and
stored warmth radiating from massive brick walls. Timeless as this scene was, Grand Duke
Casimir could well have been philosophizing in Krakow and Ivan the Terrible, Czar of all
Russians, could have been ranting in Moscow. Danzig was as much a cosmopolitan trade center
in the 16th Century as was Gdańsk in the 21st – all that changed were the individual actors that
played recurring roles.
Inspired by the unusually bright day, Andrzej and I decided to look for a high place from
which to take a few panoramic shots. The city is surrounded to the south by wooded hills, the
highest being Gradowa Wzgorze, on which is erected the Millennium Cross, a monument to 1000
years of Christianity in Gdańsk. From here we had a perfect view of the old town. Its many
green copper spires, tall linden trees - still bare from winter – and the iconic shipyard cranes all
pointed skyward. Stretching from the backdrop of hills, brick architecture extended along the

View of Gdańsk from Góra Gradowa. In the background is the Lenin Shipyard on the Baltic Coast.
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coastal plain, to Zatoka Gdańska (the Bay of Gdańsk). As far along the coast as we could see, it
ran – churches, apartments, stores, offices, factories, homes – all made of brick. As with the
Hanseatic mansions, all topped with similar red tile roofs, the walls varying in a narrow band of
earth tones – rusty brown, to beige, to deep rose. In the calm of that premature spring afternoon,
Gdańsk looked serene and eternal.
“You know all of
this was rebuilt,
don’t you?”
remarked Andrzej.
“This was an ocean
of rubble just after
World War II. Even
the Hanseatic
League district and
the old churches
were heavily
damaged; most of
Reclaiming bricks from the rubble of Gdańsk after WWII. Photo from a collection
displayed at the University Of Gdańsk.

the city was entirely
flattened – it was just

piles of brick after the Nazis and the Red Army were done. You would never know to look at it
now, but it was all ruins in 1945. Families lived in the ruins with sometimes just a tarp stretched
over them to keep off rain and snow. They say that outside of town, some lived in holes in the
ground covered with branches and ferns. There was no other choice because there was no place
else to go. All the cities of Poland were like this, and so also was Germany, and so also was
Russia. A few German families were left here - old folks, women, and kids mostly – they paid for
the crimes of their nation, some did - some paid dearly, in terrible ways.”
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____________________________________
Born in Gdańsk in 1939, Andrzej remembered much of the ruined city before the major
rebuilding projects of the mid-1950s and 1960s. The mass destruction of World War II created a
housing shortage that affected the next three proceeding generations of Central and Eastern
Europeans. Andrzej grew up in a two room apartment with his mother, grandparents, and a
brother and sister; his father was killed in the war. He recalled, “When I got married, we moved
in with my wife’s family. We lived with them for twenty years waiting for our own apartment.
That was typical. It was common to wait twenty or twenty five years to get your own apartment.
Typically two or three generations lived together until the oldest ones died. Today it is less
common, but for everyone in my generation, we had no choice – that’s how it was.” 2
Andrzej continued, giving a sweeping economic history of Poland, aptly condensing threequarters of a century in a few sentences: “Between WWI and WWII Polish currency was strong
– similar to the German mark or Swiss franc. It was a prosperous country, nearly as prosperous
as France. Poland had a very strong economy then. After the war, of course, it took years to
rebuild, but it was in the late 1970s that we realized disaster was coming. Poverty, shortages,
misery, riots, martial law – the buildings collapsed in the war, but society collapsed in the
1980s.”
Poland’s economic predicament throughout the 1980s was shared by all the Soviet Bloc
nations. It came about as part of the gradual disintegration of a particular political-economic
system that originated with the founding of the Soviet State in 1917 and that was later extended
to the USSR’s ‘sphere of influence’ after WWII. However, even in the first decade of its
2
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existence the system evolved far differently than its founder, Vladimir Lenin, had intended. The
Russian Revolution was followed by political infighting, bloody civil war, economic chaos,
social disorder and famine. Faced with an incredible simultaneous array of societal upheavals,
Lenin’s domestic policies oscillated from immediate forced collectivization of all means of
production (‘war communism’), to partial relaxation of this policy (NEP), to reversal again
(after Lenin’s death in 1924), followed by intensified effort at the original aim. The regime’s
early political orientation swung wildly from revolutionary democracy, to statism, to a partystate, to an authoritarian dictatorship headed by Joseph Stalin. 3 The degree to which Stalinism
shaped the historic trajectory of the USSR and Eastern Europe – Stalinism as a political and
economic system as well as a cultural construct – cannot be overemphasized. 4 Poland became
embedded in the Stalinist system at the end of World War II and the temporary ‘Khrushchev
Thaw’ did little to alleviate its excesses and dysfunctions. 5
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In telling the story of Soviet communism, in proceeding from the opening remarks above, it is
common practice in many general histories to see next something to this effect: “It was a flawed
and failed system to begin with…” or, “The USSR imposed on its freedom-loving neighbors a
system of slavery, and hoped to extend this system worldwide.” The author of this thesis
remembers Cold War era high school history books that proceeded in this manner – it was
fashionable to do so, in the US, from the 1950s to the 1980s.
However, some contemporary researchers, lacking the political bias of the Cold War era,
contend that the Soviet system was highly effective in its early stages, throughout WWII, as well
as into the early post-war decades.6 By the late 1970s - yes - the writing was on the wall that the
system of the East was lagging behind the system of the West. By 1980 nightly news broadcasts
showed average Americans what ‘Red scare pundits’ had preached about for thirty-five years;
bread riots in Gdańsk were evidence that Lenin had failed - 65 years late, but still he had finally
failed, and the radical right was thrilled. 7 Sidestepping the politicized rhetoric of neo-liberal
conservatives, let us look back and very briefly examine the ideology and the ‘nuts and bolts’ of

victor over Fascism in Europe. In effect, the Stalinist system was duplicated in Poland and all of Eastern Europe,
and Moscow governed the region through select appointment of leaders. The entire legacy of Stalinism – terror
politics, total control of all means of communications, ideological rigidity, and the resultant socioeconomic
dysfunctions this entailed – plagued Eastern Europe into the 1990s and beyond.
6

For example, Ronald Grigor Suny, Stephen Kotkin, and Marshall T. Poe, all quoted at length in this thesis.

7

The riots in Gdańsk, Sopot, and Gdynia in December, 1970 drew world attention as Polish National Guard
troops killed upwards of 80 demonstrators , wounded and beat up perhaps hundreds more. No exact figures were
arrived at as many of the victims were ‘buried like dogs’ – at night, without a funeral – by local authorities. Other
protestors later ‘simply disappeared,’ evidently removed by police for ‘relocation.’ Wounded and beaten protesters
were afraid to seek medical attention at hospitals as they feared ‘relocation’ more than their injuries. The Baltic
Coast Riots of 1970 were covered in US newspapers but it was not until the 1980s that cable TV news brought
regular video coverage of Poland’s struggle into American homes. The author of this thesis attended the 40 th
anniversary ceremony of the shootings at Stocznia Gdańska on December 16, 2010, interviewed eyewitnesses of the
shootings, and also attended a conference titled Grudzień ’70 (December ’70) in which local historians presented
papers on the Baltic Coast Riots and the shipyard shootings. Interview data from this event is included in this thesis
later on.

40

the Soviet system, where and how it originated, how it came to Poland, and under what
circumstances.
The ultimate positive aim of this system, derived from the idealized Marxist tradition,
entailed creation of a worldwide egalitarian workers' society in which each individual had the
economic means to reach his/her greatest human potential. The exploitation of human beings by
extraction of cheap labor, the alienation of workers from their jobs, the cold-hearted
utilitarianism inspired by the profit motive, the chaotic market swings of a capitalist economy
and the associated societal instability, class-based economic inequality, poverty and misery in
general – all these things would be eliminated by transition from capitalism to socialism. In her
well known memoire Under A Cruel Star, Heda Kovály captures the essence of ‘Marxist
utopianism’ as she describes “the proliferation of pamphlets printed on cheap paper…" in early
post-WWII era Eastern Europe, all of which eventually arrived at the conclusion "...that all
injustice, discrimination, misery, and war stem from… the exploitation of the working class. As
soon as the working people - the creators of all value - understand what must be done, they will
overthrow the exploiters... and the Kingdom of Heaven will come to earth." 8 No doubt, many
adherents of this ideology truly believed that they were elevating the material conditions of
humankind and that their system could provide the greatest good for the greatest number of
people.
8

Heda Margolius Kovály, Under A Cruel Star: A Life In Prague, 1941 – 1986 (New York: Holmes and Meir,
1989), 54 – 55. Originally published in Czech as Na Vlastní Kůži, the book’s vivid accounts of the author’s life,
from internment in the concentration camp of Łódź, escape and survival, post-war affiliation with the Communist
Party, disillusionment, and finally immigration to America, is itself a condensation of the Eastern European
experience in general. Kovály’s husband, Rudolph Margolius, was executed after being convicted of ‘Titoism’ in the
infamous Slánský Trial of 1952. Devoted to Czechoslovakia and the positive ideals of Communism, Rudolph
Margolius was caught up in the last of Stalin’s purges. The idealized notion of “Bringing The Kingdom Of Heaven
to Earth” was a forerunner of Alexander Dubček’s slogan, “Socialism With A Human Face,” of 1968. This kind of
liberalization was answered by ‘The Brezhnev Doctrine,” stating that the USSR would intervene if nations in its
sphere of influence attempted to steer their economies toward capitalism.
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Unfortunately, few of the lofty goals of ‘Utopian Marxism’ were ever realized in Eastern
Europe and Russia. Perhaps the ‘Middle Way’ of Scandinavia’s Social Democratic Party, with
its mix of centralized management of primary industries alongside, and cooperative with, smallscale private enterprise came closest to ‘bringing the Kingdom of Heaven to earth.’9 However,
the Soviet version of Marxist-Leninism was highly successful in modernizing Russia – per the
main theme of the previous chapter of this thesis, economic modernization was the major
dilemma confronting the USSR at the time of its creation. In effect, the USSR applied the
Marxist-Leninist model to ‘fast-forward’ itself from a medieval kingdom populated by
subsistence farmers to a technologically advanced global superpower in less than 30 years. The
system was also effective when applied to the rebuilding of war-devastated Eastern Europe.
Yet in the long run, the Soviet system proved to be too ideologically rigid in comparison - and
in competition with – the openness, energy and innovation of Western capitalism. As in the
imperial age, when “Russia and her church remained pure - petrified in their medieval past, " 10 likewise the USSR became petrified in the purity of Marxist-Leninism, its internal structure,
from the workings of its political bureaucracy to the working of its steel mills and chemical
plants, locked in the age of ‘The Great Stalin.’ Despite the best efforts of Nikita Khrushchev, deStalinization only went so far; purges and terror ended, but the basic operating principles of the
system remained the same.

9

Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin, and Klas Amark, Creating Social Democracy: A Century Of The Social Democratic
Labor Party In Sweden (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1992). According to the
authors, the Scandinavian model of a mixed socialist/capitalist economy managed more by economic experts than
by politically driven opportunists (as in some capitalist nations) has been very successful, producing the highest
standards of living in the world.
10

Massie, Peter The Great, 56.
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The combination of Russia's unique cultural heritage (as described in the previous chapter;
condensed by the national slogan, ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality’), and the Leninist
version of Marxism that evolved from the Bolshevik Revolution set the stage for a particular
kind of authoritarian, centrally-planned, centrally-controlled socialism; 11 perhaps a ‘puritanical
version’ in comparison with the ‘vulgar plurality’ of Scandinavian Social Democracy which had
its roots in Menshevik ideology.12 Lenin had interpreted Marx's notion of the class conflict that
emerges from the ownership of private property, the division of labor, and the exploitation of
human potential for the sake of profit, as absolutes that must be eradicated by force. Lenin would
not wait for the dialectal progression of history, nor did he have faith in the Proletariat to make
changes on its own. He believed that only the intellectuals with a complete grasp of Marx's
theories could lead the working classes out of alienation and exploitation. There emerged then a
"...leadership that claimed the right to control all because they knew all."13 This idea fit perfectly
alongside the old Czarist authoritarianism and its paternalistic traditions. The radical Bolshevik
wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party (as opposed to the more moderate Mensheviks), or
as they eventually became known, simply, the Communist Party Of The Soviet Union, claimed
11

Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 239. Beyond the cultural constructs commonly called on to ‘justify’ the
parameters of Soviet political evolution, Suny explains that the particular path taken was as much a result of
material circumstances some of which early Soviet policies inadvertently had set into motion. “…their (Lenin,
Stalin, and the close circle of early Soviet leaders) improvised responses to a series of crises they themselves had
caused, laid the foundation for a political system the Stalinists themselves did not envision. Backwardness and
ruthlessness combined with the personal ambitions of Stalin forged an autocratic regime that single-mindedly would
try to drive a continent into the industrial age.” Among the crises Suny refers to here was the near fatal economic
crash just prior to enactment of NEP. Once ‘on track’ again (after 1929) and with political power consolidated in
Stalin, the continent- wide drive into the modern era, as per Stalin’s vision of such, continued till Stalin’s death in
1953 and beyond. The People’s Republic Of Poland, as we knew it from 1945 to 1989, was to a great degree
Stalin’s creation.
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Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 81. Lenin found fault with Trotsky, ‘branding’ him a Menshevik, and criticizing
him over his more moderate and pluralistic ideas. Trotsky’s ideology would come to define Social Democracy much
as it was practiced in Scandinavia. ‘Purifying’ the Party became Lenin’s obsession and expelling all moderates was
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to have all the ‘correct’ answers, and plural forms of government were not, in their view, correct;
pluralism led only to factionalism, and thus internal conflict, which hindered progress. The
Bolshevik answer was a one party state with an enlightened ‘Vanguard of the Working Class’
imposing the correct solutions for the good of the people. 14
The Soviet system was founded on the principles of abolition of private property and private
means of production, the appropriation of all property and means of production by the State,
centralization of planning for the means of State production, and avoidance of factionalism by a
one party political system. 15 Additionally, many former cultural idioms underwent a
‘transubstantiation’ of sorts, in the conversion of the nation from Orthodoxy to MarxistLeninism. For example, near total authority was invested in a single Czar-like leader, the Party
Chairman, and unquestionable and unwavering allegiance to State/Church (being one and the
same in Czarist Russia) was replaced with total loyalty to the Soviet Union/Marxist-Leninism.
The expansionary policies reminiscent of Ivan the Terrible’s era were replaced with the notion
of inclusion of all nations in ‘fraternal proletarian solidarity.’ The collectivism and camaraderie
of the Mir was replaced with ‘planned social solidarity’ and ‘joyful fulfillment’ of five-year
plans.16
Written before excessive accumulation of ‘political toxicity’ in the Cold War era, Robert S.
Lynd’s “Planned Social Solidarity In The Soviet Union” provides a rare first-hand account and
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Ibid., 3 – 11.

15

Lewin, The Making Of The Soviet System, 3 – 45
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Robert S. Lynd, “Planned Social Solidarity In The Soviet Union,” The American Journal Of Sociology, Vol. 2,
No. 3, 1945:183 – 197.
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objective analysis of the Soviet system by a Westerner researcher. 17 Written in 1945, it includes
an overview of the organization of the Soviet Union, the stated goals of the nation, and the
nation’s intended goals for its citizens, on the eve of the USSR’s annexation of its Eastern
European satellites. By extension then, the descriptions of the goals and intentions as outlined by
Lynd were necessarily identical for all incoming members of the Committee For Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON), in the early post war era. Founded in 1949, COMECON
initially included the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania; the
German Democratic Republic and Albania were included soon after. COMECON was basically
the economic equivalent of the Warsaw Pact and both were made up of the same nations. Due to
the significance of Lynd’s study, below, several long quotations are taken from it to help explain
and summarize the ‘mission statement’ of the USSR which was soon thereafter applied to
Poland and all other nations in its sphere of influence:
The Soviet Union, being a planning society with a positive theory of social organization,
unlike our society, has a positive theory of social cleavages. Its aim is the activation of all
citizens for mass goals and the elimination of cleavages. Sharp cleavages were inherited
from czarist days, and other potential cleavages are involved in the leadership of the
Communist Party and in the rapidity of forced change. The Party undertakes to remove
these old and new threats to social solidarity by familiar and novel devices… (183)
It is a society with (a) announced collective goals; (b) the utmost speed of movement
toward these goals...; (c) a single, authoritarian leadership apparatus and geographical
segment in the pursuit of these goals; and (d) a positive policy of encouraging total social
17

Ibid. Robert Lynd, a professor of sociology at Columbia University, co-authored with his wife, Helen, a study
of small-town American life titled Middletown: A Study of Contemporary American Culture (New York: Harcourt
Brace and Company, 1929). Praised for its methodological objectivity, it remains a classic for students of sociology.
Lynd applied similar methods to his study of Soviet society. However, with the publication of his work on the USSR
he became an early target of the ‘Red Scare.’ Although Lynd served as a senior advisor to the Washington, D.C.
based Institute For Propaganda Analysis, was an executive member of American Committee For Democracy and
Intellectual Freedom, and served in a plethora of similar academic and political organizations, he came under
investigation by the FBI as a person suspected of ‘Un-American Activities.’ In striving for objectivity, Dr. Lynd’s
article, “Planned Social Solidarity in the Soviet Union,” seemed too ‘uncritical’ of the USSR to many of his
contemporaries. Mr. and Mrs. Lynd were called before a senate investigation committee during the McCarthy era
trials, but no legal action was taken against them. However, the FBI continued to compile extensive files on the
Lynds well through the 1960s. The files are available online at FBI.GOV listed under ‘Freedom Of
Information/Privacy Act/ Section: Subject – Robert S. Lynd’
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organization for the achievement of these goals and changing, or where necessary,
destroying all tendencies to opposition and cleavage at every level in the society ,
including the leadership apparatus itself... Here is a society that sets bold objectives for
itself, or, more accurately, has them set for it by the Communist party; that conceives of
these objectives as necessarily the objectives of everyone in the society; that encourages
everyone to identify his personal goals with the stated social goals; and that allows no
organized opposition. (184)
Cleavages due to illiteracy are being obliterated by programs of universal education
which constitutes one of the great achievements of the Soviet Union. Marx had lamented
“the idiocy of rural life’ and “the deaf villages” in which four-fifths of the czarist
population lived…Lenin insisted in 1921 that socialism has no place for the illiterate, and
he went on to say this means not mere reading of newspapers but a population universally
engaged in study… (188)

Lynd’s analysis continues with description of Soviet techniques used in mass communication
and indoctrination of citizens into the prescribed social, political, and economic mindset of the
nation. The Soviet Union invested very heavily in promotion of its ideology, Suzanne Labin
estimating the Soviet budget for direct propaganda to Eastern Europe alone at equivalent of $500
million per year (during the 1950s and calculated in that era's currency value) with 140,000 fulltime government workers employed in this specialized area.18 Lynd outlines an exhaustive array
of indirect propaganda methods and activities, ranging from art, movies, contests, awards and
many more conventional modes to outlandish projects such as ‘volunteer road building and city
reconstruction.’ Below, per Lynd, several of these are listed and very briefly elaborated on, as
they constitute the communicative basis for Soviet ideological indoctrination, applied in the
USSR proper and all its satellites. Per the interview data obtained for this thesis, most citizens of
The People’s Republic Of Poland were indoctrinated in exactly the same way, with several
interviewees recounting childhood memories from the 1950s and 1960s that perfectly match
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Suzanne Labin, "Il Est Moins Cinq," in Communist Propaganda Techniques, ed. by John C. Clews (New
York: Praeger, 1960), 131.

46

Lynd’s listed activities compiled in 1945. 19 Ideological indoctrination was simultaneously
carried out in conjunction with real-world activities aimed at the actual and literal building of
socialism and the infrastructure of socialist society and the inclusion of all citizens, young and
old, into the nationalist project. Some of the “aggregative devices systematically used in Soviet
society” include:
1. Insistence in speeches, and all forms of official public communication, on the
solidarity of the people as a fact…For example, Stalin declared in a speech… “The
friendship among the peoples of our country has stood the test of all the hardship and
trials of the war and had been still further cemented together…”
2. Insistence on top leaders, especially Stalin, as the source of all good things and friends
of all the people…School children write at the end of their compositions, “Thanks to
Comrade Stalin for our happy childhood…… Also, resurrection of Peter The Great and
czarist heroes…in the teaching of history to school children…
3. Use everywhere and on all occasions of pictures of Marx, Lenin and Stalin…[so
prevalent that it is]…reminiscent of icon worship.
4. Use everywhere of quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin…to confirm the rightness
of Soviet policies…It is difficult to find a single important statement on any subject that
does not contain a reference…to the words or writing of… ‘Comrade Lenin.’
5. Copious use of medals and awards for outstanding work, cultural achievements,
military service…even for motherhood…
6. Regular staging of spectacular civic celebrations…patriotic holidays, Women’s Day,
Youth Day…and ‘volunteer action days’…[on which] rest time or days off are spent in
collective civil projects such as road or irrigation building projects, work on collective
farms (at harvest time), work in factories, with mass honor given to participants…A wide
band across the population undoubtedly feel real enthusiasm for ‘the building of

19

For example, Tadeusz Drzewiecki (interview by author, 1/23/2010), Zofia Rudnicka (interview by author,
6/6/2012), and Henryk Król (interview by author 3/20/2010) all recalled near ‘icon worship’ of Marx, Lenin, and
Stalin as children, the celebration of these leaders’ birthdays in primary school with singing, and the receiving of
official awards and recognition for studies in Marxist-Leninist inspired courses. As adults, they all recalled
continuous promises through State-controlled media of a brighter future summarized in ever-changing ‘slogan
campaigns,’ the heart of each built around a contrived version of Polish nationalism in conjunction with Soviet
ideology.
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socialism’ and take pride in it… Youth are recognized and integrated into…the world of
adult purposes as Soviet citizens… 20

The central planning and propagation of this ‘mass society with bold objectives for itself,’ as
Lynd described it in 1945, became known simply as Sovietization, and it was by this process that
Polish society was transformed into ‘The People’s Republic’ in the wake of World War II’s
devastation. Poland’s post-war economy and political system was reconstructed in the image of
the USSR, as were those of the other COMECON nations. Regardless of the ultimate negative
consequences of this process (that is, the economic catastrophe of the 1980s) and the objections
to it by nationalists in Poland and the other Eastern European nations, it is a credit to the Soviet
Union’s organizational skills that such a comprehensive and coherent system was capable of
being actuated and applied considering the wartime situation.
The Sovietization of Poland began in the months prior to the end of the war. According to
Timothy Garton Ash, as Red Army units liberated Poland from Nazi military occupation,
simultaneously, NKVD operatives (forerunners to the KGB) 'liquidated' all potential political
resistance in anticipation of a post-war incorporation of Poland into the Soviet sphere of
influence.21 The NKVD systematically arrested all pre-war Polish leaders - both Communist and
non-Communist leaders alike - effectively rendering post-war Poland a 'blank slate,' politically
speaking.
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Lynd, “Planned Social Solidarity In The Soviet Union,” 191 – 193. The six examples given are simplified and
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M. K. Dziewanowski gives a more detailed account of the events than does Ash. 22 In July,
1944 the Red Army liberated Lublin, the largest Polish city east of the Wisła and established
there the Polish Committee Of National Liberation. The 'Lublin Committee,' as the group
became known, evolved into a Soviet-controlled puppet government. It displaced all previous
Polish Communist Party members, most of whom were either exiled to Siberian labor camps or
executed by the NKVD. Upon the liberation of Warsaw on January 17, 1945, the Lublin
Committee declared itself the Provisional Polish Government, establishing an office in Warsaw,
which was at the time reduced to little more than piles of snow-covered rubble. Dziewanowski
notes the psychological importance of this move - establishing immediately a Soviet-linked
government in the ruins of the former Polish capital. Although both Washington and London still
recognized the Polish government in exile (in London), the Lublin Committee's actions in
Warsaw sent a plain message of its intentions.
Dziewanowski also mentions that on December 16, 1944, President Roosevelt had pleaded
with Stalin not to recognize the Lublin Committee as a provisional Polish government (though
obviously Stalin had called for its creation). Stalin skillfully replied to Roosevelt, praising the
Lublin Committee's early efforts at reconstruction and stabilization of liberated Polish cities.
This reply was intended to signal to Roosevelt that the Polish masses were grateful to the Lublin
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Dziewanowski, The Communist Party Of Poland, 208 – 230. Władyslaw Gomułka would become Stalin’s
‘blank slate’ for writing Polish Communism. Gomułka, always loyal to Moscow, won Stalin’s favor and reorganized
the bare remnants of the existing Polish Communist Party even before WWII was over (starting in January, 1945 as
the Red Army liberated eastern Polish territories). By 1947 he had consolidated all meaningful political power in
Poland into the Polska Partia Robotnicza (Polish Worker’s Party). Gomułka lost Stalin’s favor in the year before
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responsible for inciting the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Hungarians wrongly interpreted Gomułka’s reinstatement
and ‘bargaining’ with Khrushchev as a sign that the time was right for making drastic political changes. The
Hungarians quickly learned they were mistaken as Soviet tanks and soldiers squelched the uprising, killing some
2500 rebels.
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Committee for reestablishing basic infrastructure operations and general order after the Red
Army drove out the Nazis. 23
To Stalin's credit, the initial reestablishment of any semblance of normality in this period
was no small accomplishment, and in doing so, the USSR established precedents that would
define the politics and economy of Eastern Europe for the next forty years. Most of Poland's
cities lay in total ruin at the end of WWII. Baltic Coast cities such as Gdańsk and Silesian cities
such as Wrocław had been prime targets by virtue of their industrial capacity, but others, such as
Wieluń, in the Łódź voivodeship, had simply been 'terror targets' - bombed to oblivion by Nazi
Germany for no rational reason, just as, for example, had been Dresden by the Allies. Similarly,
Warsaw - or rather the bombed-out ruins of Warsaw - was under order to be "razed without a
trace" by German soldiers on the ground using dynamite and bulldozers.24 Davies describes
Warsaw as "...a city reduced to ashes...a moonscape...[in which] such totality can hardly be
matched by the horrors of Leningrad or Hiroshima...25
Much of the USSR was in similar ruin, but on a grander scale. William Taubman describes
the unimaginable economic setback and human losses that the Soviet Union encountered as a
result of WWII.26 He cites war casualties as an estimated 27 million lives; 1700 towns
destroyed, 70,000 villages destroyed, 32,000 factories destroyed, 52,000 miles of railroad
destroyed, and 100,000 collective farms laid waste. Taubman estimates that these figures
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translate into nearly a 70% loss of industrial and agricultural capacity for the USSR with nearly
40% of its national wealth gone.
In contrast, the United States' economic infrastructure emerged from WWII virtually
unharmed and, in fact, 'geared up,' due to massive war-time industrial investments. Due to the
ideological conflict that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early
post-war years (manifested primarily in economic, military, and scientific competition), the
USSR was forced again to ‘play catch-up' with Western capitalism – as Russia had done before
WWI and the USSR did afterward. This was accomplished not only by rapid and urgent
rebuilding of industrial and economic infrastructure within the Soviet Union proper but also by
developing and expropriating industrial and agricultural production in the Soviet sphere of
influence. 27
It was under the above mentioned historic and economic scenario that the post-WWII Polish
People’s Republic came to be. Thus, the USSR politically co-opted Poland (and much of Eastern
Europe) by establishing Communist Party provisional governments in the chaos and destruction
immediately following WWII, while simultaneously establishing 'clones' of its economic system
throughout – each clone headed by a ‘little Stalin.’ The prime agenda for Poland, as determined
by its new place in the Soviet system, would be maximum socialization of everyday life through
nationalization of all means of production, urgent industrialization on a grand scale, and
collectivization of agriculture.
The rationale of the Soviet system, in purely economic terms, is the supposed efficiency of a
centrally planned system. Edward Luttwak notes that the original set-up of a centrally planned
27
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economy in the Soviet Union was not necessarily a specification of Marxist-Leninist ideology
but was rather a copy of German and British war-time economies. 28 To early Soviet leaders
"...central planning seemed an innovation of epic proportions," as it was seen as the force behind
the tremendous industrial production of these two nations during the first world war. 29 The
concept seemed simple: the State would control all means of production, limit consumption, and
invest surplus to expand the economy and provide services to its citizens. The State would
operate the national economy like a business - determining production priorities, monitoring
performance, investing for future growth, and providing for employees (in this scenario all
citizens were the 'employees' of the State).
The basic principle of a Sovietized economy is the substitution of centralized, rational planning
by a group of experts for the otherwise free-market allocation of prices and wages. 30 In a freemarket system, all commodities and services are allocated on the market by a price system driven
by supply and demand (theoretically assumed as a freely operating mechanism; in reality, in
capitalist economies, much manipulation occurs - tariffs, subsidies, wage/price freezes, interest
rate adjustments, special interest influence, labor disputes, market speculation, etc., etc.). It is
further assumed that a market equilibrium for all commodities will be the end result of free
competition, considering labor as a commodity also; that is, labor as expressed quantitativly as
wages (again, obviously, total market freedom does not exist in any economy). Prices and wages
in a Sovietized system were not based on market principles – or the theory of market principles
as in capitalist economies - but were arbitrarily set by planners.
28
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In purely ideological terms, the elimination of the market mechanisms - as per Marxist
doctrine - was intended to relieve the working class, the proletariat, from the exploitation of the
bourgeois, who extracted surplus value from labor. Marx's classic 'value theory of labor'
(simplified) states that the value (as opposed to a price) of any commodity is equal to the amount
of labor time necessary to the commodity's production. 31
It was believed that rational, scientifically based management techniques could maximize the
use of labor, resources, and productive capacity far better than could the chaotic and haphazard
free-market system. This idea is taken to various degrees, as described by economist Raphael
Shen, ranging from the moderately socialistic economies of Germany and France, for example,
to the social democracies of Scandinavian countries, to the total 'command economies' of the
former USSR and its satellite nations. 32 To a great degree, it was the 'ideological purity' and
inflexibility of the Soviet model that eventually brought about its demise. 33
In the decade following the end of WWII the Polish economy took on a "...full-blooded
Stalinist form...a politbureaucratic dictatorship...with all economic decision making tightly
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controlled by the ‘nomenklatura’ (economic managers/Communist Party members.)” 34 The
nomenklatura did not individually own any of the means of production but collectively
controlled them. The system was hierarchical with each level of local management responsible
to a higher level, eventually reaching a Central Planning Commission in Warsaw. Beyond this
level, all economic activity - planning of all industrial production, agricultural production, trade,
investment, public services, etc., - was ultimately coordinated in Moscow under the rubric of
'Five-Year Plans' (known in Polish as piąticetki).35
According to Mansfield, most nations in the Soviet Bloc made substantial and rapid economic
growth through the 1950s and well into the 1960s, with the gross national product of the USSR
growing at about 7% per year.36 However, this growth rate was achieved through much sacrifice
on the part of the citizens. Communist Bloc planners held down per capita consumption to 1920s
levels and reinvested nearly 30% of gross national product into industrial capacity. Consumer
goods were given low priority in order to build a 'military-industrial complex' to rival that of the
West. Given the starting-point of this process (with the destruction of some 40% of the
productive capacity of the USSR in WWII, as mentioned earlier) this was an incredible
accomplishment on the part of the people and leaders of the Soviet Bloc nations. Communism
did work quite well as an ‘emergency measure’ for the USSR in its goal to catch up with
Western Europe, to defeat Nazi Germany, to rebuilding after the devastation of the war, and then
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Ash, The Polish Revolution, 9.
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Steven Rosefielde, The Russian Economy From Lenin To Putin (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing,
2007), 59.
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Mansfield, Principles Of Microeconomics, 404 - 405.
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- later, during the Cold war – to catch up with the US. But many problems are apt to arise when
an ‘emergency measure’ must, by necessity, be endured for decades. 37

37

Suny, The Soviet Experience, 422. Suny makes the point that many Soviet foreign policy specialists and
economists were convinced of the necessity to break from the Stalinist-era mentality of isolation and political
repression long before the days of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost. However, they were trumped by
the defense community who held steadfast to the notion that Eastern Europe must remain, at all costs, under Soviet
hegemony as a security buffer against the West. Releasing Eastern Europe from Communism, actively building
positive economic relations with the West, and throwing off the USSR’s traditional ‘cloak of secrecy’ that
persisted since Stalin’s era – in short, engaging the Soviet Union with the modern world – flew in the face of
hardliners who were willing to endure massive economic dysfunction rather than violate ‘ideological orthodoxy.’
By holding on so tightly to an Eastern Europe that had clamored for liberation for decades the USSR inadvertently
drove the arms race which so greatly contributed to its economic problems. Suny summarizes, “The USSR was
faced with a profound ‘security dilemma.’ The policies and programs it adopted to increase its security were
perceived as threats by the United States, and the rest of the world, which responded to them by building up military
might, thereby making the Soviet Union more vulnerable.” Many interviewees in this thesis project – direct, highlevel participants in the Solidarity Movement – voiced the opinion that Gorbachev covertly welcomed the Solidarity
Movement as the necessary ‘historical moment’ in reforming the USSR. Why else, interviewees often commented,
were Soviet troops not called to suppress Solidarność as had happened in every other liberation movement since
1956 – in Berlin, Poznen, Budapest, Prague, Tallinn, Vilnius, Riga, and countless small uprisings? Martial law under
General Jaruzelski was a serious affair, still, it was nothing in comparison, for example, with the 2500 + civilians
killed by Soviet soldiers in the Budapest uprising of 1956. Jerzy Borowczak, director of Fundacja Centrum
Solidarnośći, commented, “It would not have even been necessary to call in Soviet troops. They were already
stationed all over Poland at various military bases. One phone call from Moscow could have activated them and the
Solidarity Movement would have gone down in history same as the Hungarian Revolution” (interview by author,
December 13, 2010).
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3. Stray Dogs Write Bibuła
_______________________________________
Polish Dissent And The Stalinist Legacy

Synopsis
This chapter begins the explanation of how the ‘Soviet legacy,’ more accurately, the Stalinist
legacy, was transferred to Poland, and how this legacy became expressed in terms of economic
dysfunction and various forms of dissident activities. Samizdat publishing, protests, riots, strikes,
and ultimately the creation of Solidarność - all such forms of civil disobedience in the People’s
Republic Of Poland - stemmed mainly from public dissatisfaction with the paranoia of policestate authoritarianism, and the economic dysfunction that, in part, was caused by the
antidemocratic tendencies of the system. The Communist Party Of The Soviet Union, in
conjunction with the Red Army, established political dominance in Poland in the final months of
WWII. The Polish Worker’s Party, Polskiej Robotnicza Patria, established in 1948, was the
direct predecessor of this interim Soviet government. With the PRP came full Sovietization of
Poland, in effect making it a ‘clone’ of the USSR, politically, economically – and it was hoped –
socially and culturally. To help operationalize this agenda, Beszpieka agents were deployed
across Poland. The beszpieka were trained by the KGB to use ‘approved practices’ of Soviet
policing, including interrogations, beatings, detention, and torture. A network of some 75,000
‘secret informants’ loyal to the PRP was established by the beszpieka with operatives
strategically placed in all major Polish industries. At the same time, all Polish industry and
enterprises came under direct control and management by the nomenklatura, these being
essentially ‘Party bosses.’ This chapter explains how the combination of beszpieka-driven
paranoia and nomeklatura incompetence and corruption helped establish, in the early postwar
decades, a culture of economic dysfunction that was perpetuated until its ultimate dismantling in
the 1989 transition. Locked in this ‘Soviet Legacy,’ most Eastern Bloc enterprises failed to
modernize as did their Western counterparts – this refers not only to material-technical
modernization, but also in terms of the increasing complexity of financing, management,
operations, marketing, logistics, and all other aspects of modern Western commercialism. This
situation was exacerbated by strict Party-enforced adherence to ‘ideological orthodoxy’ in all

economic sectors. Outbreaks of civil disorder fluctuated with publicaly perceived periods of
ideological relaxation in conjunction with periods of major economic hardship. Both dissident
activism and, by necessity, informal or alternative economic activities, arose from the
dysfunctions in the formal organizations of politics and economics.

Stray Dogs Write Bibuła
Snow was piling up fast and the temperature was minus 25º F. At sunset, which came at
3:00PM, the sky was deep purple with silver stars that looked like crosses. Sheets of thick grey
ice floated slowly down the Wisła to the Baltic Sea. You feared cold like this because you
realized it could kill you. Stray dogs – and Mrs. Danka had once been a stray dog – sometimes
froze to death on nights like this. ‘Stray dogs’ (bezpański pies) were political dissidents living on
the margins of Polish society. They were toxic or plagued or rabid; you could not help them
anymore, you must avoid them. They lived in abandoned buildings and had no possessions.

Iconic stationary cranes of Stocznia Gdańska (Gdańsk Shipyard) on the delta of the Wisła as it empties into
the Baltic Sea. Legend has it that an 8th Century Polish princess - Vanda, co nie chciała Niemca- (Vanda who
rejected the German) drowned herself here rather than marry a pagan German. The story is often associated
with Chrzest Polski (The Baptism Of Poland) on Holy Saturday of April 14, 966, day of the personal baptism
of King Mieszko, founder of the Polish State.
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That was 30 years ago and Mrs. Danka had a home now – well, at least a loft apartment, and
it was warm. Cactuses grew in clay pots on the cast iron radiator beneath a lead-glass window
that looked out on the Baltic. Jasmine tea with orange slices accompanied our yellow cake,
spiraled with black poppy seeds. Not too bad fare for a former stray dog. Mrs. Danka talked
about the past and lit a little candle under the kettle to kept the tea hot.
“I was hiding in those days. I was on a list of people the police were looking for. If they found
me I would go to jail or maybe ‘just disappear.’ That happened, you know – a knock on your
door in the middle of the night and you were never seen again.”
“Work was compulsory in those times. The very worst person in a Communist country was the
person without a job. Well, I was without a job - because if I worked a real job I would be found,
and caught, and arrested. I would go to jail for my printing. My ‘job’ was printing truth in a
country where truth was not allowed.”

Unusual ‘shrine’ featuring Our Lady of Częstochowa and Our Lady Of Fatima surrounded by
samizdat bulletins from Solidarność chapters in Lower Silesia. The opened scrapbook displays
pictures of Lech Wałęsa and General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Eclectic implications abound – Jaruzelski
was simultaneously a Polish Nationalist, practicing Catholic, and loyal servant to Moscow. He claims
to have saved Poland from Soviet invasion by imposing Martial Law, December 13, 1981. He
advocated strong Polish identity and fraternal proletarian solidarity with the USSR. Lech Wałęsa 58
advocated a Poland free from all ties to the USSR.

“During martial law it got so bad that I nearly starved – everyone was afraid and I cannot
blame them. I got sick – I thought I would die – I had no one left to turn to. Finally, I ended up
hiding in an abandoned warehouse – no heat, no electricity, no water. Only my brother knew
where I was and he brought to me enough food to keep me alive. Those were the darkest days of
my life. Back then, and for many years after, if I even heard someone talk about their home I
would burst into tears. I was worse than homeless – I was a stray dog that could never have a
home again – that’s what I believed. But somehow I survived those days and by 1985 people like
me could show their face again. Still, it was difficult because no one would hire me. Finally,
Solidarność was able to get me a job in an office… I still have nightmares about being a ‘stray
dog.”
___________________________________

‘Mrs. Danka’ had been an underground publisher - a producer of dissident political literature
condemning the Communist Party and calling on Poles to unite in peaceful Solidarity to bring
about a social evolution – ewolucja nie rewolucja (evolution not revolution). Traditionally called
‘samizdat’ (самиздат) in Russian, underground journalism became known as ‘bibuła’ (literally,
tissue paper) in colloquial Polish. The name comes from the fact that shortages of nearly every
consumer item in the last two decades of the Polish People’s Republic - paper and ink included forced underground publishers to use any kind of paper they could get their hands on for print
stock. Mrs. Danka remembered printing philosophically elaborate Marxist-inspired critiques of
Marxist-Leninism on meat wrapping paper with homemade ink pigmented with goryczki fioletu
(‘gentian of violet’ – an inexpensive, over the counter antiseptic; she went from store to store
buying one bottle at a time as to not seem suspicious).
Bibuła pamphlets and newspapers kept the Solidarity Movement alive during its outlawed
years and transmitted its ideology to ‘the masses.’ An official conviction for bibuła production or
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distribution meant prison time or deportation; ‘off the record’ arrests meant the perpetrator
simply ‘disappeared’ – ‘shot and buried in the night like a stray dog,’ as another samizdat
publisher commented during an interview. Underground journalists and individuals marginalized
by lesser varieties of political activism - strike organizers, protest leaders, and even ‘bill
stickers’ (messengers who posted signs) - endured greater financial hardships than average
citizens as they were excluded from the formal economy. Likewise, as in Mrs. Danka’s case,
participation in even the shadow economy would give away their whereabouts. Thus, the subculture of ‘stray dogs’ and later, ‘former stray dogs,’ were among the most disadvantaged of all
Polish citizens.
Conditions for Polish ‘stray dogs’ in the 1970s and early 1980s - the time in which Mrs.
Danka experienced life on the streets - was cruel and precarious to say the least. As Solidarność
grew in strength and numbers (created in 1980, forbidden in 1981, reborn in 1985), some ‘stray
dogs’ were taken into ‘shelters’ - no-kill shelters at that! Funded by weekly paycheck
deductions and increasingly large donations from Western trade unions, Solidarność eventually
came to the rescue of thousands of political dissidents, providing not only food and shelter but
legal services as well. 1
Yet, decades earlier, the conditions which necessitated the entire Solidarity Movement and
all it entailed were set in place. Before returning to the stories of interviewees like ‘Mrs. Danka’
1

Arch Puddington, “Solidarity Forever,” in Lane Kirkland: Champion Of American Labor (Hoboken, N.J.:
John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 163 – 190. America’s AFL-CIO and the French equivalent, CGT (Confédération
Générale du Travail – The General Confederation of Labor) were the main Western financial sponsors of
Solidarność. LO, The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige) was the main conduit
for delivering Western aid to Poland, smuggling millions of dollars worth of printing equipment, radio
communications equipment, food and clothing through the port of Gdańsk. American and French union members
contributed generously to this cause, spurred on by AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland. Kirkland’s Czech-born wife,
Irena, and President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski were instrumental in
persuading the AFL-CIO to back Solidarność. Union members had 1% of their weekly earnings deducted from
paychecks to support the movement. Legal services were provided free of charge by lawyers who created the KOR
(Komitet Obrony Robotnikow), the worker’s defense committee.
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and their daily lives in Gdańsk and Wałbrzych, it is necessary to explain how brutal elimination
of an earlier generation of dissidents (1945 – 1965) simultaneously contributed to stagnation of
the Polish economy and fueled the social unrest that eventually exploded on the Baltic Coast in
December, 1970. The macro-level conditions that precipitated political dissent and social
movement formation in the 1980s had roots in practices established shortly after WWII. The
resulting economic dysfunction is what created ‘stray dogs’ and every other kind of dissident,
from priests, to labor union supporters, to students and housewives. As we shall see, ironically,
the highest-ranking Communist Party leader of the era, Nikita Khrushchev, ‘saw the writing on
the wall’ and predicted the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Bloc economic system based on his
observations of the 1970 Baltic Coast strikes. Unfortunately, Premier Khrushchev, who did
much to de-Stalinize the USSR and its Eastern satellites, could not entirely free the region’s
economic system from its dysfunctional ‘Soviet Legacy.’ 2
According to Andrzej Paczkowski, the Soviet Union conducted in Eastern Europe a highly
organized “…conquest of the State through mass terror” from the end of WWII throughout the
1950s.3 In effect, Polish society and the Polish economy were Sovietized by force during this
period. The end result, in strictly economic terms, was establishment of a ‘Communist-crony

2

Suny, The Soviet Experience, 451. Suny uses this term, ‘Soviet Legacy,’ to describe the accumulating economic
dysfunctions that persisted until the Soviet Bloc dissolved. A hyper-centralized command economy based on crude
planning set forth in five year increments worked well in transforming Russia’s primitive, agriculturally based
system into a modern industrial state. Likewise, the same plan worked well in rebuilding Eastern Europe after
WWII. However, the method and its practice remained static long after wartime emergencies had ceased. Rapidly
growing complexity in all aspects of the economy – from financing to production to marketing - characterized
Western nations after WWII, whereas Soviet Bloc economies actually became more inflexible and less responsive to
change. This ‘Soviet Legacy,’ in part due to Stalin’s iron-fisted control and later to Brezhnev ‘being asleep at the
wheel,’ was not breached until near complete failure occurred. Poland’s revolution was almost entirely about
throwing off this ‘Soviet Legacy,’ and in doing so a ‘chain reaction’ occurred that eventually resulted in
‘Perestroika from below’ in the USSR.
3

Andrzej Paczkowski, “Poland, The Enemy Nation,” in Stephane Courtois, Nicholas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne,
and Jean-Louis Margolin, The Blackbook Of Communism: Crimes, Terror, and Repression (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 363 – 393.
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bureaucracy’ heading all means of industrial production and a large segment of agricultural
production.4 Per Paczkowski’s account, corroborated by first-hand interview data, this meant in
everyday terms that virtually all of Poland’s economic leaders – from plant managers, to
collective farm directors, to shop foremen on the factory floor, to spółdzielnia organizers (heads
of local workers’ collectives) – obtained their positions by virtue of Party loyalty, not by virtue
of their education, experience, or job performance. Once established, this system was
generationally perpetuated until the 1989 transition.5 As one interviewee from Wałbrzych
remarked, “…it was like a ‘dynasty of idiots.’ Fathers and sons ran our factories and mines. They
had no education, just Party connections. They could care less if the operation was profitable, or
efficient, or even safe - their main goal was making themselves rich. They did this by every
corrupt idea you could imagine.”6
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Red Army enforced the dominance of the
Communist Party Of The Soviet Union in Poland in the months preceding the end of WWII.
Once established, the General Party created a specific Polish branch in 1948, the PRP, Polish
Worker’s Party, Polskiej Robotnicza Patria, first headed by Władyslaw Gomulka. The PRP
faced strong resistance from PSL, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - the Polish Peasant Party and

4

Much of Polish agriculture was never collectivized. Chapter 6, Daily Life In Wałbrzych, explains why, and the
ramifications thereof.
5

In many cases it continued after the transition as former Party members took the lead in obtaining private
property from the State. As one interviewee commented, “It was the Party men who became responsible for
privatization. Who do you think got the best deals in the new economy? Of, course – the Party men!”
6

Several of these ‘corrupt ideas’ are discussed in chapter 6, Daily Life in Wałbrzych. They often were quite
‘profitable’ – to the detriment of the industrial operations they exploited. No ‘official’ conception of the capitalist
notion of profit existed in the socialist system, as all production was supposedly done ‘at cost’ with commodities
sold ‘at cost.’ However, Mansfield (in Principles of Microeconomics,402, previously cited) states that in Socialist
economics a ‘turnover tax’ was added as the differential between the price of production and the price paid by
consumers; this was the State’s ‘profit.’ Personal ‘profits’ made by corrupt managers took many forms, ranging
from black market sales of finished items to direct theft of raw materials for ‘personal projects’ – such as building
complete homes from stolen materials.
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the WIN, Wolność i Niezanislość, Liberty and Independence Party, both of which were
outlawed by the Communists. In order to squelch political resistance from these democratic
factions the PRP organized the Polish Security Service and the Ministry of Public Security. In
effect, these two security services waged war against all resistance to the Communist Party in
Poland. They became known colloquially as bezpieka (simply, ‘the guards’ or ‘the security
men’) and conducted what can be considered a terror campaign aimed at total elimination of all
political resistance to the PRP.7
According to Andrzej Paczkowski, the beszpieka consisted of some 20,000 political operatives
backed by 30,000 armed security officers. From 1948 until the ‘Khrushchev Thaw’ (after
Stalin’s death in 1953) the beszpieka deported around 140,000 Polish citizens, put 60,000 in
prison, and executed 8700.8 The beszpieka were trained by KGB agents and used ‘approved
practices’ of Soviet policing, including interrogations, beatings, detention, and torture. A
network of some 75,000 ‘secret informants’ loyal to the PRP was established by the beszpieka
with operatives strategically placed in all major Polish industries. These informants were
instructed to maintain close supervision over the operations of their specific manufacturing plant,
chemical factory, mine, collective farm, etc., keeping a watchful eye for sabotage, intentional
slow-down of operations, stealing, or vandalism. In short, the informants became identifiers of
scapegoats through which plant managers might justify failure to meet planned production
quotas. As mentioned earlier, virtually all the managers of all the ‘means of production’ in the

7

Tadeusz Drzewiecki, non-published manuscript on contemporary Polish history. This essay by the 82 year old
retired school teacher, businessman, and translator discusses, among other things, the terror campaign of the
bezpieka. The content of Mr. Drzewiecki’s essay is corroborated by similar data in Andrzej Paczkowski’s chapter,
“Poland, The Enemy Nation,” in The Blackbook Of Communism, ed. Stephane Courtois, et al., 1999.
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Soviet Bloc were loyal Party members, many of whom had little or no formal training in
business management.9
Thus, early on (1948 – 1953), during the initial set-up of Poland’s new, post-war Communist
economy, this combination of inept managers justified by beszpieka-placed ‘secret informants,’
set in motion a ‘bureaucracy of industrial dysfunction’ (or ‘dynasty of idiots,’ as Wałbrzych
locals like to call it), in which inefficiency, low quality, high production costs, poor supply
chains, lack of planning, and duplication of administrative job titles, became part and parcel of
normal operating procedures. Therefore, the later (1970s – 1980s) epic dysfunction of the Polish
economy and the resulting material shortages of nearly all consumer goods, food, and services –
which ultimately fueled the political dissent and created real and actual need for emergence of
alternative economic strategies – may be traced, in part, to the initial PRP/beszpieka fiasco that
ousted experienced Polish industrial managers and replaced them with nomenklatura
bureaucrats.10
Paczkowski goes on to discuss the creation of formal bureaucratic agencies, beyond the
beszpieka-placed informants, charged with cracking down on ‘industrial subversion’ and the
‘shadow economy’ which quickly emerged as a response to very early stages of economic
dysfunction. As early as 1949, a ‘Special Commission For The Fight Against Economic Abuses’

9

Andrzej Falkowski, interview by author, 3/16/2010. Those who did take business management classes in
Soviet Bloc nations found that they were geared to the collective and focused on pre-set, unchangeable rules. Mr.
Falkowski recalled, “We had classes in ‘State Economy.’ This was Marxist-Leninist style of business management.
It was about the role of the State in economics and how we as managers had responsibility first to State. If anyone
made a comment or asked a question that contradicted with ‘approved message’ of teacher, he was dismissed as
being stupid! Some students had been to West Germany and asked why their economy looked so much brighter.
Answer of teacher: It’s just a trick made by Western capitalists! It is not real – you were fooled by it! You must
really be stupid!”
10

Many other factors that contributed to Polish economic dysfunction are discussed as this thesis proceeds; the
concluding chapter summarizes these.

64

and the ‘Commission For Urban Economic Crimes’ were established by the PRP. 11 These
agencies enforced the ‘ideological purity’ of Polish Socialism, arresting any citizen involved in
any form of private enterprise, black market trading, or unlawful subsistence production. Tens of
thousands of ‘economic criminals’ were sent to forced labor camps in the early 1950s, some for
‘crimes’ as harmless as selling home-grown tomatoes. Additionally, in the same time period,
full-time ‘Protection Squads’ were organized in factories to guard and inform, thus making
formal and official the prior ‘secret informant’ scheme of the beszpieka.
In sum, the PRP was institutionalizing a system that set state-sanctioned managers against
workers in a so-called ‘worker’s paradise state.’ Their actions turned citizen against citizen,
fueled fear, suspicion, and paranoia, added unnecessary costs to production (paid ‘Protection
Squad’ employees produced nothing – they just informed), and made criminal any attempt to
produce food or provide services through all but state-sanctioned means. Later generations of
political dissidents and ‘economic criminals’ (participants in the alternative economy) took
action because of the economic dysfunction that became ‘built-in’ to the Polish economy – a
clone of the Soviet economy. Ideological rigidity fully co-opted ‘proletarian common sense’
and in the process the resulting frustration and bitterness between worker and Party member
made a mockery of the idea of a classless society, a worker’s utopia in which all could reach his
or her fullest potential as a human being. 12 Instead, early in the history of Poland’s Sovietization,
the seeds were sown for rebellion and economic catastrophe.
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Paczkowski in Courtois, et al., Blackbook of Communism, 381 – 382.
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Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 68. Suny calls this type of system an ideocracy, “…a state ruled by an
ideology.” Ideological purity was so paramount in Soviet Bloc domestic policy that a position was created with the
Orwellian title, ‘Supreme Guardian Of Ideological Orthodoxy.’ All proposed economic planning by COMECON
nations (USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia) had to
meet standards of ideological purity per the ‘Supreme Guardian’s’ interpretation of Marxist-Leninism. Thus,
common sense often took a backseat to ‘religiously’ held notions of ‘ideological orthodoxy.’
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‘Boris,’ an interviewee from the Wałbrzych area, told a story that aptly illustrated the
enormous ramifications of industrial mismanagement. ‘Boris’ had retired from a steel mill and
described the monumental inefficiency that was common in Soviet Bloc manufacturing:

… it was common in the mill where I worked that steel was made so poor in quality that
it was just re-melted like scrap. The finished product - plates and rolls of new steel - was
melted like scrap to try again to make a product that could be sold! That is an incredible
amount of money, labor, energy and time put into a worthless product that must be
melted and made again! 13
Poland had been re-industrialized after WWII by Soviet investment and in Soviet scale and
style - that is, gigantic interconnected industrial operations that dominated regional economies.
The mill where ‘Boris’ had worked employed 30,000 people and was tied into a supply chain of
other regional ‘mega-factories.’ This pattern was intended to maximize production through an
economy of scale and by virtue of ‘planned proximity.’ (For example, strategically locating coal
mine, coke plant, and steel mill side by side in order to reduce material handling costs to
practically zero; this does not always happen naturally in a ‘non-planned’ Capitalist economy.)
Unfortunately, this system also afforded itself to exponential dysfunction, as in Boris’s
description of re-melting newly made steel. With no real free-market competition, Polish plant
managers answered solely to the bureaucratic chain that supervised the particular five-year plan
of their economic segment. There was little incentive to increase efficiency or to improve
product quality as the bureaucracy of plant managers – like the plants they managed – were
linked in a gigantic, interconnected, cooperative system. All managers ‘played the game’ and
‘covered for each other,’ keeping expectations low and protecting their jobs by ‘not rocking the

13

‘Boris,’ interview by author, 6/20/2011.
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boat.’ 14 Likewise, there was little that could be done to improve performance even if a plant
manager wanted to do so (given he actually had a business education and was capable of
applying it). According to Boris, the main reason for this was a lack of capital for improvements
and modernization; later on, as the system fell more and more into disarray, basic maintenance
and repairs were neglected, further crippling industrial output.
Boris’s contentions are corroborated by a plethora of secondary data. For example, a 1989
New York Times article titled "Can Poland's Steel Dinosaur Evolve?" describes the condition of
the Lenin Steelworks at Nowa Huta:15 "We need to modernize desperately," a union spokesman
says, "We need $450 million to modernize, and we need foreign investment if we're going to
obtain that type of money..." The article describes the plant, built in 1949, as "...a fossilized hulk
of a burdensome Communist economy," where some 32,000 workers struggle to produce the
same quantity of steel as would 7000 workers in a modernized, Western-designed plant.16
However, the Lenin Works was still twice as productive as the Soviet plant at Magnitogorsk.
Another 1989 New York Times article claims the Magnitogorsk steelworks required a staggering
60,000 workers to produce the same quantity of steel as would a modernized plant with 7,000
workers.17

14

Nearly all interviewees from both Gdańsk and Wałbrzych who had worked in heavy industry described
management in this way – as an ‘old boys’ network’ of the nomenklatura covering for each other.
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Allison Stenning, Living In The Spaces of Post-Socialism: The Case Of Nowa Huta, Poland.
http://www.nowahuta.info/html (retrieved 9/8/2012). Per Stenning, the Lenin Works at Nowa Huta apparently
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Nowa Huta’s production dilemma was the rule rather than the exception across the Soviet
Bloc.18 Stephen Kotkin explains that the Russian and Eastern European ‘mania for heavy
industry’ was generated on the ideological predication of the ‘real and actual’ building of
Socialism per the building of industrial works and industrial cities on a monumental scale.19 The
industrial proletariat class - the supposed backbone of the Marxist-Leninist system - would
naturally expand in proportion to the industrial base of a given society. The logic was simple:
build more factories and you get more industrial proletariat; more industrial proletariat will
ensure the success of communism. The success of communism in the Cold War era antagonized
capitalist states and a military-industrial complex emerged (in both camps), thus exacerbating
need for further expansion of heavy industry for defense.
In this regard the Soviet Bloc economic system was ideologically driven to the ultimate
extreme. According to Kotkin, this philosophy resulted in creation of the world’s largest
concentration of heavy industry, literally dwarfing all other nations’ industrial capacity. By the
mid-1980s fully 70% of the Soviet Bloc economy consisted of heavy industry and mining. 20
Conversely, all other sectors of the economy – production of consumer goods, agriculture, food
processing, and all consumer services – were so condensed or abbreviated that they accounted
only for the remaining 30%. No other region in the world ever had such a high percentage of its
economy based on traditional heavy industry, especially not this late in the historical process of
global industrialization when ‘third or fourth wave’ industrial enterprises (i.e., advanced
18

However, production and wages were not related in the communist system in the same way they were in the
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chemical manufacturing, engineered materials, consumer electronics, computers, etc.) were
taking the lead in most developed economies. 21
As in the United States, much of the heavy industrial infrastructure of the Soviet Bloc was
built during or in the decade following WWII. Not necessarily ‘state of the art’ at the time of
their original construction,22 by the early 1980s America’s post-war generation of ageing
factories was rapidly being scrapped as a wave of deindustrialization created America’s ‘Rust
Belt.’ 23 Much of the ageing industrial infrastructure from the WWII era had simply exceeded
its useful lifespan. Rather than continue to maintain and repair antiquated factories with low
profit margins, many US corporations chose to shut down operations and reinvest in newer, more
profitable, ventures. In many cases, these new ventures were not industrial plants. Allied
Chemical Corporation, for example, closed nearly all of its US-based chemical plants during the
1980s, changed its name to Allied Signal, and diversified its operations to include banking,
insurance, medical technology, and materials engineering. 24
However, disinvestment, reinvestment, and diversification did not occur across the Soviet
Bloc. Instead, locked in ideological rigidity, lacking market-based reinvestment strategies,
21

CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2012.html For
comparison, the 2012 US GDP per sector is as follows: Agriculture, 1.2%; Industry, 19.2%; Services, 79.6%. Russia
and Poland still have disproportionately high industrial sectors with 2012 figures as follows: Russia – Ag., 4.5%;
Ind., 37.9%; Ser., 58%, and Poland: Ag., 3.6%; Ind., 33.3%; Ser., 63%. US industrial output reached a plateau
between 1957 and 1962, at 26.9% GDP, and has declined ever since, per figures given by the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2005/12December/1205_GDP-NAICS.pdf .
22

Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 16 – 17. Kotkin explains that many US and Soviet plants built during or
immediately after WWII were based on 1930s designs. He adds that all WWII era industries were ‘energy gluttons’
as fuel was cheap and plentiful.
23

Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization Of America (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
Bluestone and Harrison report that US disinvestment in heavy industry started as early as 1969. By September 30,
1977, ‘Black Friday,’ Americans ‘saw the writing on the wall’ as 10,000 steelworkers were laid off from the
Bethlehem Pennsylvania Works.
24

Information from personal experience; the author of this paper is a former employee of Allied Chemical
Corporation.
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lacking capital in general, and oblivious to the economic modernization of the West, 1930s-style
industrial operations lumbered on across Poland and Russia through the 20 th Century until the
reality of the 1989 – 1991 transition forced their closure. The Soviet Bloc industrial strategy, like
its ideological directive, was very simple - expand existing production – and this single-minded
goal was pursued for the life of the system. Missing in this formula were all the basic
components of industrial modernization: reduction of labor and energy input, improved supply
chain efficiency, attention to quality control, diversification of product lines per consumer
demand, increasing financial sophistication in regard to capital accumulation for operations and
infrastructure improvements, and most importantly, technological innovation.
Basically a continuation of WWII-era emergency measures, the system relegated production
of consumer goods to the lowest priority. Thus, a massive overproduction of steel accompanied
everyday shortages of socks and shoes; ocean-going cargo ships were produced by the millions
while the workers who made the ships had their names on ten-year waiting lists to purchase a
‘Fiat Bambino.’ Chemical plants churned out nitrate fertilizer filling five-mile-long strings of
railroad tank cars while housewives stood in line five hours to buy a loaf of bread. 25 The vast
majority of this heavy industrial production was geared to export. For example, interviewees at
Stocznia Gdańska explained with great frustration how the ships they built were ‘traded’ to the
USSR for oil and natural gas and to pay back Polish national debt. The USSR sold the ships
world-wide but the Polish shipbuilders never saw an improvement in their quality of life. 26
Likewise, Polish agricultural production was exported to the USSR while store shelves went
25

All of these ‘colorful scenarios’ were described to the author by various interviewees during the process of
collecting data for this thesis. One interviewee commented that only Poles would buy a ‘Fiat Bambino’ as the
quality of the little car was so poor; Poles bought them as they were the only car manufactured in Poland and many
people actually waited 10 or more years to purchase one. A self-deprecating joke ran as follows: – “Polish ham was
wanted everywhere but only a fool or a Pole would buy a Bambino.”
26

This will be elaborated on in detail in the next chapter.
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empty in Gdańsk, Wałbrzych and across the nation. An interview excerpt aptly demonstrates the
frustration and anger endured by Poles who labored long hours in factories but were unable to
purchase basic necessities in local stores. Dr. Barbara Wejnert, remembering daily life in Gdańsk
during the 1980s, commented as follows:
The people were starving in the cities. There was nothing on the shelves (in grocery
stores) but tea and macaroni - that's all! Everything was gone - empty shelves!...even
shoes, clothes, too - nothing for us!
Interviewer asks Dr. Wejnert if she thought that all the food and consumer goods were
being expropriated by the Soviet Union:
I don't think - I know! I know it was! In those days was discovered the trains full of Polish
goods - meat, butter, potatoes, grain - going east, to Russia. It was put into the trains, on
trains was put the label, ‘paint!’
Interviewer asks, ‘Paint?’ What do you mean?
Like paint for houses - house paint. They wanted people to think the train had in it paint.
But some railroad workers stopped the train - for some reason - and one of the cars was
opened up, and they realized it was full of food! It was heading to Moscow while we
starved in Gdańsk. That lead to riots and strikes when the people started to know about
this. 27
With all private enterprise banned, again, strictly on an ideological basis, no legal alternatives
to the mismanaged State economic apparatus existed; thus, out of necessity, alternative economic
strategies and a shadow economy emerged. Throughout the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, Poles were
assured that their economy would soon be improving – but year after year their quality of life
declined. “With each new economic plan (five year plan) we got more promises and new
slogans,” an interviewee commented. “We got: ‘Build A New Poland,’ and ‘Prosperity Through

27

Dr. Barbara Wejnert, interview by author, 1/23/2010.
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Planning’ - slogans, yes, plenty! Results, none. We got lower pay, longer (working) hours, and
higher prices – that’s all we got regardless of new slogans.” 28
Thus, per the above discussion, we see outlined the general progression of Poland’s post
WWII economy: Soviet annexation, Communist Party take-over of industry and agriculture,
beszpieka terror, expropriation of production by the USSR, failure to modernize the economy,
failure to satisfy basic consumer demands - and from these failures, growing social unrest. We
see also how Poland’s economy came to be dominated by outdated heavy industry managed by a
‘dynasty of idiots.’ Stephen Kotkin lyrically sums up the same scenario with a quote from the
Moldavian writer, Ion Druţă:

Then Leonid Ilich Brezhnev appeared…We lived fabulously, quietly stealing, quietly
drinking. [A voice interjects: not quietly.] So be it.29

As COMECON figuratively burned, Brezhnev era bureaucrats ‘fiddled’ and drank, Nero-like in
their unconcern, quietly waiting for the inevitable collapse. Yet, one of their own, Nikita
Khrushchev, had accurately and perceptively assessed the problem shortly after the 1970 Baltic
Coast riots; and, in a ‘round-about way,’ Khrushchev was partially responsible for the
dilemma.30
Khrushchev’s famous de-Stalinization of the USSR and its satellites had brought an end to
the worst abuses and human rights violations. Far from realizing the basic civil rights we take for
28

‘Leszek,’ interview by author, 6/26/2012.

29

Ion Druţă in Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 10.

30

Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 444. Khrushchev commented on the 1970 Baltic Coast riots in his memoirs just
two years before his death. He was ‘retired’ from office in 1964 by the Presidium headed by Brezhnev in a near
coup. While Khrushchev was on vacation at the Black Sea, Brezhnev arranged for the ‘transition,’ himself replacing
Khrushchev as First Secretary.
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granted in modern Western democracies, the end of Stalin’s most overt terror tactics and the end
of the Polish beszpieka allowed for a period of relaxation – relatively speaking. Purges and show
trials ended and exile to Siberian work camps for minor ‘economic crimes’ was no longer likely.
Daily life in Władysław Gomułka’s Poland had progressed beyond beszpieka terror and ‘witch
hunts’ for industrial saboteurs, yet it was plagued by shortages of food and consumer goods, near
total absence of consumer services (if you did manage to buy a Fiat Bambino no one was
available to service or repair it), ten-year waiting lists for telephone service, desperate housing
shortages, decline in genuine income, and frustration over shipments of Polish commodities to
the Soviet Union. Emboldened by the ‘Khrushchev Thaw,’ pent up anger was vented in a series
of protests, riots, strikes, and attempts at full-fledged revolution across Eastern Europe. Most
famously, workers rioted in Poznań and Budapest in 1956 and students rioted in Warsaw,
Belgrade, and Prague in 1968; the Soviet Union sent its military to squelch the Hungarian and
Czechoslovakian revolutions, and the National Guard (ZOMA) contained the Polish riots. 31
On December 13, 1970 the Gomułka administration announced tremendous price hikes on all
staple food items – up to 36% on most products.32 The increase was justified by the State as a
needed 'correction' in the planned economy. This 'correction,' as unreasonable as it was and

31

Barbara Wejnert, “The Contribution of Collective Protests to the Softening of Communist Regimes in East
Central Europe,” in Transition To Democracy In Eastern Europe and Russia. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger,
2002), 66 – 90. Beyond these well known, large scale incidents, Wejnert provides statistical data on a plethora of
small scale protests, strikes, marches, riots, etc., that plagued East Central Europe from 1948 to 1988. Thousands of
such events chipped away at Communist Party power over the years in what Wejnert terms, “waves of mobilization
for collective action.”
32

Ash, The Polish Revolution, 13. However, in June of 1976 food prices were again increased in an effort to
reduce demand. Gregory Sucharczuk reports cheese and butter prices up 60%, meat prices up 69%, and sugar
prices up 100%. Gregory Sucharczuk, "A Free Trade Union In A Totalitarian Society: Towards Understanding The
Solidarity Movement In Poland, August 1980 - December 1981," PhD diss.,, McGill University, 1994: 31.
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coming two weeks before Christmas, resulted in widespread protests across Poland and strikes
and riots on the Baltic Coast. Interviewees from Gdańsk speculated that the price hike was
simply a method to generate more revenue for the State, even though newspaper reports had
suggested that the increase was an attempt to lower the Christmas season demand as a result of
actual food shortages. Stocznia Gdańska (still Stocznia Lenina – the Lenin Shipyard at this
time), with some 20,000 workers, went on strike to protest the price increases. About a week
before Christmas, Gomułka responded by sending in a police and military contingent to break
the strike at the shipyard and restore order. The crackdown resulted in a conflict at the gates of
the shipyard in which an unspecified number of workers were killed by police gunfire. Ash
reports ‘dozens’ of workers killed in the event and an online source (Gdansk- Life.com 2009)
reports 80 killed; 33 M.K. Dziewanowski reports 45 killed and 1,165 wounded.34
‘Paweł,’ a 67 year old interviewee who witnessed the 1970 events, said that the exact number
is not known because the Polish government contacted the families of the slain workers and
threatened them with more violence if they told anyone how their family members died. 35
Thus, when funerals were held for these workers no mention was made of them being shot by the
militia. Paweł also claims that the bodies of some slain workers were removed from the site of
the Gdańsk shooting and were ‘disposed of’ by the State Militia; Paweł estimates that close to
500 individuals were killed by police and militia forces in the Baltic Coast riots, as the Gdańsk
incident sparked rioting that lasted five more days and spread to Gdynia, Sopot, and Szczecin.

33

Ibid.
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Dziewanowski, The Communist Party Of Poland, 307.
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‘Paweł’ interview by author, 3/15/2010. ‘Pawel’ was a key source of first hand data concerning the Polish
Revolution and Stocznia Gdańska. He went to work at the shipyard in 1963 at age 20 and was an eyewitness to the
1970 shootings and all the important events concerning Solidarność through the 1980s.

74

He claims that militia units in helicopters opened fire on protesters in Gdynia, literally spraying
the crowd with bullets, killing nearly 100 people and wounding thousands. 36
Regardless of the exact number of deaths, the point here is threefold: (1) conditions of daily
life across Poland had so deteriorated that tens of thousands of citizens were incited to take to the
streets in protest, with hundreds paying for this action with their lives; (2) the minor
liberalization (or perception of liberalization) of the Communist regime by Stalin’s death and
Khrushchev’s attempt at normalization of relations with civil society had emboldened
populations across Eastern Europe to demand changes and they expressed their demands through
strikes, protests, and riots; (3) the brutal retaliation against these demands by the Polish
government and by other Soviet Bloc governments radicalized a large population segment which
set as their ultimate goal regime change, that is, the replacement of the monolithic Communist
Party with national representative democracies.
In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev very aptly summarizes the cause of the Baltic Coast riots
of 1970 and the potential outcomes of the Soviet system if major reforms were not enacted.
Khrushchev's statements proved to be a very accurate summary and a historical prediction.
Beyond that, he captured the ‘human element’ in the situation; he looked beyond ‘ideological
orthodoxy’ and realized that material needs must be met regardless of political philosophy.
Below, an excerpt from his comments, clarifies this notion:

36

The author attended Konfrencja Solidarności: Grudzień ’70. Europejskie Centrum Solidarności, Gdansk. 15
Grudnia, 2010 (15 December, 2010) led by Dr. Jerzy Eisler, Dr. Janusz Marszalec, Dr. Michał Paziewski, and Dr.
Wojciech Polak. Among other topics, these prominent Polish historians offered evidence from eyewitness accounts
and archival sources that place the total number of deaths in the 1970 Baltic Coast riots near 500 with as many as
2000 being injured. The historians had also gathered stories of brutal beatings and torture during police
interrogations of arrested protesters. This topic is contentious as no ‘official record’ is available from the militia and
police forces responsible. A large monument now stands outside the gates of the Gdansk Shipyard to mark this
event. Along with my interviewee, ‘Pawel,’ Lech Wałęsa, the future leader of Solidarność, was also a witness to the
December 1970 events.
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I believe that we can compete successfully with capitalism only if we alter the priorities
and organizational structure of our economy so as to supply our citizens with the food
and consumer goods they want. A man labors and lives in order to satisfy his material
and spiritual needs. If capitalism satisfies those requirements better than socialism, it will
become increasingly difficult for us to propagate our point of view and consolidate our
way of life. Eventually, we will run the danger of losing everything - of going bankrupt.
The danger is political as well as economic. Just look what happened in Danzig [referring
to Gdańsk as Danzig] during the 1970 riots there… What happened in Poland represents
a lesson for us. The events on the Baltic Coast were a direct result of a food shortage and
a consumer revolt against rising prices...The teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin cannot
be hammered into people's heads only in the classroom and newspapers and at political
rallies...Our people must be able to use their wages to buy high-quality products
manufactured under socialism if they are to accept our system and reject capitalism. 37

Dissidents widely ranging from Lech Wałęsa and Václav Havel to ‘stray dogs’ such as ‘Mrs.
Danka’ in the opening vignette of this chapter were created in the backlash of radicalization that
followed the Khrushchev Thaw. This political radicalization was accompanied by the desire and
need to create an alternative economy alongside the existing State economy. The Solidarność
creed of ewolucja nie rewolucja (evolution not revolution) entailed the building of a parallel
economy – a shadow economy that met the needs of Polish citizens neglected by their own state.
To a great degree, this idea harked back to the notion of praca organiczna, literally, ‘organic
work,’ when during the Partitions, Polish bankers, industrialists, farmers and entrepreneurs of all
sorts worked quietly and cooperatively to build the Polish economy through expansion of the
private sector. In effect, the alternative economic strategies employed by Polish citizens - the
subject of the next chapter – were also the ultimate political weapon as they simultaneously
expressed rejection of the State economy while they supported the Solidarity Movement and the
individual citizens and activists involved in the movement.
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Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. Strobe Talbott (New York: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1974), 146 – 147.
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4. The Proletarian Ethic And The Spirit of Socialism: Lenin Turns Weber On His Head
______________________________________
Inside The Lenin Shipyard
Synopsis
Chapter four concerns the daily life of Gdańsk shipyard workers, explaining why and how many
were forced into the alternative strategy of ‘urban homesteading’ during the darkest years of
Poland’s economic turmoil. This is the first of many informal economic activities mentioned,
others to be discussed in chapters five and six. The chapter includes description of this scenario,
derived from field notes, first-hand observation, and interviews with residents of Gdańsk. The
chapter also defends the integrity of workers in a Socialist economy, refuting commonly held
Western assumptions that portray such workers as lazy, unmotivated, and dependent on the State,
and thus, by these faults, a primary cause of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Interview data
confirms that just the opposite is true. Not only had most citizens of the People’s Republic Of
Poland developed extensive ‘personal alternative economic strategies’ (by necessity, due to
dysfunction of the formal economy), but also many were simultaneously dedicated to their
formal jobs as well. The chapter discusses why this was so, elaborating on constructs such as
pride in craftsmanship, generational dedication to workplace, political motivation - both toward
the politics of Marxist-Leninism and towards Solidarność – condensed in the idea of
transformation of the ‘Protestant Ethic’ into the ‘Proletarian Ethic,’ and captured in the slogan
‘Pride, Dignity, and Solidarity.’ Again, these ideas reflect the earlier mindset of praca
organiczna (organic work, discussed in Chapter 1) during the Polish Partition era, in that,
regardless of the political system (a system imposed from outside or otherwise) there exists a
Polish cultural construct that rationalizes attempts to modernize, improve, and otherwise
facilitate the growth of the national economy and to pursue progressive social trends; this distinct
Polish cultural construct has clashed time and again with Prussian, German, Austrian, Russian,
and Soviet occupiers. The chapter also points out that Solidarity’s aim in bringing about the
transition to capitalism and democracy was creation of alternative or parallel choices for all
citizens. These included facilitation of many parallel or alternative economic strategies, but also
creation of a parallel labor union (Solidarność as opposed to State-operated unions), and

ultimately a parallel government that would replace the monopoly of the Communist Party. The
creation and maintenance of parallel political, social, economic, religious, and linguistic
alternatives in the face of foreign occupation has long been a survival strategy for Polish identity.

The Proletarian Ethic And The Spirit of Socialism
When you visit a giant’s world you are made to feel very small. You pass through doors as
tall as a five story building into a space as big as the Superdome. But this place was not built for
the bourgeois pastime of professional sports fans; it is utility and function incarnate. It is living
men and living machines in service to The People - the means of production for their fraternal
proletarian dream of prosperity and equality. From inside this black skeleton, filled with smoke,
fire, and noise, come the guts of supertankers.

The Syn Antares under construction at Stocznia Gdańska, December, 2010. For scale, note the man walking under the
center of the crane base .
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Outside, near the banks of the Wisła, the separate parts are united by soaring cranes that are as
much icons of the Gdańsk skyline as Bazylika Mariacka - the Basilica of Mary - the largest brick
church in the world. It is startling to round a corner in this city of fabrication and see rising
ominously the steel framework of a ship that dwarfs a blast furnace; your head tilts back and
your eyes roll up slowly as if you were approaching God’s throne. It is rather frightening, I
suppose, because the overwhelming size makes you feel very insignificant.

Welding sub-structures for the Syn Antares. The ship is a liquefied natural gas supertanker with a capacity of 9000 cbm.
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Scaffolding rings the unfinished section of the giant ship and sparks rain down as Solidarność
brothers grind, fit, and weld. They take pride in their craft – pride today for their free and
democratic Poland, pride in the past for The People’s Republic Of Poland. Paweł tells me,
“This shipyard is my family – like my mother, my children – I love it. I made a living here all my
life and now my son works here. I am proud of the ships we built for Poland and for Russia too.
The skills of shipbuilders are passed down through generations. Disguised as a commoner, Peter
The Great worked for a time in this city as an apprentice, to take home to Russia, in his head, the
art of shipbuilding. But he was a newcomer; they had been building ships here 1000 years before
Peter came.”

Retirees visiting the shipyard. Many remain actively involved in Solidarność-sponsored civic organizations.
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_____________________________________
Stocznia Gdańska or the Gdańsk Shipyard (from 1952 to 1980 it was called Stocznia Lenina,
the Lenin Shipyard), four other related shipyards, and several port-loading facilities are located
in the province of Pomorskie (Pomerania) on the Baltic Sea. Here the Wisła forms a delta of
three branches: the Leiwka Wisła, Śmiała Wisła and the Martwa Wisła. The city of Gdańsk
dates back to the 7th Century and lies along the coastal estuary formed by the Wisła as it empties
into Zatoka Gdańska (Bay of Gdańsk). The city is surrounded to the south by wooded hills, the
highest being Góra Gradowa on which is erected the Millennium Cross, a monument to 1000
years of Christianity in Gdańsk. Shipyards and sea ports have been located on this protected
coastal plain since the 1400s, first established by rich merchants of the Hanseatic League. 1
A German company owned by Ferdinand Schichau built the first modern-era shipyards at the
current Stocznia Gdańska site in 1890, then called Schichau Seebeckwerft. In 1921 the Danziger
Werft yards (referring to the German name for city, Danzig) were opened as additions to the
Schichau yards. The shipyard complex and various port facilities expanded and prospered until
WWII. During the war the shipyards and most of the city of Gdańsk sustained heavy damage.
After the war the Gdańsk yards were restored and modernized through loans from the Soviet
Union and became part of the state-owned enterprise of The Polish People’s Republic. In this
way, a very profitable means of production was established in Gdańsk. 2

1

Andrzej Falkowski and Marek Gąsecki, interviews by author, 3/16/2010, and 12/15/2010. The background
history of Gdańsk and Stocznia Gdańska which opens this chapter was provided by these two interviewees in
conjunction with details added from: Timothy Garton Ash, Solidarity: The Polish Revolution (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2002) and Lech Wałęsa, A Way Of Hope (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1989), originally
published in France as Un Chemin D’espoir (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1987).
2

Ibid.
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However, the wealth generated by the shipyards was not realized by the residents of Gdańsk much of it was extracted by the USSR. According to interviewees at the shipyard, Stocznia
Gdańska produced 30 - 40 large ocean-going ships per year during its prime (1960s and 1970s).
Most of the ships were coal and ore carrying ships, oil and chemical tankers, and cargo ships. 3
All of the ships were produced for the Soviet Union, which sold them around the world as a
source of national income. The shipyard workers felt that they were producing these ships ‘for
free,’ for the benefit of the USSR, as interviewee ‘Paweł’ explained:
We built all kinds of ships here - military ships, commercial ships, fishing ships. But we
were building them for free for the Soviet Union...we built them in Gdańsk but the
Russians put their name on them, and sold them to Greece, Libya, Brazil - all over the
world. They made good money on our ships...and we couldn't even afford to buy basic
food on a regular basis...4

Paweł was 67 years old at the time of this interview and had started working in the Lenin
Shipyard at age 20 in 1963 (he is now retired). He was married in 1970, at which time, he
commented, he had worked in the shipyard for seven years but still could not afford to buy a suit
for the wedding. "I worked hard every day and was still poor," he said. Once he asked the
shipyard manager why wages were so low:
I asked him where the money is going - you know how many ships we build - why can
we not have a pay raise? He said the money is all going to Warsaw, to the government to
pay for our benefits. We had some benefits, yes; If we got sick we had our own hospital
right here in the shipyard…And we had a small retirement if we managed to survive 30
years of work here. But the production of this shipyard was tremendous – all the value of
3

Marek Gąsecki, interviews by author, 12/15/2010. Mr. Gąsecki, employed by Stocznia Gdańska for 32 years,
stated that the shipyard was geared to mass production of huge, simple cargo ships during the Soviet era. Greatly
downsized today, Stocznia Gdańska is jointly owned by Ukrainian and Swedish investors who aim to make it the
most advanced shipyard in Europe. In order to compete with Asian shipyards, Stocznia Gdańska is building
specialized ships with onboard technology necessary for servicing offshore oil fields and offshore wind generators.
They also build oil exploration ships, and ships to carry liquefied natural gas.
4

‘Pawel,’ interview by author, 3/15/2010.
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our ships was far more - far more – than the management would have us believe. We
lived and worked in poverty while a few top men became rich. Yes, this was the way of
our world, all knew it. And from this knowing came our anger.5

Similarly, ‘Felix’ had worked in a port facility near the Lenin Shipyard. Coal, grain, and
chemicals were shipped from the interior of Poland up the Vistula by barge and loaded onto
ocean-going ships here. He commented on the low wages in proportion to living expenses and on
the constant promises of ‘better days ahead.’
You could work here - we had policy of full employment - but you could not buy what
you needed. Sometimes all the stores had was vinegar and tea! You had ration cards to
buy everything with, like in war-time. Meat was hard to get - if you were a worker you
could buy something like two kilos - if you worked in an office, half that amount. Now I
see all kinds of meat in stores! Back then...no. It was a miserable time - no hope, no food,
no future. I didn't even think there was a possibility for a different kind of life…They
kept telling us things will get better - just keep working and life will be a paradise
someday! 6

‘Pawel’ and ‘Felix’s’ comments were typical. When asked to discuss daily life during the 1970s
and 1980s, nearly all interviewees from both Gdańsk and Wałbrzych recalled a very simple and
very similar pattern: through the 1970s wages fell and prices increased; by the 1980s, wages
became irrelevant – there was simply nothing to buy in local stores regardless of one’s income.
All consumer items were rationed and standing in long lines to purchase scarce items became a
fact of daily life for all Poles. 7 All interviewees made explicit comments concerning empty store
5

Ibid.

6

‘Felix,’ interview by author, 3/15/2010.

7

Dr. Barbara Wejnert, interview by author, 1/ 21/2010. However, the ‘Nomenklatura’ faced no shortages.
Along with Dr. Wejnert, numerous other interviewees voiced anger for the fact that special stores filled with high
quality goods required a Communist Party membership card for admittance. The class distinction was more extreme
in Russia. According to Dr. Wejnert, “When the change to democracy happened in Russia what we (Poles)
discovered was they had worse system than ours. People were starving in many places - not just shortages - but near
famine. And alongside this the leaders of Communist Party - they lived in palaces! They lived in districts off limits
to all but them - behind barbwire with guards! In their districts (of Russian cities) was like homes of Hollywood
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shelves and the realization that their money was worthless. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the acute shortages were the primary cause of the riots, strikes, and demonstrations in the Baltic
Coast cities of Gdańsk, Sopot, and Gdynia that led to the emergence of Solidarność at Stocznia
Gdańska.
One would think that the bitterness of workers living on a daily bread of promises would be
translated into every sort of retaliation imaginable against the immediate object of their dire
economic situation – their workplace. This was the reasoning of the Polish Communist Party
from its early postwar takeover and throughout the Stalin era. As described in the previous
chapter, the hated beszpieka were charged with the job of closely monitoring every industrial
workplace, always vigilant for sabotage, intentional slow-down of operations, stealing, or
vandalism; and always ready to mete out interrogations, beatings, jail time, or deportation to the
gulags for all ‘enemies of the people.’ Today’s well known meme titled ‘shootings will continue
until morale improves’ would not have been lost on the beszpieka.
Yet, interview data, corroborated by secondary sources, refutes the notion that workers
intentionally took out their frustrations in acts of vengeance against their places of employment. 8
The findings also negate the condemning assumptions of Westerners that workers in a socialist
state are unmotivated and unproductive. 9 Quite like the beszpieka, founded by ‘office-dwelling’

stars - yes, really! They had highest quality living - residences like kings, shops with anything from all over the
world to buy, the best schools for children, even their own hospitals and doctors. It was like a world within a world.
This was reality of ‘classless society!”
8

Generally speaking, this was true. Obviously, not all workers fell into this category. Primary and secondary
data will shortly elaborate on this point. This statement begs the application of statistical analysis for elaboration and
validation.
9

This is a common Western assumption. For example, in teaching introductory sociology sections at Marshall
University, Huntington, West Virginia, the author of this paper notes that in class discussions of comparative
economies many students make sweeping assumptions that lump nearly all economic forms, past or present, other
than ‘US capitalism,’ into some hazy realm of ‘Communism,’ assumed to be populated by lazy automatons.
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bureaucrats with little experience in the hands-on world of trade unionism, Westerners often
apply their own reasoning, based on their personal experiences in service or information sectors
of modern economies, to ‘explain’ (through no first-hand research) why Soviet Bloc enterprises
were ‘unsuccessful.’ Their first line of thought is usually to blame ‘socialist workers,’ as
Westerners generally assume that ‘capitalist workers’ are somehow more highly motivated
(hourly workers from both economic systems have little incentive beyond hourly pay – unless
they have a profit sharing plan, stock options, or other similar investment in their company).
Beyond this, the labels of ‘successful / unsuccessful’ in capitalist terms, became relevant to
socialist enterprises only after 1989 when they began competing in a market economy. As
Gdańsk interviewees observed, the Lenin Shipyard was judged highly successful in the eyes of
both Polish and Soviet central planning committees, validated by the incidental data of the
shipyard’s enormous export production and by the fact that a work strike of one hour was
considered intolerable; thus the most effective tool of the Solidarity Movement was the ‘strajk’
and those that lasted days or weeks were often broken by the National Guard so as to maintain
the State’s profitable industrial output.
The salient points of the above observations are several, and will be elaborated on as they help
validate the core idea of this thesis, i.e., that workers in a non-capitalist system expressed,
through their personal economic activities, a mindset congruent with attitudes usually associated
with capitalist entrepreneurialism – the so-called ‘Protestant work ethic’ per Max Weber’s well

Likewise, ‘common knowledge’ in the US – from the barroom to the classroom to the analysis of ‘armchair
historians and economists’ everywhere – generally contends that that the primary reason for failure of Soviet
Communism was ‘lazy workers’ who somehow obtained a hefty paycheck while shirking work. Far right pundits
attempt analogy here in regard to social welfare state political theories in western democracies. Of course, those
truly steeped in Republican Mythology believe Ronald Reagan’s simple admonition to Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear
down that wall” resulted in spontaneous collapse of the entire Soviet system!
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known book.10 A plethora of personal alternative economic strategies and various
entrepreneurial schemes employed by individuals during the years of The People’s Republic Of
Poland will be discussed in the remainder of this thesis. Yet, there often existed alongside these
personal commitments to ‘work ethic attitudes’ a similar mindset in public works – despite the
above mentioned frustrations of workers over low wages, high prices, and dire shortages
(sometimes referred to as the ‘Proletarian Ethic’). 11
Obviously, this is not to make a sweeping assumption that all Soviet Bloc workers were
highly motivated and deeply engaged in their occupations, nor is it to ignore the massive strikes
that came to paralyze the Polish economy – at the height of Lech Wałęsa’s ‘power’ his call for a
work stoppage could idle 10 million workers as rapidly as the word could be spread. 12 This
‘power,’ and the workers’ understanding of their own power in solidarity, is precisely what

10

Max Weber, “The Protestant Ethic And The Spirit Of Capitalism” [1904] in Classical Sociological Theory,
Craig Calhoun ed. (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2008), 228 – 246. Per Weber, this implies a conscious effort
upon the part of individuals to cultivate work habits and lifestyle conducive to furthering material progress in a
capitalist system. This norm becomes a part of the Weltanschauung – the society’s collective worldview. In short,
this thesis contends that Solidarność actively encouraged similar cultivation of a work ethic among their members
as a material validation of the ‘rightness’ or ‘righteousness’ of their movement. This construct was part of the
‘framing’ of the movement, per the entrepreneurial version of general social movement theory. Similarly, alignment
of the movement with the Catholic Church also gave Solidarność a certain ‘moral authority.’ A ‘Catholic Work
Ethic,’ nearly identical to Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’ and with a similar social agenda, was created, that agenda
being outward, societal validation of itself in direct opposition to the ‘Soviet Legacy’ that hindered all sectors and all
arenas of Polish society.
11

Timothy W. Luke, “The Proletarian Ethic And Soviet Industrialization, “ in The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 77, No. 3, 1983, pp. 588 – 601. Here Luke explains the ‘Proletarian Ethic’ and the proposed
substitution of Marxist-Leninism for Calvinist doctrines. Both forms of ‘religious zeal’ – one ‘sacred’ and one
‘profane,’ or one ‘spiritual’ and one ‘secular,’ provided psychological motivation for hard work.
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Jerzy Borowczak, interview by author, 12/18/2010. Jerzy Borowczak mentioned a unique form of strike
communication. He said that after the signing of the Gdańsk Agreements (August, 31, 1980) until the enactment of
martial law (December 13, 1981) - that is, during the first legalization of Solidarność, the union was so coordinated
that city-wide strikes could be called by the ringing of church bells. A specific time and date for a strike was decided
upon by Solidarność leaders, this was relayed to the various churches in the 'tri-cities' (Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia,
which are located along the Baltic coast), church bells were rung at the decided time - and all industrial work came
to a halt. This was no small work-stoppage; Borowczak estimated there were some 70,000 shipyard and industrial
workers in the tri-city region at this time. This method was used in many other Polish cities as well, and according to
Borowczak, Lech Wałęsa had once commented that Solidarność could literally shut Poland down at will, simply by
the ringing of church bells.
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fueled the unprecedented success of the Solidarity Movement. The ability to ‘turn on’ or ‘turn
off’ the entire productive capacity of a state driven by a centrally planned economy - on the part
of the workers, not the Central Planning Committee – was what finally convinced the
Communist Party chiefs in Warsaw and the Politburo in Moscow that their ‘reign’ was over.
Thus, a conscious effort was made by workers, as members of Solidarność, to aspire diligently to
‘work ethic principles’ while on the job, and likewise, to ‘pull the plug’ and bring the nation to a
standstill when called upon by Wałęsa. This ‘bi-polar mentality’ was part and parcel of the entire
Solidarity movement, expressed (as the continuation of this thesis will demonstrate) not only in
personal alternative economic activities but in public workplace behaviors; the entire gist of the
Solidarity Movement was creation of parallels – a parallel work routine (‘on’ or ‘off’ as needed
per political expediency), a parallel economy (the many alternative forms to be discussed
shortly), a parallel labor union (Solidarność alongside the official State-sponsored unions), and
ultimately, a parallel government, social democracy alongside (and replacing) authoritarian
autocracy.
Workers at Stocznia Gdańska, they being the center of the Solidarity Movement and thus the
‘guiding example’ for all other Polish enterprises, made it a principle to maintain productivity
and pride in craftsmanship throughout the long course of their struggle against the Communist
Party (nine years; 1980 – 1989). ‘Pride, Dignity, Solidarity’ (Duma, Godność, Solidarność) was
the motto of the movement on both sides of the Iron Curtain and both sides of the Atlantic. 13

13

The motto‘Pride, Dignity, Solidarity’ was used by Solidarność in Poland and by all labor unions in support of
the movement in Western Europe and the US. The author of this thesis participated on a committee of support for
Solidarity at Allied Chemical’s Semet Solvay Plant, Ashland, Kentucky, (OCAW Local 3 – 523) throughout the
1980s and recalls the ‘novelty’ of seeing hourly workers from Appalachia – some without high school diplomas –
vigorously defending their union brothers in Poland. No doubt, very few (if any) had prior knowledge of Polish
labor relations before the Solidarity Movement appeal was made to them; perhaps some could not even locate
Poland on a map – yet, nearly all were ‘onboard’ with the project, a testimony to the effectiveness of the ‘marketing’
of this social movement. A Synthetic Analysis Of The Polish Solidarity Movement: Solidarność - Ewolucja nie
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Interview excerpts from union officials and comments from both former and current employees
of Stocznia Gdańska will help clarify this concept and solidify the connection between the
Solidarity Movement’s agenda, and operationalization of this agenda, in everyday life.
Comments from Jerzy Borowczak, current director of Fundacja Centrum Solidarności, provide a
good overview:
It was the policy of our movement not to be violent, not to be destructive, not to be
corrupt – we took the moral path, we were aligned closely with the Church. Quite
honestly, this was for two reasons: first, we had all seen what happens here when we use
aggressive tactics… the 1970 riots, in which workers set fire to the local Communist
Party headquarters, was answered to us by bullets from the ZOMA [the national guard or
civil militia]…and many innocent people were killed. Second, by behaving differently
than the Communist Party – opposite of how they expected us to behave - we made
legitimate our cause to Poland and to the world. We were moral, they were corrupt; we
were workers, they were takers; we made peaceful protest, they used guns and tanks
against their own people. It was slow process - step by step - evolution not revolution –
but this was the only way. Without Wałęsa, who, like me, saw with his own eyes the
massacres of 1970 – and too, without influence of our priests – influence of Pope John
Paul II – well, it could have been violent, bloody revolution and probably Soviet Union
would use tremendous force this time [in the 1981 strikes just before declaration of
martial law] to wipe out all trace of our ambitions…
…we did not want to provoke attacks by the State or to make attacks on the State – no,
not for any reason…We were creating an alternative to the State, an alternative to
Communism, that is, the kind of communism that was forced on us [in the decade after
WWII]… But let me be clear, we advocated socialism, not abrupt shift to capitalism. Our
aim was to take what was good from our old system – care of families, medical care,
maternal leave (for new mothers in the workplace), full employment, things like this and eliminate the bad things – political repression, control of communication, one party
system, monopoly of State on economy… So, of course, we could not do this in ‘official
way’ … we had no political power… so we made for people of Poland many alternative
ways, ‘unofficial ways,’ until Communist Party would - we hoped - cease to exist… As
you know, finally it did! 14

Rewolucja (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012), also by the author, elaborates on seven
factors that contributed to the success of the movement in light of resource mobilization, issue framing, and political
opportunity – the ‘standard fare’ of the entrepreneurial version of social movement theory.
14

Jerzy Borowczak, interview by author, 12/18/2010. Jerzy Borowczak is currently the general director of the
Solidarity Labor Union at its headquarters Ulitca Wały Piastowskie 24, Gdańsk. He is a former employee of
Stocznia Gdańska and was active alongside Lech Wałęsa throughout the Solidarity Movement.
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This ‘moral high ground’ advocated by Solidarność in the process of pushing its public
agenda translated into the afore mentioned ‘Protestant Work Ethic’- or perhaps ‘Proletarian
Work Ethic’- in daily operations at Stocznia Gdańska. Interview data backs this notion as do
secondary sources, for example, in descriptions of the appalling working conditions at Stocznia
Gdańska and the resolve of workers to rise above them, maintaining the ‘pride, dignity, and
solidarity’ of their social movement. Lech Wałęsa’s autobiography provides a telling portrait of
the Gdańsk Shipyard in the 1970s and 1980s along with the story of how Solidarność strove to
‘reform’ the workplace (at first, not in political terms but simply in terms of basic health and
safety upgrades) within the constraints of its limited power. Wałęsa describes his first
impressions of Stocznia Gdańska:
When I arrived our shipyard looked like a factory filled with men in filthy rags, unable to
wash themselves or urinate in toilets. To get down to the ground floor where toilets were
located took at least half an hour, so we just went anywhere. You can’t imagine how
humiliating these working conditions were…Human dignity and the chance to be fully
responsible for one’s own life were not available options… 15
…the climate of oppression at the shipyard was reinforced by an accident that claimed
the lives of twenty-two workers. In order to step up productivity, arrangements had been
made to mobilize almost two thousand men to install the final fittings and equipment on a
ship…Some [of the men] had been working for thirty-six hours at a stretch on this vessel
[the Konopnicka] which had already been filled with fuel, again, to save time…There
was an explosion, and because the hatchways and hulls were sealed off, firefighting
equipment was unavailable. Though workers attempted to cut through the metal with
acetylene torches… [to rescue the trapped men] supplies of acetylene were inadequate.
Thus, twenty-two men were burned alive in the hold of Konopnicka…16

Wałęsa goes on to explain how, slowly, Solidarność was able to win demands against the
management of Stocznia Gdańska guaranteeing safer working conditions, basic sanitary
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Lech Wałęsa, A Way Of Hope (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1987), 44.

16

Ibid., 52.
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facilities, and improved ventilation in smoky welding shops and painting sheds of the shipyard.17
Throughout this process, the union admonished its men to retain - to the best of their ability in
spite of appalling conditions - a work ethic and professional attitude above and beyond the
pettiness and penny-pinching of management. Effort was made through samizdat newspapers to
circulate the call among Polish enterprises nationwide, not only for worker solidarity but also for
worker job loyalty. Only by taking the ‘high path’ in all areas – non-violence, adherence to moral
principles (the Catholic Church saw to this), and maintenance of professionalism on even the
most dehumanizing jobs – could the Polish Solidarity Movement frame its agenda in terms so
progressive and so humane, that in contrast the Communist Party was made to look even more
backward and barbaric than it indeed was. This is the essence of ‘social movement
entrepreneurialism,’ framing one’s self and one’s opponent in such bi-polar terms that public
opinion is unequivocally skewed to facilitate the movement’s agenda. Lech Wałęsa was a master
at this game, so much so that in the 1980s there went around Poland the humorous saying that
the nation’s capital had moved from Warsaw to Gdańsk – specifically, to the electrician’s shop in
Stocznia Gdańska where Wałęsa was employed. 18 Interview excerpts from current employees of
Stocznia Gdańska further illuminate how the agendas of Solidarność paved the way for
alternatives in other segments of Polish society. Marek Gąsecki, a production supervisor and 32
year employee of Stocznia Gdańska, commented as follows:
I came to work at Stocznia Gdańska just as Solidarność was beginning its campaign…
Back then a man might work here 15 years and his health would be ruined for the rest of
his life. He would die from lung disease early in life due to inhaling smoke and fumes
from the welding of the ships, dust from grinding the welds, toxic chemicals used in
cleaning the steel in preparation for painting, and the paint fumes themselves. There was
17

Ibid., 115 – 204. Through contract negotiations forced on shipyard management by strikes, the demands of
Solidarność were eventually met.
18

Jerzy Borowczak, interview by author, 12/18/2010.
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no ventilation and no health protection from these hazards. There were many accidents
that crippled workers - because no one cared about safety or health. All this is different
now - the work here - well, it was inhuman before. It was all a man could do to survive
this place until he retired. When the yard was operated by the State, no one cared about
health or safety - all they cared about was production. There were rules (health and safety
rules) but these were only words in a book - no one enforced them. All they enforced was
whatever increased production, not what was safe or even sane. Now we have proper
ventilation, protection from dust and paint fumes, and a much better safety record. All of
these changes are due to Solidarność…
These [health and safety regulations] were major changes - before, no worker dared say
anything to management and although we had a union, it was operated by the State so it
was really no union at all…
As Solidarność gained more power there seemed to come over the shipyard a new spirit.
Still conditions were terrible and our wages were low…but the union convinced us to
show our better side to shipyard management…to work hard and be professional
tradesmen. They even named streets in the shipyard, the ‘Street Of Welders,’ the ‘Street
Of Electricians,’ the ‘Street Of Painters,’ as a symbol, I think, to inspire our people to
think of themselves as more than some kind of ‘slave laborers’… 19
Mr. Gąsecki added a further layer to the notion of workplace loyalty as he elaborated on the
generationalism that accompanies union tradeswork in Poland (as it does the world over). He
said that many employees of Stocznia Gdańska are the 2nd or 3rd generation of their families to
be employed there as shipbuilders. Although the shipyard has been greatly reduced in size and
number of employees in recent years, 20 its long-term success is a concern for current workers as
many of them hope their sons will continue the tradition. The various skilled trades required in
shipbuilding (the skills of welders, electricians, mechanics, instrumentation technicians, mill
wrights, painters, etc.) are learned in apprenticeship programs sponsored through a joint
partnership between Solidarność and Stocznia Gdańska. This ensures continuity of the skilled
labor force required there, which benefits both the shipyard and the tradesmen, while
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Marek Gąsecki, interview by author, 12/15/2010.
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Currently Stocznia Gdańska has around 2000 employees, down from near 20,000 at its peak in the mid 1970s.
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simultaneously cultivating a reciprocal loyalty and dedication from both the workers and their
company; this concept, generally unknown outside of the closed communities of skilled,
unionized tradeswork, negates the commonly held assumptions that denigrate skilled workers
and craftspersons by lumping all hourly workers into one social class. It is an absurd
misrepresentation to group highly skilled industrial workers – from the tradesmen who build
ships, to the operators of the steel mills and chemical plants – into the same ‘lumpenproletariat’
class as, for example, fast-food workers. Generationally transmitted concern for the success of
highly capitalized heavy industries, 21 operated by highly skilled employees, in highly
responsible positions, does not have an analogy in regards to unskilled labor. The point here, as
ascertained in the interview of Marek Gąsecki, is that the advent of the independent trade union,
Solidarność, as opposed to the previous ‘pseudo-unions’ organized as extensions of the
Communist Party (beszpieka-like in their police state mentality), eventually gave full voice to the
‘reciprocal loyalty concept’ described above; even before this, employees of Stocznia Gdańska
had a high degree of workplace integrity – which guaranteed continuity between union and
shipyard, even more so.
For other workers, such as ‘Paweł,’ whose comments along these lines are used in the opening
vignette of this chapter, ‘pride, dignity, and solidarity’ – and the accompanying ‘work ethic’ seemed to come naturally in conjunction with the process of shipbuilding itself. Paweł spoke
openly of the personal fulfillment he felt in building huge oceangoing ships, “…for Poland and
for the USSR,” as he put it. Few interviewees were as outspoken as Paweł concerning the brutal
conditions of the shipyard and the injustice of Poland’s Communist system, while
simultaneously expressing outright affection for their place of employment. Paweł said, “This
21

That is, enterprises built on monumental investment; modern steel mills, for example, cost as much to build as
nuclear power plants - billions of dollars – and the operating ‘ lives’ of such facilities is multigenerational, in terms
of human lifetimes.
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shipyard is my family – like my mother, my children – I love it. I made a living here all my life
and now my son works here.” Paweł, and many workers similar to him, epitomize the ‘dual
nature’ of parallels that Solidarność sought to instill in the Polish population. Quite simply,
Paweł loved his nation and his workplace, and despite his open contempt for the
mismanagement of both by the Communist Party, he worked diligently to build ships and to
build a new Poland. The misinformed condemnations and uninformed assumptions of
Westerners toward common workers in former Soviet Bloc states could not be more misplaced in
the case of Paweł and his union brothers at Stocznia Gdańska. Again, this construct seems a
throwback to the Polish Partition era, and the notion of praca organiczna, literally, ‘organic
work,’ when Poles under Prussian, Russian, or Austria-Hungarian rule continued their patient
progress to ‘build a new Poland,’ both literally and politically.
Still, shortages and deprivation were constants that had to be contended with on a daily basis
until the ‘new Poland’ came into being. Many Gdańsk residents came to believe that the
shortages were a retribution for the political activism centered in the shipyard. ‘Pitor,’ a retired
mechanical engineer, was positive this was the case. Pitor held a very high-level position in the
design office of Stocznia Gdańska and made frequent trips to the steel manufacturing centers of
Lower Silesia. His travels afforded a wider perspective than that of hourly workers, most of
whom did not even own a car. Pitor remarked that he often bought canned goods and other nonperishable food items when traveling south. He reasoned that the shortages in Gdańsk were
artificial and were deliberate attempts to weaken the population’s resolve and to literally weaken
their bodies – an attempt to starve them into submission. 22
While outright starvation was uncommon, malnutrition was prevalent. Those who did not
have alternative economic strategies often lived on bread, potatoes, macaroni, and tea. Meat,
22

‘Pitor,’ interview by author, 3/20/2010.
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milk, eggs, and vegetables were virtually non-existent in Gdańsk stores through much of the
1980s. Mothers worried that their children were lacking proper nutrition. ‘Anna,’ an interviewee
from Gdańsk, reported that baby food and milk formula were strictly rationed and fights often
erupted between desperate women seeking these scarce items. Like Pitor, ‘Anna’ believed the
shortages were deliberate attempts to weaken the population, especially the protesting workers.
Anna remembered that police and militia operatives seemed well-fed and healthy while
protesting workers seemed gaunt and weak. She expressed bitter, virulent contempt toward the
Communist Party whom she blamed for “…attempted starvation of a generation of Polish
children.”23
Anna’s anger was exacerbated by the denial of food shortages by local Party officials and
higher level government inspectors. As with the mismanagement of industrial operations by ‘old
boys’ networks’ of nomenklatura (described in the previous chapter), likewise, bureaucrats
responsible for distribution of food and consumer items shifted blame for shortages to common
citizens. Local Party officials claimed that striking railroad workers, cargo handlers and truck
drivers were causing the shortages as their protests delayed delivery of perishable food items.
Anna remembered seeing pictures in newspapers of truckloads of spoiled food, accompanied by
reports blaming striking workers for the shortages. Yet, when transportation workers went back
to work the shortages continued. She blamed the Party for artificially creating the acute shortages
while simultaneously diverting blame to striking Solidarity union members.
According to Paczkowski et al., the shortages and protests in Gdańsk became so volatile in
1981 (just before Martial Law was declared on December 13), that the Brezhnev administration
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sent

its own investigators to

the Baltic

Coast

cities to

assess the

situation. 24

They reported back to Moscow that no actual shortages existed, rather, the greater concern was
that the government was being shortchanged in tax revenue due to black market trading.
Paczkowski quotes from the inspectors’ report:
...the Poles have plenty; there is grain, meat products, vegetables, and so on. But they
give nothing to the State and are adopting a wait-and-see attitude. In the private markets,
a rather active trade is being conducted at very elevated prices. They buy what they
need...the people are not going hungry. 25

In fact, per interview data, by 1981 a full-fledged alternative economy had emerged in
Gdańsk, driven by necessity, but as previously discussed, encouraged also by Solidarność as a
way to further operationalize ‘parallel systems.’ Yet, the reality was not nearly as ‘rosy’ as was
reported back to Moscow by the investigators. Rather, driven to near starvation, the people of
Gdańsk had resorted to ‘urban homesteading,’ literally producing their own food on every
available foot of open space within the city. Physical evidence, still apparent today, in
conjunction with oral histories, reveals the scope of the city’s desperation as citizens came to the
realization that they were ‘on their own.’ Condemned by the Polish People’s Republic for the
political activism centered in Stocznia Gdańska and ‘written off’ by Moscow as a thriving black
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Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne (editors). From Solidarity To Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of
1980 - 1981: A Documentary History (Budapest: Central University Press, 2007), 242 – 244. This occurred only
months before Brezhnev’s death. Yuri Andropov and a select Politburo committee made all decisions in the final
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market town which robbed the State of tax revenue, Gdańsk had no alternative but to create its
own ‘private means of production’ or else be ‘starved out’ by its own national government.
Gdańsk in the early 1980s was a town under siege, with a population doubly burdened by ‘wage
slavery’ to the State and the necessity to produce its daily bread in its own backyard. Personal
observations made by the author in March and December 2010 validate this point; below, taken
from field notes, these observations digress to first person format for clarity and lyricality:
Up the wooded hillsides surrounding the outskirts of Gdańsk I noticed what seemed to
resemble the squatters' towns outside the city of Juarez, Mexico where live the maquiladoras, or
in-migrating factory workers.26 The slopes were divided into small plots, each with a little leanto shed or shack made of scrap wood, sheet metal, and assorted odds and ends. I saw this again in
a city park; a little 'settlement' seemed to have once occupied the park's extremities, but I could
see

it

was

abandoned.

now

Later

noticed

similar

towns'

built

I

'shanty
on

the

property of a coal-fired
power

plant.

The

old

plant, according to an
interviewee, was said to
be ‘a gift from Uncle Joe

Homemade greenhouses and chicken pens on steep hillsides within the city limits of
Gdańsk. Subsistence farming was a form of ‘economic dissent’ during the 1980s.
26

Juarez is notoriously famous for its sprawling shantytowns built of discarded shipping pallets, tar paper, and
cardboard.
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Stalin,’ and apparently still used
pollution control technology from
Stalin's era; that is, it had none. I
noticed fly ash in the air near the
plant and the acrid smell from the
burning of low-grade, high sulfur
coal,

reminiscent

memories

of

of

coal

childhood
and

coke

processing plants in Appalachia of
the 1960s.
A local resident told me that
these ‘shanty towns’ were actually
Hillside garden terraces constructed from aluminum and steel siding
scraps. The aim was food producing – not aesthetics. Note the larger
natural terraces in the upper-left background.

tool storage sheds for little, private
gardens. Some had large south-

facing windows or clear sheet-plastic covers and had been used to start tender plants in early
spring. These gardens were not at all 'picturesque European flower gardens,' but were
ramshackled hillside conglomerations of recycled industrial materials, home-made, and protected
by woven brush fences and sagging barbed wire. In some places the steep hillsides had even
been terraced using everything from aluminum siding scraps to splintered utility poles, to hold
back the soil and form small flat strips that contoured with the terrain. Some plots had longneglected fruit trees and grape arbors. These private plots had fed the people of Gdansk during
the worst years of Poland's economic crisis. All of my interviewees (those old enough to
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remember) have described to me the hardships of those years, especially 1981 - 1983, during the
time of martial law.27
In order to survive, people bought and sold garden produce, fruits, and berries grown on these
little plots for the 'black market.' As everything produced in The People’s Republic of Poland
during the Communist era was subject to a state tax, the operators of these little market gardens
were, technically, committing tax evasion. However, my interviewees told me, the State
generally ignored this 'crime.' The tradition continues and I saw several 'old-timers' selling jam,
honey, and home-canned fruit on the sidewalks of Gdańsk (perhaps it is again necessary due to
globalization of capital and deindustrialization). Most of the gardens are abandoned today but I
was told that in the worst economic times the 'garden shacks' were also used as hen houses,
rabbit hutches, and occasionally as a shed for a milk goat or two.
It is not unusual to see backyard gardens or community gardens within any city. Many
residents do this as a hobby, for fun, or as a throwback to more traditional times. However, it is
the economic and historic context of the Gdańsk gardens that make them so striking and so
revealing. They extended up the hillsides and into city parks of a town that was the site of one of
the largest industrial works ever built. Stocznia Gdańska was immense and once produced great
wealth for the State. Jerzy Borowczak, the current director of the Gdańsk local of Solidarność,
explained that at one time some 70,000 workers were employed in shipbuilding alone in the
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Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia region. 28 Yet, this city was dependent on little hillside gardens and
chicken houses as a supplemental food source. 29
The significance of this observation of a material cultural tradition (or perhaps the hillside
gardens may be called folk culture relics) as an antidote or correction to the economic
dysfunction of an ideological/political system cannot be understated. It is analogous to imagining
New York City residents forced to take up gardening in Central Park to avert starvation, or
Washington, D.C. residents grazing goats on the National Mall in order to earn extra money to
buy shoes; this, however, not by the unemployed - because full employment was guaranteed and
required in Poland - but by people working 40 - 60 hour weeks in highly capitalized (i.e., capital
investment by the State), heavy industrial facilities. It reflects not only a long-term dysfunction
of the economic system, but a realization by Gdańsk residents that the system was beyond repair
and that reform or relief was not coming; as one informant told me, "You can't make soup out of
ideas." Resolved to materially fend for themselves by gardening and 'black market trading,' while
their 'official' labor - the output of their industrial jobs - went to support, in effect, a colonizer,
the people of Gdańsk understood the long-term nature of the struggle they were in.
Most Polish cities have a tradition of Ogródki działkowe - allotment gardening - but the dire
economic situation in Gdańsk had forced residents to extremes. Ogródki działkowe were
community gardens set up by local city governments. Residents paid a very small yearly fee to
be granted a strip of land – their allotment – within the set boundaries of the garden. However, as
described above, desperation drove the citizens of Gdańsk to cultivate any and all available land.
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Jerzy Borowczak, interview by author, 12/18/2010.
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Andrzej Falkowski and Marta Rutkawska, interviews by author, 12/18/2010. These interviewees in particular
contributed information concerning gardening as an alternative to starvation in the 1980s. Several other
interviewees, mentioned in Chapter 5, also contributed stories and information on this topic.
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Excerpts from an interview with ‘Ola’ and ‘Henryk’ elaborate on this most basic economic
alternative:
(Ola)
Everyone had a garden in those days (early 1980s) because it was only way to have food
other than bread. People in apartments learned to grow tomatoes and onions and lettuce
in buckets on balcony! They planted vegetables next to house in little strips this wide
(Ola holds her hands about a foot apart). They planted also in edge of city park and over
time they sort of ‘claimed’ these spots for their own. Rights to Ogródki działkowe was
usually passed down through family, so all were taken long ago. People started to cut
trees up hillside to make firewood, then plant garden in open spot. This was in city limits!
Right across from shipyard in city park!
…I actually built a fence around a little piece of land no bigger than this room (approx.
12 x12). It was city property but was near my apartment so I ‘claimed’ it and considered
it my own. Lots of people started doing this. I even carried to it manure for fertilizer from
goats and chickens that my friends had. They had them on hillside, in city limits, behind
their house! This sounds to you like primitives – yes? Like Middle Ages? But this was in
city of Gdańsk in 1980!
…Of course this was all illegal, but police ignored it. I used to imagine police stopping
me (during martial law) and asking, “What are you transporting in buckets?” I would
answer, “Goat shit! Is this illegal trade?” hahahaah!

(Henryk)
Many factories would let their workers grow gardens on workplace property. Inside
property of Stocznia Gdańska they had gardens. Some industries even arranged for
workers to make collective gardens outside the city (on industrial property controlled by
the factory). This was important for the people as there was no other way to get
vegetables…only potatoes were available in stores. At the city power plant where run
steam lines along the ground, people stripped insulation from steam pipes and planted
garden next to hot pipes to extend growing season…30

30

‘Ola’ and ‘Henryk,’ interview by author, 12/21/2010. ‘Henryk’ also explained that nearly all buildings in
Gdańsk were heated by steam generated at a central power plant. This system is common in Eastern European cities
and reflects the Soviet ideal of collectivism, centrality, and industrial efficiency. Most of the systems were built
just after WWII during the era of ‘full Sovietization.’ Huge steam lines run above ground in many Gdańsk
neighborhoods even today. One can imagine the tremendous waste of energy as residents bared the pipes of
insulation in order to heat gardens!
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Ogródki działkowe - allotment gardening – is a Polish cultural tradition. Nearly every town has
a fenced, collective garden such as the ‘Kostecki II’ in Wałbrzych. The best individual plots are
highly coveted and are passed down through generations. Some Poles also retreat to rural
‘daczy’ - as do Russians to their dachas. Like the Poles, the Russian ‘dachniks’ (дачники’ –
dacha owners) covet their little ‘estates’ and take great pride in them.

In addition to gardening, some interviewees remembered picking berries and mushrooms to
supplement their diet. Preserving food by home canning and making jam from wild fruit or from
fruit picked in long abandoned orchards were also common alternatives. Some city residents had
family or friends in rural areas and were able to purchase both vegetables and meat from them.
One interviewee recalled visiting a bar in which the meat from a recently killed deer was being
sold at a high price, and several individuals told stories of obtaining rabbit meat from hunting
trips. Thus, life went on in Gdańsk, and across Poland, and across the entire Soviet Bloc in the
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1980s in this ‘make-do’ way of urban homesteading, foraging, and the occasional rabbit hunt.
These innovative alternatives, and many more, sustained the lives of the proletariat, the urbanindustrial working class, in the failing worker’s paradise, as they patiently endured a peaceful
‘evolution’ in lieu of the certainty of violence an open revolution would bring.

Polish daczy with fruit trees, garden space, and a very rustic little dacha house.
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5. Competitive Queuing, Blackmarket Trading, And Other Necessary Consumer Sports
_________________________________
Daily Life In Gdańsk
Synopsis
Derived from oral histories, chapter five discusses the many alternative economic strategies
developed by residents of Gdańsk during the 1980s. Discussed are black market trading and
informal employment (czarny rynek handlowy and fucha czarna robota), the smuggling of
foreign-made goods into Poland, the trading of skilled labor, bribing, stealing, and otherwise
circumventing formal or official channels of economic exchange. Most citizens of the People’s
Republic Of Poland, far from being submissive automatons beaten-down by authoritarianism and
ideological indoctrination, were, by necessity, independent, informal ‘entrepreneurs,’ engaged in
a plethora of economic activities far more ‘commercial’ in nature than most average Western
citizens ever experienced in their daily lives. Simply obtaining the basic necessities of living
entailed entrepreneurial skills and trading savvy that would intimidate most Americans.
Communism as a lived system, in its final years in the Soviet Bloc, inadvertently prepared
citizens for transition to market capitalism by virtue of necessitating entrepreneurial survival
skills. Chapter five, Daily Life In Gdańsk, as well as chapter six, Daily Life In Wałbrzych, relate
valuable and unique oral histories of life in the People’s Republic Of Poland, and capture the
sense of private desperation that ran parallel to a collective sense of ‘running out the clock’ – of
waiting-out the historical evolution of the Soviet Legacy; evolution, not revolution, was hoped
for. Throughout the 1980s few Westerners grasped the enormity of the events quietly transpiring
in Eastern Europe; thus, the events of 1989 – 1991 came as a shock to the West. Poles, however,
believed their ‘nightmare’ would eventually come to an end – either through violent Soviet
intervention that would totally eradicate their State’s identity, or – as it did – in peaceful
evolution of the entire Soviet Bloc system.

Competitive Queuing

Street, tramway, and sidewalk, all running closely parallel to storefronts - typical layout in Eastern European
industrial towns.

Street Scene December 20, 1982, Gdańsk:
By 5:00 AM the line stretched two city blocks, and 5:00 AM was an hour before night curfew
was up. It was rumored that canned ham had arrived overnight. This would be the last
opportunity to buy meat for Christmas, unless one had ‘connections’ in some farm village and
had a means to travel there. By the time Mrs. Skibińska got the children off for school the line
was three-quarters of a mile long. But she had a plan; she would hold the family’s place in line
until Zosia, the oldest daughter, was free from school. Zosia would hold the place till her father
got off from work and ate supper. Mr. Skibiński would wait in line until the store closed or ran
out of ham, whichever came first.
The line moved so slowly because only a dozen people at a time were allowed in the tiny
store. They had to present coupons for what they wanted and wait at a counter until a dimwitted
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boy brought the items from a windowless, concrete-block storage room in the back. Ham was
like gold and the storeroom like Fort Knox. Then there was the inevitable time consuming
argument with that bitch-of-a-store-clerk. It didn’t matter what store you went to or even if ham
was involved or not – all the store clerks were evil, power-crazed bitches who went into a rage if
you gave them a large bill to break, complained about the quality of the junk they sold, or asked
for more items than you had coupons for. Seinfeld’s ‘Soup Nazi’ must have been dreamed-up by
a former resident of Gdańsk who had daily encounters with ‘The People’s Store Clerks.’
Mrs. Skibińska’s back, legs and feet ached from standing on the cobblestone sidewalk all day. At
least it wasn’t snowing. She hated to wait in line when it snowed, not because it was any colder,
but because it was so depressing. There was an old, cobbled-up, coal-fired power plant nearby –

Smokestack of Gdańsk’s downtown, coal-fired powerplant in the background. In the foreground, a collective garden and
daczy accumulating sooty snow.

a gift to the people of Gdańsk from Uncle Joe Stalin – and so much soot poured out of its
smokestack that it turned the piles of cigarette-strewn snow black. Mrs. Skibińska said it made
Gdańsk into a black and white world in the winter, and that was really depressing. The only
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good thing about the power plant was that its steam lines ran above ground. People tore the
insulation off the steam pipes and planted little garden plots beside them – the lost heat extended
the growing season a little and the only way to be sure you had fresh vegetables was to grow
them yourself. There was a joke about this: you knew you had crossed over into Eastern Europe
when you saw rows of onions following the above-ground steam pipes that ran to your house.

Collective garden, ‘Lech Wałęsa,’ on a December day – Gdańsk.

Zosia relieved her mother around 3:00PM. She tried to read while standing in line but an old
lady kept prodding her from behind each time she failed to inch forward at every immediate
opportunity. Line-standing was a competitive sport for Gdańsk housewives and they took it very
seriously. Rumors traveled down the line that the ham was nearly gone – but this was always the
case (it was a form of homegrown psychological warfare), and such rumors had been spreading
since early morning. These rumors were meant for novices like Zosia who might believe them
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and give up; but she was more experienced than the old babuczki (grandmaws) gave her credit
for. At 6:00 PM her father came and took the final watch to get the Christmas ham.
By 8:15 Mr. Skibiński was the fourth person from the door. Now he could see that bitch-of-astore-clerk through the front window. Then, in the snap of a finger, a tragedy happened: the
clerk leaned her fat, ugly head out the door and screamed, “Ham’s gone! Go home!” A
collective curse rose at the head of the line and those still a block away knew exactly what had
happened. Most people spat and swore or kicked the nearest garbage can – then headed for
home, face down, muttering threats to store clerks. Since he was so near the door, Mr. Skibiński
waited a few more minutes. Maybe there was something else inside he could buy and trade it for
a canned ham – but what could be so valuable?

Gdańsk tram on a winter day.
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It was Mr. Skibiński’s lucky day. That bitch-of-a-store-clerk had held back several crates of
toilet paper – she had hid them in the back room just for this occasion – to soothe the hearts of
those who would be ham-less for Christmas. ‘Maybe store clerks aren’t so bad after all,’ thought
Mr. Skibiński, as he slung an entire carton of toilet paper – 24 rolls – onto his back, like some
kind of perverse Santa Claus. ‘I’ll ask around at work tomorrow,’ he thought, ‘Surely someone
will have some kind of meat from the country they’ll want to trade for this – you can’t grow toilet
paper on the farm.’ But Mr. Skibiński’s good luck had ran out. On his way home, a young man
jumped from a railing, knocked Mr. Skibiński to the ground, and ran off with his treasure. Only
his pride was injured, but he had neither ham nor toilet paper for Christmas, and nothing at all
to show for the 12 hours his family had wasted standing in line.
A story told the author by ‘Anna,’ an interviewee from Gdańsk

Queuing for trams on a freezing day near the Baltic Coast in Gdańsk.
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______________________________
Apart from working in the ‘slave provisioning grounds,’1 as one resident called the allotment
gardens of Gdańsk (as described in the previous chapter), and standing in the above described
‘deficit commodity lines,’ two other activities typified life in the city during the 1980s: czarny
rynek handlowy (black market trading), and fucha czarna robota (part-time ‘under the table’
work, or ‘black work’). Both were practical responses to everyday shortages, black market items
being the usual currency of black market work, except when work was simply traded for work. 2
Seaport access apparently made the Baltic Coast cities Meccas of activity in illegal trade which
filtered down to individuals and dispersed throughout the country. This chapter relates the
experiences of several interviewees whose ‘entrepreneurialism in a non-capitalist system’
consisted of black market trading and working, bartering and bribing, all common adaptations to
Poland’s major economic dysfunction in the decade before transition to a market economy.
Interview data suggests these ‘proto-capitalists’ (i.e., black market entrepreneurs) along with the
nomenklatura class (Communist Party members, many of whom were simultaneously
blackmarketeers) took the forefront in the post-1989 transition to capitalism (to be discussed in
the final chapter). This chapter also begins to make the distinction between the Baltic Coast and
Lower Silesia in terms of their different economic circumstances and adaptations as part of the

1

‘Czarek,’ interview by author, 6/19/2012. ‘Czarek,’ a history teacher, likened the plethora of legal and
illegally placed gardens in Gdańsk during the Communist period to ‘slave provisioning grounds’ per an article he
had read describing small garden allotments granted to negro slaves in the American South. In addition to daily
plantation work for the master, some slaves had to grow much of their own food ‘in their spare time,’ similarly as
many Gdańsk factory workers did.
2

‘Non-market reciprocity exchange’ being the technical term used for informal trading of both goods and
services in most anthropological literature. ‘Kinship and friendship reciprocity networks’ are usually the primary
means of exchange in pre-modern societies, but they played increasingly important roles across the Soviet Bloc in
the final years of Communism.
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People’s Republic Of Poland, continuing into the proceeding comparative chapter titled, ‘Daily
Life In Wałbrzych.’
How did the Polish black market operate and what sort of items did it deal in? Marta, an
interviewee from Gdańsk, related a typical scenario that was repeated by several other Baltic
Coast residents. Marta’s grandfather had been a merchant seaman and spent his working lifetime
on freighters. “He always had for sale work gloves, canned meat, flashlights and batteries,”
Marta said, “he bought big quantities of these on sea trips and sold them when he was in port for
a little extra cash.”3 In discussing similar activities with other (more cynical? more realistic?
more truthful?) interviewees it was suggested that more likely the old seaman had simply stolen
these common items from his ship’s stores rather than had bought large quantities for resale.
Buying for resale at a marked-up price was generally limited to luxury items such as jewelry,
watches, cameras, and similar merchandise and was often carried out by the nomenklatura as
they had access to such items in ‘Party-Members Only’ shops.
“Back in those days everyone had some kind of ‘trade stock’ they dealt in,” ‘Anna,’ a lifelong Gdańsk resident, commented.4 “A lot of it was petty items taken from the workplace. I
‘specialized’ in typewriter ribbons because I worked in an office. Of course, this was illegal and
dangerous, but it was very, very common.” Anna continued, explaining that everyone ‘had
connections’ to which they looked as a secondary source of basic, everyday processed consumer
items (canned meat, canned vegetables, coffee, tea, candy, etc.) as well as ‘special sources’ for
harder to get items widely ranging from her typewriter ribbons, to spark plugs, hand tools, coal
and even gasoline. These items were available from individuals who had pilfered small quantities
3

M. Skibinska, interview by author, 12/20/2010.

4

‘Anna,’ interview by author, 12/21/2010.
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from their workplace – food processing plant workers were especially notorious as reliable
sources of canned meat.5 Miners and railroad workers were often paid, in part, with bags of coal
which they generously helped themselves to – well beyond their quota – for resale to friends.
Mine bosses turned the other way after receiving bottles of vodka (the vodka itself probably
pilfered from a local distillery), and as Anna remarked, “…all ‘transactions’ were accompanied
by vodka. Bribes and trades were expected from anyone with authority over, or access to
consumer items (such as store clerks, truck drivers, plant managers, distribution officers, etc.),
and as their pay was low too, this was considered their ‘supplemental income.” 6 Gasoline was
harder to get than coal in the People’s Republic Of Poland (it was rationed by coupons till the
late 1980s) but any enterprise that had major access to gasoline became a black market source of
fuel. Workers on highway crews, airport maintenance operations, and trucking firms offered
bosses the customary bottle of vodka as they siphoned off a few gallons of fuel ‘for home use,’
and there was also a constant bartering of gas coupons.
“You could get anything you wanted in Poland if you knew the right person, had enough
money, and could wait long enough,” Anna joked. “It was networks of friends…you didn’t call a
5

‘Mrs. Danka,’ interview by author, 12/22/2010. Fresh meat was sometimes pilfered by butcher shop employees
as well. This interviewee told a story of how her mother bought meat from a butcher shop worker who carried a
piece or two of meat home each day in his coat pocket. ‘Mrs. Danka’s’ mother once bought a large bag of this
stolen, frozen meat. On the way home her train was delayed for quite a while and the meat started thawing. Blood
ran out of her shopping bag, giving away her unusually large ‘purchase.’ She was detained by police who questioned
where and how she could have bought so much meat in time of shortage. She was threatened by the police, but not
charged with any crime – because she gave the officers the bag of meat! The story demonstrates the prevalence of
‘informal arrangements,’ be they with a pilfering butcher or the local police department.
6

Walter L. Hixson, Witness To Disintegration: Provincial Life In The Last Years Of The USSR (Hanover, New
Hampshire: University Press Of New England, 1993), 39. Hixson claims that in the Soviet Bloc it was possible to
spot anyone with workplace access to food - store clerks, truck drivers, and those who worked in processing plants
– because most had “Santa Claus bellies” whereas the average citizen was rather thin. Such workers would pilfer
small quantities of food daily, yet, Hixson explains, this was not considered stealing – merely taking advantage of
their situation. In fact, some considered their actions a ‘service’ to their fellow citizens as they sold part of their
take. Interestingly, such persons were not socially condemned but were said to have ‘blat,’ or ‘wpływ,’ that is,
‘pull’ or ‘influence,’ and were thus, informally, of a slightly higher social status.
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stranger and say, ‘hey, I heard you have stolen ham for sale.’ Back then, people met at each
other’s homes almost every night – they visited – neighbors just dropped in – no one had money
for movies or restaurants – they entertained themselves by visiting, talking, cooking, eating
together – much more often than today. This is where our ‘trading’ occurred…among trusted
friends.” 7 Anna also described how some Gdańsk housewives traded ‘line-waiting time.’ One
woman would take the ration coupons of several of her friends, wait the required several hours in
line (depending on the scarcity of the item), and thus be able to ‘buy in bulk’ for the entire
shopping pool. Officially, this was ‘legal,’ but it often elicited howls of anger from other
shoppers who feared scarce supplies would be exhausted by a ‘bulk buyer.’ Furious women
would yell, “What are you doing? Starting your own restaurant? Opening your own store?
Leave something for us poor folks!” It was also possible, according to Anna, to hire certain
persons - “usually old men or drunks,” she said - to simply stand in a shopping line in your place,
with your ration coupons. They would be paid with a very small, pre-agreed-upon ‘cut’ of the
shopping list.
Beyond the small-scale pilfering of goods from local workplaces and distribution hubs, some
interviewees believed that organized rings of illegal traders operated out of the Baltic Coast
ports. They cited as evidence for this the occasional, highly publicized, breakup of criminal
trading rings and news of harsh punishment for the operatives. However, some interviewees
questioned the validity of these alleged ‘breakups.’ Anna, for example, flatly stated that she
believed them to be police fabrications aimed at scaring the general public away from their
‘everyday informal trading.’ There were times when the ‘informal sources’ dried up, she

7

‘Anna,’ interview by author, 12/21/2010. ‘Friendship and kinship networks’ were indispensible for securing
items in short supply.
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recalled, forcing everyone to rely on State-operated stores and thus creating the maddeningly
frustrating waiting lines described in this chapter’s opening vignettes.8 None-the-less, foreign
goods poured into Baltic Coast cities (through shipping channels) and were legally sold in
special shops reserved for Communist Party members only. Dr. Barbara Wejnert stated that this
type of shop existed across Communist controlled Eastern Europe and the USSR and often stood
as a focus of contention between common citizens facing dire shortages of everyday consumer
goods and Party members who had access to luxury items. 9 According to Dr. Wejnert, these
shops carried fine wine and chocolate, liquor, jewelry, cameras, the latest electronic items, and
high quality clothing, shoes, and purses. All Party members could shop in these stores, and select
Party members operated them – allegedly with high personal profit. According to ‘Rosa,’ a brisk
illegal trade was also carried on between owners of these ‘Party-Only Shops’ and non-Party
members in Baltic Coast cities – at greatly inflated prices. “This is where the few luxury items
common people had came from – this is where nearly all wedding rings and engagement rings
came from…from corrupt Party-only shop owners…well, I think all of them were corrupt!” 10
The transactions consisted of a simple mark-up and resale for profit of luxury items to non-Party
members by Party members.
8

Hixson, Witness To Disintegration. Hixson’s book describes life in Kazan in the decade prior to the 1991
transition. It is replete with stories of daily life that echo the experiences of Poles during the same decade per
interview data collected for this thesis: the frustration of long lines to purchase everyday items, hoarding of scarce
items, bribing, the necessity of ‘informal connections,’ rationing of fuel, and at times even rationing of bread.
Hixson says that Soviet citizens usually had to stand in line three times: once to see what was available, once to pay
for it, and once to pick up the item. Ironically, the longest line he ever saw was at a newly opened McDonalds
restaurant. It was “…the longest line I have ever seen in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. It stretched through
streets, around buildings, up and down hills, to Vladivostok for all I knew, for I could not see the end of it…” (75).
Hixson speculates that McDonalds, this most-basic American ‘institution,’ represented “the powerful allure of the
West…” and the spectacular waiting lines revealed the desperation many Soviet citizens felt in regard to the
dysfunction of their own economy.
9

Dr. Barbara Wejnert, interview by author, 1/23/2010.

10

‘Rosa,’ interview by author, 6/16/2012. ‘Rosa’ believed that nearly all available jewelry for sale in Poland was
secondhand or antique and had been manufactured before 1939!
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Another source of hard-to-get items came through travelers, through the few who obtained
travel visas to the West. Zofia Rudnicka and her father, Tadeusz Drzewiecki, both obtained
travel visas to the West (travel visas into neighboring Soviet Bloc states were not difficult to
obtain, but Western visas were relatively rare) and both recalled taking advantage of ‘shopping
opportunities’ while traveling. Mr. Drzewiecki worked as an interpreter during the 1970s and
spent two years in Boston, Massachusetts with a State-owned Polish engineering firm. During
his stay he sent many packages of American-made clothing to his family back home in Poland.
Zofia recalled, “…my friends would gather around and say, ‘let me touch your jeans made in
America!’” Western-made clothing was in high demand in Poland and was readily saleable at a
quick profit – if one could access it through such circumstances as Zofia was afforded. She
claimed to have made a good deal of money this way, as did other Poles who had family
members on extended overseas trips or in permanent residence in the West. 11
In the early 1980s Zofia was granted a travel visa for study in West Germany. She recalled
being overwhelmed by the wide selection of clothing available there, filling luggage with newly
bought clothing before each trip back to Poland. “The first trip back I wore two or three layers of
new clothes because I was afraid my luggage would be confiscated and I would lose all my
purchases! Even though I had permission to travel, and had only simple purchase of jeans and
shirts, I was so conditioned – I think – to fear what I was doing was wrong! I was afraid also that
a good quality German-made bra was somehow ‘obscene’ and would be confiscated…cheap
Polish-made bras were like ‘one-size-fits-all’ and were not much more than a cloth bag with

11

Zofia Rudnicka and Tadeusz Drzewiecki, interview by author, 6/6/2012.
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straps…(much laughter).” These (German-made nylon bras) were ‘hot items’ in Poland and
could be sold at high price.” 12
However, as Philip Nazlecki recalled, some Western items, other than clothing, were forbidden
and possession could rate a jail sentence. 13 Mr. Nazleckei said that border guards often “tore cars
apart” looking for Western books, newspapers, and records or tapes of Western music. Yet, these
items, he recalled, seemed to be readily available in Poland through certain individuals who
informally traded them. He was not sure how the contraband items made it into Poland, but he
speculated that border guards – like nearly all Polish authorities – were paid off with bribes by
travelers who regularly made trips to Western Europe or the US. He also speculated these
‘curriers’ were probably Party members who had long-standing arrangements with their
counterparts in border inspection offices.
Throughout history, ports of entry have been conduits for the transfer of ideas as well as
material goods, and the Baltic Coast was no exception – more accurately, Gdańsk, Sopot, and
Gdynia became terminals for clandestine Western aid in the form of the material means to spread
the alternative ideology of Solidarność. As mentioned in chapter three, US, French, Italian, and
Swedish labor unions all participated in supplying Solidarity activists with printing equipment,
printing supplies, radio transmitters, and financial aid for the support of the underground press.
Many of the legendary samizdat or ‘bibuła’ newspapers - the dissident political publications
condemning the Communist Party and calling on Poles to unite in peaceful Solidarity to bring

12

Ibid.

13

Philip Nazlecki, interview by author, Malmö, Sweden, 3/28/2010. Mr. Nazlecki immigrated from Poznan to
Malmö in the early 1990s.
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about ewolucja nie rewolucja (evolution not revolution) - had their origins on presses smuggled
into the Port Of Gdańsk.
Immediately after the 1981 outlawing of Solidarność and subsequent declaration of Martial
Law, AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland set in motion the network primarily responsible for
supplying Solidarity activists with Western-made communications equipment. Arch Puddington
recalls,
…Kirkland relied on a small cadre of dedicated assistants who shared his passion for the
Solidarity cause. Tom Kahn…former aide to civil rights leader Baynard Rustin
coordinated the undertaking. Joining Kahn…was Adrian Karatnycky, an American of
Ukrainian descent who was fluent in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian…along with Irving
Brown, the AFL-CIO’s director of international affairs based in Paris… Second to Brown
was Miroslaw Dominczyk, a Solidarity activist from Kielce who had been forced into
exile after a year of martial law internment… Although the AFL- CIO was not the only
source of assistance [to Solidarity], it was by far the largest supplier of material aid. 14

Puddington continues, stating that overall, the AFL-CIA channeled over $4 million of aid to
Solidarity, the majority passing through Gdańsk. Similar to the above-mentioned ‘informal
friends networks,’ as described by interviewee ‘Anna,’ networks of merchant seamen, dock
workers, general laborers, and truck drivers combined forces with AFL-CIO operatives, mainly
in Paris, Brussels, and London, smuggling in many tons of equipment between 1981 and 1985. 15
This plethora of seemingly incredible stories of ‘friends networks’ and various other
‘informal networks’ through which Communist era Poles obtained items as varied as bags of coal
14

Arch Puddington, “How American Unions Helped Solidarity Win,” in Lane Kirkland: Champion Of American
Labor (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 182.
15

Ibid., “Solidarity Forever,” 163 – 190. Kirkland’s interest in the Polish Solidarity Movement was spurred on by
his Czech-born wife, Irena, and President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski.
Kirkland actively promoted this interest throughout American labor unions affiliated with AFL-CIO. Many local
unions in the US set up small ‘committees of support for Solidarity’ to raise money for the cause. During the 1980s
the author of this thesis served on one such committee at Allied Chemical Corporation’s Semet Solvay operation in
Ashland, Kentucky.
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from Oświęcim, to printing presses from Chicago, to bras from Munich, turns now from czarny
rynek handlowy (black market trading), to fucha czarna robota (part-time ‘under the table’
work). Before doing so, an academic note on ‘really existing communism’ – communism as a
lived system, as opposed to its theoretical operationalization – must be added to help validate the
notion that so much ‘clandestine activity’ actually occurred in an alleged ‘police state.’ Karen
Dawisha elaborates on this topic, opening a paper with a Russian anecdote that aptly sums up the
scenario:

The Russian definition of the difference between dictatorship and freedom: When
nothing is allowed, everything is possible. When everything is allowed, nothing is
possible.16

Under the Soviet thumb for some forty years, the same adage apparently applied to Poles as
well. The plethora of informal networks committed to black market trading, black market work,
smuggling, bribing, concealing, manipulating, etc., was part and parcel of the normal, daily,
routinized operation of communism as a long-term, lived system; material survival depended on
access to ‘alternative modes of production and distribution.’ Poles, along with citizens of the
USSR proper and all other Soviet-dominated territories, came to “embrace the irony,” as
Dawisha puts it, of ‘really existing communism’ in that it simultaneously incorporated
… the idea of respect for centralized power, the idea of a large sphere for private
interactions, and horizontal networks of mutual cooperation and informal connections…a
unique mix of beliefs, practices, values, and institutions shared by members of the
society…that make up a net of both formal and informal ideas…as they are lived by the
ordinary people…17
16

Karen Dawisha, “Communism As A Lived System Of Ideas In Contemporary Russia,” in East European
Politics And Society, Vol. 19, 2005, pp. 463 – 493.
17

Ibid., 468
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Or more succinctly, when ‘nothing was allowed,’ all, by necessity, ‘became possible.’ The
centralized economy was failing to meet the daily needs of Poles; thus, out of necessity, they
turned to elaborate, informal, economic networks.18 Thus the explanation for myriads of
‘alternatives’ in former Soviet Bloc economies, not normally found in the open, democratic,
market-driven, capitalist West.19
As somewhat of a ‘psychological antidote’ to the inconvenience, frustration, and waste of
time entailed in navigating Poland’s official bureaucratic systems – when no informal
alternatives were available – a set of situation-appropriate jokes evolved. Several slight
variations of the ‘line-standing joke’ were told by various interviewees, the basic form being as
follows: “It was a typical day in Jaruzelski’s Poland and the people of Gdańsk spent much of it
as usual: standing in line. There were lines to get permission to install a telephone, to buy a used
car, to get on a ten-year waiting list to rent an apartment, to convert ‘pay-tokens’ to złotys (some
factories still paid workers in ‘scrip’ which needed conversion – similar to the ‘company store’

18

Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics And
Business (Ithaca, New York: The Cornel University Press, 2006). Ledeneva describes “an economy of favors’” (18)
that pervaded not only daily life in the Soviet Bloc but politics and business as well. Far more elaborate than the
most complex bartering schemes described by my Polish interviewees, Ledeneva must several times resort to
diagrams in order to explain the intricacies of Russian ‘informal bureaucracy.’ Still, the same reasons drove
Gazprom executives to ‘wheel and deal under the table’ as drove Gdańsk housewives to seek ‘covert sources’ of
ham and cheese: the reality of a hopelessly dysfunctional official system, the continued breakdown and corruption of
the system, loss of faith in the system, the frustration of dealing with the official bureaucracy and/or system, and the
positive incentive of – perhaps – personal profit from ‘playing’ the informal system. The ultimate form of this
personal agenda came in the 1989 – 1991 transition across the Soviet Bloc when a new generation of capitalist
millionaires emerged from the ranks of former Communist Party bosses as the entire system underwent
privatization. Those who best knew how to play the ‘informal bureaucracy’ and the ‘economy of favors’ got rich.
19

Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate The Twenty-First
Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 144. Ideological rigidity was a primary problem in the Soviet Bloc version
of Communism. Strict, legal adherence to ideological orthodoxy especially as it pertained to economic
arrangements seems to have been the norm from the Stalin era forward. One factor in the current success story of
Chinese Communism is what Halper calls ‘the bamboo policy,’ which allows for sensible economic flexibility
(“bending in the wind rather than standing straight and eventually snapping”). Like Lenin’s 1921 NEP policy,
modern China’s ‘commanding heights of the economy’ are controlled by the State and great variance is given to
small-scale, private entrepreneurs who fill much needed gaps in the centrally planned economy. Lacking this
official leeway, Polish citizens created informal, although technically illegal, versions of it.
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setup in 19th Century Appalachian coal towns). To buy groceries required first standing in line to
get commodities coupons; to get commodities coupons required first standing in line to see a
local State functionary who distributed coupons according to family needs (the sick, elderly,
handicapped, and infants had specific allotments). Then, some stores had three lines: one to see
what was available, one to pay for it, and one to pick up your item. In the ‘potato line’ on Ulica
Piękna (‘Beautiful Street’) one man had enough; he said, “Fuck this! I’m going to Warsaw to kill
Jaruzelski!” Two days later he returned – same people, same line. They asked, “So, did you kill
Jaruzelski?” The man replied, “No. Line was too long.”
Another joke concerns the unequal trade balance between Poland and Russia: “Did you hear
about the new ‘two-lane pipeline’ from Moscow to Warsaw? One side uses a six-inch diameter
pipe, the other a thirty-six-inch diameter pipe.” Why such a size difference? “The six-inch-pipe
brings oil to Poland, the thirty-six-inch pipe is for driving live hogs back to Russia!”
And finally, concerning long waits for basic consumer services, there is this one: “A man saved
his money for ten years to buy a new car - a Fiat Bambino. On January 1st, 1980 he went to the
car dealership and proudly presented his savings in cash, purchased the new car, and asked when
it will be delivered. The dealer told him, ‘Your new car will arrive precisely at 2 PM, on August
25th, 1995.’ The man was furious and said, “I can’t pick it up at that time – that’s when they’re
coming to install my telephone!”
In 2011 a board game was created and marketed in Poland with the aim of demonstrating to a
new generation the economic frustrations of times past. It is described as follows:
You won't get to build hotels or collect rent in a new Polish board game reminiscent of
Monopoly. In fact, you may be lucky even to get a pair of shoes. Poland's state-run
National Remembrance Institute has created the new game – called "Kolejka," which
means queue or line – to help young Poles understand the hardships of life under
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communism. In the game, players are tasked with buying a number of goods, but a lack
of deliveries, shortages and the connections competitors have to communist authorities
turn the task into a string of frustrations.
“We want to show young people and remind the older ones what hard times these were
and what mechanisms were at
play," said Karol Madaj, the
game's creator.
Players try to buy basic goods but
food supplies run out before they
reach the counter. If a bed is

needed, they may be offered stools instead.
Players needing the shop's last pair of shoes
can get edged out by someone holding a
"mother with small child" or "friend in
government" card.
"We want to show how it was when you lost
your chance because someone with high
connections jumped the line," said Madaj, a 30-year-old who still remembers spending long
hours with his mother in lines. We may laugh at it today, but it was not funny for them, when
they were wasting their lives in lines." The game is best played by members of various
generations because it evokes emotions in older players who start to talk about their
experiences.20
As the board game recalls, ‘special connections’ were necessary to obtain ‘deficit items,’ and
nearly every Pole had some specialized, informal ‘trade stock’ (from typewriter ribbons to bags
of coal) to ply on the black market. Likewise, most had some specialized skill or service for trade
20

Monika Scislowska, ‘Polish Board Game Recalls Communist Hardships,’ in Huffington Post World Edition,
1/26/2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/line-polish-board-game-re_n_814177.html. Pictures on this
page from same source.
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or sale by the hour – czarna robota. Ironically, much ‘black work’ was performed by common
citizens for Communist Party members (the nomenklatura), as they were usually the only
segment of the population who could afford to pay for domestic services. This aptly illustrates,
per Dawisha’s observation (above), a great irony of ‘real existing communism,’ that in practice a
great respect for centralized power was accompanied by much leeway for ‘horizontal networks
of mutual cooperation and informal connections.’ This observation apparently held true for both
dedicated Party members and average citizens.
Interviewee ‘Zuzka’ explained czarna robata and her own interaction with the nomenklatura
as follows:
Czarna robata was work ‘under the table,’ without registration, without taxation…for
cash…off the record. Ordinary people worked again after their regular work for
‘government people’ [Party members] on their private properties. Men would work on
building or repairs, paint houses, work on cars, move heavy furniture or appliances,
maintain yard or garden. Women would do cleaning, cooking, hair dressing, care for
children, care for old people. Remember, this was ‘traditional time’ – women did all the
housework, cooking, cleaning at home – Polish men never did any of these things! So
women worked all the time! ‘Big government people,’ those employed by military,
police, or State, paid well, and I worked both in the factory and for these ‘bosses’ in their
home. 21

Of course, this set-up between workers and nomenklatura was illegal – in theory, there were
no private workers or private enterprises in the People’s Republic Of Poland – but it was a very
common and accepted part of ‘the lived system of communism.’ ‘On paper’ the system did not
allow for any small-scale, local, private enterprises or entrepreneurs, but in reality they existed as
‘czarna robata.’ In the People’s Republic Of Poland, the official system of organizing workers
21

‘Zuzka,’ interview by author, 6/12/2012. ‘Zuzka’ also mentioned that ‘professional people’ did ‘professional
versions’ of czarna robata. For example, clerical workers, teachers, lawyers and even medical doctors offered
private, off-the-record services for those who could afford it. Private photographers, dressmakers, clothing alteration
specialists, music teaching and language lessons rounded out the ‘skilled services offered’ list compiled by ‘Zuzka.’
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for the plethora of small-scale enterprises that make up any modern economic system was called
spółdzielnia (worker's collectives). 22
It must be remembered that every legal enterprise in the Soviet-style economic system was
state-operated; private means of production, except in very rare cases, were forbidden on an
ideological basis regardless of the impracticality (one reason for the system's demise). In other
words, the ‘crime’ of working for oneself was not simply the possibility of failure to pay taxes
(as happens with many ‘side jobs’ in the US under capitalism), rather it was considered
competition with the state monopoly. Thus, the smallest and most obscure businesses or services
that we take for granted in the capitalist system were operated by the state in the communist
system. For example, the many services considered 'one-man or two-man operations,' such as
locksmiths, barbers, hair dressers, tax preparers, plumbers, auto mechanics, house painters,
building maintenance, pest control, etc., etc., etc., and small scale retail shops - everything from
a corner coffee shop to a newsstand - were state operated. This was accomplished through the
worker's collective known as Spółdzielnia.
Spółdzielnia may also be described as local craft collectives; local groups of skilled or semiskilled workers organized together as 'work units.' They were organized around a specific
geographic area or neighborhood. For example, the local auto mechanic, barber, coffee shop
attendant, handy man, window washer, and nail salon operator might all be organized into a local
Spółdzielnia (although their crafts were not at all connected they were simply organized by
locale). Their work would be supervised, records kept, pay distributed, etc., through the
management of the Spółdzielnia to which they belonged, just as, for example, a single large-

22

Zofia Rudnicka, interview by author, 6/6/2012. Ms. Rudnicka explained the operation and organization of the
Spółdzielnia from many years of first-hand experience, as both worker and manager in a Spółdzielnia. These small,
locally organized, worker governed, worker managed collectives were ‘soviets’ in the truest sense – functioning
workers’ councils at the grassroots level.
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scale block of specific tradespersons - welders in a shipyard, assembly workers in an auto plant,
laborers on a construction site - would be organized through a trade-specific union. Solidarność
was an 'umbrella' type labor union; all occupations could join; the Spółdzielnia were stateoperated unions; Solidarność was the first independent union in a communist country and was
promoted as an alternative to state-operated unions.
The point here is that neither czarna robata or work done through Solidarność were legal or
formally recognized alternatives in filling the economic gaps beyond ‘the commanding heights
of the economy’ – only Spółdzielnia could legally do this. The idea of the Spółdzielnia evolved
from the similar Russian version, кооператив (cooperative) which filled the small enterprise and
service gap after the outlawing of the NEP in 1928. 23 The prevalence and volume of work done
as czarna robata (informal and technically illegal), evolved in response to the inadequacies and
inefficiencies of the Spółdzielnia system. No statistical data is available to quantify this
statement specifically, but interview data suggests that the majority of basic non-commercial
services were not provided by the Spółdzielnia system, but through czarna robata. Party
members with higher than average incomes paid common citizens for such services and
common citizens simply ‘traded work.’
Andrzej Falkowski explained the importance of trading work in the People’s Republic Of
Poland in relation to the tremendous housing shortage that plagued most cities from the end of
WWII until the post-transition building boom of the 1990s. As recounted in Chapter 2, Andrzej
waited some 20 years for a single family apartment. In addition to decades-long waiting lists in
23

Stalin outlawed the NEP (New Economic Policy) after Lenin’s death , thereby making all private enterprise
illegal. The Kооператив systems took up the slack left in the economy in the USSR and a similar system,
Spółdzielnia, was used in Poland after ‘full Sovietization.’ Both the Spółdzielnia and Kооператив were ‘ideological
baggage’ that made little economic sense, but were necessary after outlawing of small private enterprises and
services. With the revival of Solidarność, after the liberalizing trend of 1985, the union actually facilitated ‘private
means of production.’ It gave loans to individuals ‘blackballed’ by the State per their affiliation with Solidarność so
that they could start small-scale private business.
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the cities, he also described the near impossibility of obtaining a bank loan for new building,
expanding, or remodeling in rural areas. Much of rural Poland was never collectivized (to be
discussed in the next chapter) and many families in the countryside had land available for
building room additions or new, separate houses for the younger generation, but they had no
means of finance.24 Some were able to circumvent this by trading labor, but obtaining building
supplies was more difficult, as Andrzej described:
In rural areas some people had land and when the son or daughter got married they
wanted their own place to live… Let's say we wanted to build a house - OK - we help
each other! When I'm finished with mine, I help you – then we help our neighbor build
his. We didn't pay - didn't charge - it was labor traded for labor. And if someone knew a
trade like electricity, plumbing - that guy helped with that kind of work. The guys who
know bricks traded their work - you see, we traded what we knew - we helped each
other…
But like everything else, you waited in line to buy things to build with. Maybe you can
buy two bags of cement today - wait a month, buy two more bags…all materials were in
very short supply. Lay some bricks - wait for cement - it was slow! And for roof - the
tiles for roof – very hard to get! People used stone they found by the roadside, broken
concrete block, used brick, chunks of concrete from old buildings [being torn down]…
anything like that to fill-in walls, then plaster over them. In other words, during this time,
Polish houses were built of junk held together by mortar. It was common to build a shed
on the side of a house one year, maybe make a floor two years later, a wall in three years
– you understand – after 15 years maybe, of building a little at a time, you had a room
added to your home. Your son or daughter got married and the new family lived in this
room addition.25
24

Zofia Rudnicka, interview by author, 6/6/2012. This interviewee explained that workplaces, especially large
factories, usually offered a sort of ‘credit union loan’ for items such as furniture and appliances, but ‘home loans’ or
‘home improvement loans’ were unheard of. Basically this was because almost no city dweller owned his or her
own home (virtually all housing was State owned) and independent rural families were considered ‘second class
citizens’ by State authorities. Ms. Rudnicka said she believed hardly any common Polish citizens had savings
beyond a few hundred źoltys. She said that party members were obligated to ‘State sponsored savings plans’ in
which savings were taken out of each paycheck. The few non-Party members who did have substantial savings
suffered massive currency devaluation in the 1989 transition. Many Party members were able to ‘convert’ their
savings to property or other productive investments as discussed in chapter 7.
25

Andrzej Falkowski, interview by author, 3/16/2010. In addition to describing the trading of skilled and
unskilled labor for constructing living spaces, Mr. Falkowski also described the trading of centrally located
apartments. State-appointed housing did not always mesh well with individual’s work locations, thus apartments
were sometimes unofficially traded by residents rather than endure the red-tape nightmare of obtaining legal
permission for a relocation. Trades of very desirably located apartments were sometimes accompanied by informal
cash payments between the traders – highly illegal, but just one more way in which Poles ‘worked the system’ to
their mutual advantage.
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In summary then, as the preceding examples have demonstrated, average citizens of Gdańsk
developed an extensive network of alternative economic practices in order to offset the
deficiencies in the ‘official’ system. The extensive ‘urban gardening’ as described earlier in
chapter four, along with chapter five’s black market trading, illegal black work, direct trading of
work, extended ‘friends’ networks,’ and outright bribing and stealing, were all common survival
strategies in 1980s Poland. The next chapter turns to Wałbrzych, and emphasizes the differences
in alternative economic strategies between the two cities.

Owner-built sheds with walls of masonry rubble in Gdańsk as pointed out by Mr. Falkowski. The further shed has been
walled-in and converted to an ‘apartment’ for a young couple. This idea was ‘standard practice’ until the post-transition
building boom. Separate housing for newly married couples was virtually nonexistent from the end of WWII until the 1990s.
Young couples and their children lived with their parents until the older generation died or the 20+ year apartment waiting
list offered a vacancy – whichever came first.
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6. Memories of The Golden Age Of Socialism
___________________________
Daily Life In Wałbrzych
Synopsis
Chapter six discusses the lived experience of communism in the Sudaty town of Wałbrzych,
during the 1980s, in comparison to the same decade in Gdańsk. The chapter notes the structural
and ideological differences of the two regions, emphasizing Wałbrzych’s more ‘relaxed
Communist orthodoxy,’ its ‘rural proletariat,’ and its prevalence of Panowie, caudillo-like local
Party bosses who operated private enterprises while simultaneously maintaining dutiful loyalty
to the Polish Communist Party. The chapter begins to explain the contradictory nature of
regional versions of Polish Communism, as it proceeds from an opening narrative quite
dissimilar from other accounts thus far given. Wałbrzych enjoyed the ‘golden age of socialism,’
through the 1960s and 1970s, while conflict simmered on the Baltic Coast. In the 1980s
Solidarność brought to Wałbrzych ‘political awareness’ along with economic turmoil.
Sudetenland had existed in relative isolation to the politically active Coastal cities, and Lower
Silesia, in general, had been ‘pacified’ by the State, in part, by several post-WWII infrastructure
developments – ‘socialist showcase’ industrial works and planned towns. In conjunction with the
‘relaxed orthodoxy’ of the region (i.e., many small private farms owned by common, local
citizens and private enterprises owned by nomenklatura) and the abundance of relatively wellpaying industrial jobs - under more modern working conditions than, for example, the old
Coastal ‘rust-belt’ shipyards – communism worked for Wałbrzych, much better, and much
longer than it had in the north. Nonetheless, Wałbrzych residents participated in informal
economic activities as did their counterparts in the north. However, informal work in Wałbrzych
was generally limited to off-the-record jobs provided by the Panowie. The plethora of informal,
alternative economic arrangements found to have been undertaken in Gdańsk – some of which
bordered rather on the bizarre – was unheard of in Wałbrzych. In Sudaty, it appears that major
economic dysfunctions arrived rather late (in early the 1980s) and thereafter rapidly devastated
the region’s economy; massive layoffs, and plant and mine shut-downs, were followed by mass
out-migration as residents found few other alternatives. In this light, Solidarność and the entire

Solidarity Movement has a far greater tendency to be viewed as an object of blame, in Sudaty, as
opposed to its being revered as a ‘savior’ in the north.
______________________________________________
Memories of The Golden Age Of Socialism

Oksana remembers Wałbrzych…
I had a good life growing up here. We were not rich but certainly were not poor – there were
no shortages or lines back then [in the 1960’s and 1970’s] – those started when General
Jaruzelski took over [1980]. My grandfather called him [Jaruzelski] ‘the welder’ because he
wore those big, ridiculous dark glasses, winter and summer, day and night! My friends called
him ‘The Buddha,’ because he tried to appear so calm and dignified, but we all knew he was not
in control of the country – no one was in control – we were spinning into disaster…

Train Station, Wałbrzych

127

I lived in a small apartment in town with my mother – my mother and father divorced when I
was very little… I spent every summer on Ulica Wilcza [Wolf Street] just outside of town where
my [maternal] grandparents lived. They had a small farm and I loved it there! They were what
you might say ‘rich’ for that time. My grandfather worked in town in a factory – some kind of
metal foundry, I think – and he also had this small farm, so there was plenty of everything. He
even had a motorbike, which was rare, so that made him ‘rich!’ They had TV also in the 1960s,
which was rare for most people until the 1970s… In addition to pigs, which every small Polish
farm had, my grandfather had honeybees - also quite rare - he had, perhaps, two dozen houses of
bees, and he sold honey in the farmers’ market in town. He had a big garden too, and they
always had potatoes and every kind of vegetable preserved for winter…

Ulica Wilcza (Wolf Street), Wałbrzych.
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My grandparents received this house and farm on Ulica Wilcza – it was tiny, only a few hectares
– when they were resettled here after WWII. They came from near Lwów [Ukraine]. The Red
Army drove the Germans out of Wałbrzych and gave land to the Polish people. During the war
my grandparents had been slaves for the Germans on a farm in Ukraine – they were very lucky
to survive. In fact, my mother was born there [on the German-occupied farm] and I don’t know
how they all lived through it because it was common for the Germans to work their prisoners to
death. They never talked about those times – never. I knew nothing of this when I was a child.
Only when I was older, I asked my mother about our ‘family history’ and she told me these
things…and she never mentioned any of it again.
There was never a shortage of work in Wałbrzych. There were coal mines everywhere – in the
countryside and even right in the middle of town. My mother worked in the office of a mine.
There were many
factories too – metal
and chemical
factories – and
porcelain too.
Wałbrzych is famous
for fine porcelain –
the clay is mined
here, and this dates
back to Medieval
times…

Krzysztof Porcelain factory and outlet store, Wałbrzych.
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One of the few remaining superstructures of a deep-mine operation inside Wałbrzych city limits. Coal was literally mined
from beneath the city streets. In the 1980s there were 23 operating coal mines in a 5 mile radius of the city’s center.

The city was very crowded when I was growing up. Few people had cars and I remember nearly
fighting my way onto the city buses – they were so crowded… My mother and I lived in a very
old apartment building but there were many new blocks of apartments built in the 1970s. This
helped with the crowding. A special block was built for mineworkers and their families on
Piaskowa Góra [Sand Mountain]. These were very nice apartments – very plain, but very new
and clean. They even had ogródki działkowe [allotment gardens] just across the street from each
apartment. That way the residents could easily walk to their gardens. Most other allotment
gardens were outside of town and people rode those crowded buses to and from their gardens…
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Life was peaceful and predictable back then [1960s and 1970s]…and there was no thought of
changing anything…At school we sang ‘happy birthday to Lenin’ and learned everything
from‘the Marxist perspective,’ but we [school children] did not take all this too seriously…

Khrushchev-style, five-story apartment blocs in Wałbrzych. A coat of white paint and colorful street-level markets are
vast improvements over the grey, raw concrete walls which characterized the Communist period. Note the wide
cobblestone streets.

Most young people just planned to get a factory job or mine job – and to get married soon
after school – mostly to get away from mom and dad and to make their own life… But things
started to come apart just after I graduated from high school …[1979] and I’m not sure why.
There were strikes at all the factories and mines and many of them were shut down – many
people lost their jobs. This is when shortages of everything started to occur. Solidarność was
very active at the mine where my mother worked…They tried to make for better pay and better
conditions but some people blame Solidarność for the shutdown of mines and factories, for the
shortages of food and clothing, for the entire economic disaster that hit Poland in the 1980s…
Life was never the same [after the turmoil of the 1980s] …and I never had the stable, normal,
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adult life my mother had… People had to sell their silverware and jewelry to buy food [referring
to triple-digit inflation during the 1989 transition to capitalism] and many people moved away in
search of work…some men went to West Germany to work and left their wives and children
here…[sending home money for the family to live on]. And you know - do you know? - there
were some people who just gave up and killed themselves – the changes were too great for them.

Rainy day in downtown Wałbrzych.
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__________________________________
During the height of the Cold War, Zbigniew Brzezinski shocked Western ‘specialists,’
when in his book, Ideology And Power In Soviet Politics, he explained that communism was not
generic – not nearly as uniform in ideology or in practice as infamous ‘Red Scare Era’ pundits
would have Americans believe.1 Rational, comparative observations should have made this
obvious. Capitalism on Wall Street does not operate exactly the same, nor is it perceived the
same, as in an Ohio village with a population of 500 people; nor is ‘American Capitalism’
identical to ‘Italian Capitalism,’ ‘Bolivian Capitalism,’ or in today’s world, ‘Chinese
Capitalism.’ Likewise, Gdańsk on the Baltic Coast, and Wałbrzych, near the Czech border (about
400 miles separate the two cities) both varied greatly per ‘the lived experience’ of ‘actually
existing socialism.’ Nearly every line of ‘Oksana’s’ story (above) conflicts with typical
‘Gdańszczanin’ accounts (accounts by citizens of Gdańsk ) of life in the People’s Republic Of
Poland. Most strikingly, for this researcher, the uniform and unquestioned support for Solidarity
– nearly a sacred religious fervor in Gdańsk – was absent in Wałbrzych; some interviewees even
expressed open hostility to Solidarność and to the Solidarity Movement in general. In describing
daily life in Wałbrzych, this chapter will attempt to account for the differences in the lived

1

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ideology And Power In Soviet Politics (London: Thames and Hudson, 1962). Fluent in
several languages and possessing thorough theoretical understanding of various political/economic systems, Mr.
Brzezinski is uniquely qualified to elaborate on the many variations of communism, and its evolution, revisionism,
and practical application from Bolshevik days to the present, worldwide. Most pertinent to this thesis, he discusses
the circumstances of Poland, Hungary, and Romania, in which were evident “…the pangs of transition from a rural
society to an industrial one lacking the indigenous support that both the Russian and Chinese Communists enjoyed”
(121). In lieu of this support, these nations in particular “abandoned the simplifications of the Soviet ideological
outlook” and by necessity – as much as was in their power in regard to ‘bending’ Moscow’s rules – created their
own working versions of Marxist-Leninism. Communist systems varied as widely as Castro’s nationalist Cuba, to
Tito’s ‘Brotherhood and Unity,’ to Mao’s inclusion of the ‘rural proletariat,’ to the police state of Nicolae
Ceaușescu. Brzezinski discusses the ‘historical stages’ of communism as well, the changes in Soviet communism
from Stalin through Khrushchev, and the political realities that Communist politicians had to deal with. No doubt
this book was considered quite an ‘inconvenient complication’ to the over-simplifiers of Cold War days – yet, in
US politics, the super-simplified, black and white paradigm dominated all the way through the Reagan era.
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experience of communism in two Polish cities, 400 miles apart, that were officially under the
identical political/economic system.
The main difference between Gdańsk and Wałbrzych is that communism worked in
Wałbrzych – or at least it worked well enough to keep most citizens of Wałbrzych satisfied with
daily life for several decades. Several factors account for this, but three general findings stand
out: (1) the local economy of Wałbrzych (of Lower Silesia in general) seems to have been ‘less
ideologically driven,’ that is, more relaxed per the restrictions on private production; (2)
ironically, although ‘less politically orthodox,’ Lower Silesia seems to have received
‘preferential treatment’ from the State in terms of facilitating industrial growth and maintaining
overall job satisfaction (as compared to the ‘uniform dissatisfaction’ that seems to have pervaded
the Baltic Coast); (3) Wałbrzych and Lower Silesia in general seem to have been ‘pacified’ and
‘rewarded’ by the State, whereas the Baltic Coast seems to have been ‘provoked’ and ‘punished’
for its rebelliousness.
The cultural, political, and economic ramifications of these three contentions are immense;
each could generate a thesis in itself and each involves complex interplays of historical
processes over many decades. That broad disclaimer stated, this chapter now attempts to
validate these three statements per the interview data and secondary sources obtained in the
course of this project’s research. Again, it is realized that more lengthy and extensive socialhistorical research would be necessary to fully validate these claims; this particular research
serves only as a framework for potential, future work.
Wałbrzych was not strictly a ‘communist utopia’ any more than Gdańsk was a bastion of
‘dark satanic mills’ within ‘The Evil Empire’ (colorful phraseology has emotionalized
discussions of communist ideology from Marx to Reagan; part of its appeal and/or revulsion).
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But the particular version of ‘communism as a lived system’ that evolved in Wałbrzych seems to
have functioned better and lasted longer than that of Gdańsk. As a starting point, ‘Oksana’s’
reference to her grandparents’ economic situation – very typical of Lower Silesia, per other
similar interviewees’ stories – is a clue to the success of communism in this particular region.
Unlike Wielkopolska (greater Poland; the great central plains), the hilly Dolny Śląsk (Lower
Silesia) and the mountainous Sudaty (Sudetenland; the Czechoslovakian borderlands in which is
located Wałbrzych), was never collectivized for agriculture.

Landscape Of Wielkopolska
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According to Tadeusz Drzewiecki, this was due to the differences in topography and the general
settlement pattern of the two regions. 2 Mr. Drzewiecki explained that Panstwowe

Landscape of Sudaty
2

Tadeusz Drzewiecki, interview by author, 6/6/2012. Mr. Drzewiecki is from the Wielkopolska region and at
age 82 at the time of this interview, remembers the collectivization of agriculture in the early 1950s. Mr.
Drzewiecki further commented on a rather controversial settlement pattern issue concerning ‘ethnic makeup’ of
southern Poland. He speculated that the many ‘Jews and Ukrainians’ resettled there after WWII, displacing
Germans, somehow made the area more receptive to Communist ideology. He added that ‘Czech people’ in
Sudetenland were also very compliant to government rules and would not dream of rebellion as did Poles. Political
attitudes notwithstanding, his comments concerning ethnic makeup are validated by Norman Davies in Microcosm:
Portrait Of A Central European City (London: Random House, 2003), 433 – 443. Davies discusses the “…largest
human migrations in modern European history” (438), i.e., the post-WWII resettlement. Just as Mr. Drzewiecki
claimed, Davies explains how Wałbrzych voivodeship (township) received some 50,000 Jewish settlers
(specifically in Dzierżoniów, a village near Wałbrzych), and millions of other repatriates, including Greek
Communist refugees, Polish-speaking Ukrainians, and Polish-speaking Russians. Davies claims the movement of
Russians to Poland and movement of Germans out of Poland (per new post-war boundaries) in 1945 – 47 was twice
as large as the movement of the six million Jews during the Holocaust (437). The populations were generally
resettled per their native language. Davies avoids ‘ethnic politics’ here as much as possible, simply stating that Poles
blamed “the Germans, the Russians, or both” for the suffering during the migrations. Mr. Drzewiecki claimed that
Poles from the Baltic Region generally blamed Russians for all their problems, but the southern, resettled
‘Ukrainians, Jews, and Czechs’ had an affinity for Russia and its ways – thus, his ‘ethnic explanation’ for the
rebelliousness of the Baltic, and the pacifism of Sudaty. Obviously his broad generalizations could be considered
‘ethnic profiling’ but, as with most folk beliefs, were simply based on his immediate observations and personal
experience. The point is not the ‘accuracy’ of Mr. Drzewiecki’s statement, but that he believed it to be so, thus
demonstrating the racial and ethnic tension still apparent in Central Eastern Europe.
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Gospodarstowe Rolne (State Collective Farms or PGR) were established by the Polish
Communist Party in Wielkopolska in the years immediately following WWII, in similar fashion
as were the Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz of Russia. The Russian Kolkhoz (Kołchoz in Polish) was a
communal or collective farm made by combining many existing smaller private farms. In theory,
the Kolkhoz workers would share in the profits of their work after first supplying pre-arranged
quotas to the State; however, the quotas were generally set so high that little was left for the
communal workers. The Polish PGR operations were more like the Sovkhoz, true State Farms, in
that the state owned all land, all machinery, all infrastructure, and paid PGR workers an hourly
wage just like a factory worker. The logic of the PGR was mechanization, standardization,
economy of scale, and maximum socialization of the main cost in modern farming – i.e., the
acquisition, maintenance, and fueling of large-scale farm machinery. 3
According to Mr. Drzewiecki, millions of small Polish land holdings in Wielkopolska, divided
by fences, stone walls, and living hedgerows that had accumulated since the Middle Ages, were
physically consolidated in the early 1950s so that huge, modern tractors and combine harvesters
could be utilized to maximum efficiency. Obviously this made good economic sense on the open
plains of Wielkopolska (notwithstanding the tremendous human cost of ‘dekulakization’), but it
certainly was not feasible in the mountains of Sudaty where tiny patches of arable soil were
widely interspaced among heavily wooded hillsides. Thus, the tiny hillside farms of southern
Poland remained in private hands. This fact had several positive ramifications that facilitated the
success of the local economy in Wałbrzych.
3

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, A History Of Russia (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 572. ‘Maximum socialization of everyday life’ was a general theme across the Soviet Bloc
from the collective farm to the household. Riasanovsky and Steinberg even mention ‘appliance pools’ in Russia, in
which refrigerators, washing machines, or vacuum cleaners were shared among local collectives. However, in
Poland, this researcher heard stories of housewives actually renting out scarce washing machines and vacuum
cleaners by the hour in order to make a little extra cash!
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Private ownership of a single-family home and small acreage, however modest they may have
been, certainly was a ‘relief valve,’ so to speak, for many residents of Sudaty. It gave them some
measure of personal independence, privacy, and security. Beyond this, it allowed for
development of a ‘rural proletariat’ in the truest sense of the term. 4 The description of
‘Oksana’s’ grandparents in the opening vignette of this chapter is case in point: Oksana’s
grandfather had ‘the best of both worlds’ in that he had a secure industrial job in Wałbrzych with
full state benefits5, while simultaneously he privately owned and operated a small farm just a few
miles outside the city limits. He participated in ‘the commanding heights of the economy,’ to use
Lenin’s famous term for the mainstay of state enterprises (heavy industry, transportation, energy,
finance, etc.), while also participating in subsistence farming and private, market-oriented
farming. Most importantly, unlike the ‘black markets’ and ‘black labor’ that characterized
Gdańsk, all of this was legal and totally legitimate in Wałbrzych. Small, private farms fell under
a special rubric in Sudetenland called artel, or ‘gang farming’ – similar to the American version
of a farm co-op.6 Private farmers and market gardeners (badylarze) could legally market their

4

Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Anchor Books, 2006). Mao Zedong’s
incorporation of rural peasants into the Chinese Communist system was the backbone of his success. Mao created
self-sufficient, rural communes which included both agriculture and industrial operations carried on in a noncentralized pattern. That is, agriculture and industry were intermixed in an economically-rational manner, not
separated per ‘orthodox ideology.’ Chang and Halliday quote Anna Louise Strong (332): “Mao’s great work has
been to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form…in ways which neither Marx or Lenin could have
dreamed…” That ‘great work’ was recognition of the enormous potential of the ‘rural proletariat.’
5

Dr. Barbara Wejnert, interview by author, 1/23/2010. Dr. Wejnert explained that private farmers in The
People’s Republic Of Poland did not receive any of the State benefits that other citizens had. Private farmers had no
State retirement, no insurance of any kind, no worker’s comp, no subsidized housing, no help or support of any kind
from the conventional State Social Security System (ZUS, Zaklad Ubezpieczen Spolecznych). Dr. Wejnert
speculated that this was probably arranged as a negative incentive to force private farmers out of business. She said
that the State was reluctant to buy anything produced on a private farm and did not share agricultural information or
technological information with private farmers. She believed there was a limit to the size of private farm holdings in
communist Poland but was not sure of the exact acreage; she speculated it was less than 25 acres.
6

Ibid. This was possible across Poland for a number of transitionary years, as Kołchozi phased-out private
ownership. However, in most regions State collective farm markets overtly discriminated against private sellers by
denying them stall space, heavily taxing them, or by outright intimidation. Additionally, in many areas no private
farms existed – they had all been collectivized. Just the opposite condition prevailed in Sudaty – no collective farms
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commodities collectively – thus, Oksana’s recollection of her grandfather’s sale of honey and
garden produce ‘in town at the market’ was not a form of ‘black marketeering’ but rather a
legitimate private enterprise within a communist state.
The implication here is very significant: the many small, private, local farmers of Sudetenland
kept the townspeople of Wałbrzych, and other small towns, supplied with local food, bypassing
many of the supply chain bottlenecks that caused years of food shortages, long lines, and
rationing – the main causes of dissatisfaction in urban areas – that eventually led to rioting,
demonstrations, strikes, shootings, and major social upheaval on the Baltic Coast. Major
upheaval began as early as 1956 in Wielkopolska (the Poznan riots) and 1970 saw the infamous
massacres at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk – all this while sleepy Wałbrzych dozed contentedly
in its Marxist dreams.
Thus, one simple factor in the stability and satisfaction with the communist economy of
Sudetenland seems to have been the contribution of the ‘rural proletariat’ to local city food
chains, as well as a far better quality of life for the ‘rural proletariat’ themselves (as compared
with shipyard workers in Gdańsk, for example).7 Wałbrzych interviewees had never heard of the
‘urban homesteading’ that had taken place in Gdańsk (as described in the previous chapter of this
thesis); they seemed to think questions concerning the growing of tomatoes in the city park, for
example, or the keeping of goats and chickens on balconies or in basements (reality for 1980s

existed, thus the old market system survived. The Polish artel is equivalent to артел in Russian. ‘Arteli,’ is
probably from the Latin word ‘cartel,’ meaning some special organization of producers – like a ‘drug cartel’ or an
‘oil cartel;’ for Sudaty residents, it was a ‘farm commodities cartel,’ similar to ‘farm co-ops’ in the US.
7

Davies, Heart Of Europe, 49. Davies notes this unique social class as well, calling them chłopo-robotnicy (peasantworkers) and comments that they were “…perhaps the best-placed class…who contrived to keep the family plot
whilst holding down a job in a factory. Many such families, living on the fringe of the great industrial regions, had
the best of both worlds – a high cash income all the year round, a cheap supply of home-grown food, and an
independent base. They were prosperous and relatively secure.” This scenario typified many families in Sudaty and
explains why many of Wałbrzych’s residents bemoan the demise of their particular variety of communism.
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Gdańsk) were quite ridiculous! It became clear to this researcher that Wałbrzych had not
suffered food shortages nearly as great as had Gdańsk at any time during the communist era.
Wałbrzych’s problems came not during communism’s heyday, but during communism’s
demise.8
There is another implication to this story. It is not to say that the tiny hillside farms of Sudaty
were somehow ‘super productive’ because they were privately owned and therefore the ‘magic
hand of free enterprise and self-interest’ somehow increased yields.9 The Panstwowe
Gospodarstowe Rolne (State Collective Farms or PGR) were highly productive, due to their
economy of scale (tracts ranged into tens of thousands of acres), high mechanization, heavy use
of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and hybrid crop varieties. The maddening problem for Poland
was that the PGR were extractive industries – store shelves lay empty while train cars of Polish
grain traveled east to Russia.10
Greater Poland’s food shortages were due to politics, not to poor agricultural practices.
Sudetenland towns like Wałbrzych existed in oblivion to this fact due to their relative isolation
and the benefits of ‘ideological flexibility’ allowing for a lively private agricultural economy to
coexist alongside the State-operated heavy industrial complex. Analogous to this chapter’s
8

US State Department, FM AmeEmbBassy Warsaw, Doc. # 89warsaw08679, June, ‘89Subject: Without
Economic Improvement Social Peace Will Be Impossible To Maintain and Doc. #08680, Concerning Possible
Social Disorder. Referring specifically to conditions in Silesia at the time of the June, 1989 elections, US
Ambassador to Poland John Keller, speculated on possibility of ‘social disorder’ unless rapid economic
improvement was implemented.
9

This notion is commonly perpetuated in Western-centric books and literature discussing Soviet Bloc farming
practices. The peasant’s private kitchen garden is often made out to be far more productive than the giants fields of
the collective farm – ‘magically,’ through self-interest. Allusions to this can be seen, for example, in Peter Molloy,
The Lost World Of Communism: An Oral History Of Daily Life Behind The Iron Curtain (London: BBC Books –
Random House UK, 2009) or in Katherine B. Eaton, Daily Life In The Soviet Union (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 2001).
10

Dr. Barbara Wejnert, interview by author, 1/23/2010. This was common knowledge among nearly all Poles
and was personally witnessed by several interviewees, most notably, by Dr. Barbara Wejnert who confronted
railroad workers as to the destination of a huge shipment of grain during a near famine-like winter of 1981-82; the
Polish grain was on its way to Moscow. Solidarity activists promoted news of her find to help validate their agenda.
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opening story of Oksana’s grandparents, ‘the best of both worlds’ (communist and capitalist) was
realized in Sudaty, making for a ‘lived system of communism’ that worked well.
Yet, it takes more than a steady supply of potatoes and cabbage from the farmer’s market to
sustain a local economy and maintain the satisfaction of its citizens. Just as vast quantities of
grain were exported from Wielkopolska, millions of tons of coal were exported from Sudaty. The
town of Wałbrzych sits directly on one of Europe’s most productive coal seams. 11 The
aboveground superstructures of twenty-three mineshafts dot the city’s landscape, and house coal
is still mined and made available directly at the source – from deep below a central city street.
Unlike the export of badly needed Polish grain, export of coal made good economic sense for
Poland in general and for Wałbrzych /Sudaty/ Dolny Śląsk in particular.12

11

Leszek Kurowski, “The Intra-Sudetic Basin.” Institute of Geological Sciences, University of Wrocław.
http://geolines.gli.cas.cz/fileadmin/volumes/volume16/G16-165.pdf The Wałbrzyska coal basin is part of the
Greater Bohemian Massif that stretches through Germany, Austria, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
12

The workings of COMECON (Council For Mutual Economic Assistance; original members from 1949 were
USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania; other nations joined later) seem far more political
than economically rational. Interviewees with knowledge of COMECON beyond ‘everyday hearsay,’ such as Dr.
Barbara Wejnert and ‘Yurik,’ a former high-level executive of the Lenin Shipyard, believed COMECON trading to
have been nearly always to the advantage of the USSR. Both had personal knowledge of Moscow-trained,
Moscow-loyal business executives employed in Polish enterprises who manipulated trades of commodities as they
saw fit. By the same token, published accounts can state very conflicting data. For example Zubok, A Failed Empire,
269, states that the failing Polish economy of 1980 was infused with four billion dollars worth of aid from the
USSR; a conflicting account for the same time period says that Moscow specifically sent investigators to Poland to
ascertain economic need, saw the flourishing black market, and denied all aid to Poland, in Andrzej Paczkowski and
Malcolm Byrne, eds., From Solidarity To Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980 - 1981: A Documentary History
(Budapest: Central University Press, 2007), 242 – 244. In light of these examples, it is safe to say that COMECON
trading worked per Ledeneva’s descriptions of ‘the economy of favors’ (Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works, 18).
It was so tangled with favors, personal and State politics, and even criminal activity, that the intended rationale of a
centrally planned, mutually beneficial economic exchange was probably lost in most cases.
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Koksownia Wictoria, Wałbrzych

Beyond raw coal exports, the Lower Silesian industrial economy depended on metallurgical
coke and chemicals made from Sudaty coal. The Lenin Steelworks at Nowa Huta and the
Katowice Steelworks near Częstochowa, both considered ‘showplaces of socialist industry,’13
were fueled by coke made at Koksownia Wictoria in Wałbrzych. 14

13

Allison Stenning, “Post-Socialism And The Changing Geographies Of The Everyday In Poland,” in
Transactions Of The Institute Of British Geographers, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2005: 113 – 127. Per Stenning, the Lenin
Works at Nowa Huta just outside Kraków was meant to be a showcase of planned socialist industrial society in
contrast to the ‘old bourgeois cultural center’ of Kraków. Opened in 1949, the Lenin Works employed nearly
40,000 people at its height in the 1970s. The Katowice Works opened in 1972 and employed around 30,000.
14

Koksownia Wictoria or ‘Victoria Coke Works’ was a major industrial employer in Wałbrzych, producing high
quality furnace and foundry metallurgical coke and a variety of hydrocarbon by-products from local coal. The
enterprise was actually several different facilities spread out in various locations across Wałbrzych. Today, only a
small remnant of the various operations survives. According to interviewees, Koksownia Wictoria attempted to
make synthetic oil from local coal during WWII while under Nazi control.
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Additionally, Wałbrzych coal fed several nearby coal-fired electrical generating plants. Thus,
tens of thousands of workers had long-term, good-paying jobs in the interconnected
coal/coke/chemical/steel industry of Lower Silesia. 15

The Wałbrzych Valley In Winter From Chełmiec Hill

15

B. Dolata, Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945 [Liberation of Lower Silesia in 1945], Wyd. Ossolineum,
Wrocław, 1970: 160 – 164. It was the enormous industrial potential of Lower Silesia and Sudetenland that made
the region coveted by Adolph Hitler. Along with major industrial works the region had abundant coal mines and
produced copper, silver, sulfur, antimony, tin, and lead. In January and February, 1945, as Soviet forces liberated the
region, Stalin ordered Marshall Ivan Konev to capture the mines and industrial plants intact, deeming them ‘as
valuable as gold.’ Konev allowed German forces to ‘escape’ through a 3-mile wide corridor in order to avoid their
destruction of the industrial infrastructure. Thus, Wałbrzych was saved from the carnage many other Eastern
European cities saw. The loss of Lower Silesian coal and coke production drastically lowered Germany’s ability to
make steel in the last year of the war. Allied bombing had destroyed much of the Ruhr industrial region and Lower
Silesia was supplying 60% of Germany’s coal. When Minister of War Production Albert Speer heard of the loss of
Silesia, he cabled Hitler, opening with the phrase, “The war is lost now.”
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With access to plenty of good industrial jobs, coupled with the previously discussed local,
private agriculture, and the apparent ‘ideological relaxation’ of the region, one can readily see
how residents of Wałbrzych were generally more satisfied than were those living on the Baltic
Coast. Interview data makes it obvious that Wałbrzych industrial workers, quite unlike their
northern counterparts, found little reason to complain, protest, or go on strike – until ‘made
politically aware’ by Solidarność activists.
Interview data from former employees of Koksownia Wictoria and related Wałbrzych
industries helps explain the animosity some residents feel toward Solidarity. ‘Jan’ began working
at Koksownia Wictoria in 1973, in the “golden age of Polish socialism.” 16 Due to a major downsizing of the plant in 1991, Jan lost his job, as did many other residents of Wałbrzych whose
livelihoods depended on production of coal and coke. Accompanying these job losses was the
triple-digit inflation that arose from the ‘shock-therapy’ transition to capitalism, a new system of
property taxation, and a general ‘feeling of abandonment’ by the State as all former social
services were eliminated.17 As massive unemployment hit Wałbrzych, Jan found his only
alternative was to leave the area in search of work. He left his wife and daughter in Wałbrzych
and worked for a decade in Berlin. He did construction work and various other manual labor
jobs in order to earn enough money to maintain the family home and pay property taxes. He
returned to Wałbrzych only a few years ago. Jan recalls his experiences as follows:

16

Stenning, “Post-Socialism And The Changing Geographies Of The Everyday In Poland,” 123. Speaking about
Nowa Huta, Stenning remarks, “The 1970s were (and are remembered as) a period of growing prosperity,
opportunity, and security. The worst excesses of Stalinism had faded and post-1953 challenges to the regime had
resulted in higher levels of investment in consumer goods production and housing. These, coupled with high growth
rates in industry, caused much of the decade to be seen as the ‘golden age’ of Polish socialism. Poles repeatedly look
back to this decade with positive assessments…In contrast, the 1980s were a period of turmoil, uncertainty and
insecurity.”
17

Poland’s transition to capitalism will be addressed in the next chapter.
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I thought I would retire from Koksownia Wictoria…I never thought I would have to
search for work in middle-age years, move to Germany, live like a migrant… The work
at Koksownia Wictoria was hard, hot, and dirty – of course, it was – it was a furnace coke
plant and that’s how such work is…But the job paid well…and we [workers] were treated
fairly…I could afford a home, short vacations with my family…we were happy in our
life here…
Solidarity had good ideas but they wanted change too fast. Yes, Koksownia Wictoria
needed better health and safety regulations…and better environmental control – I agreed
with that. But Solidarity became militant…demonstrations, protests, strikes, became
everyday things. First some local mines were shut down…then some chemical
plants…Solidarity pushed so hard for changes in safety and environmental regulations
but some of the operations were too old and not profitable enough to be worth
upgrading…and I don’t think the State had any money to invest in upgrading these old
operations and no one wanted to buy them [when privatization began] so they just closed
them. Thousands of people lost their jobs as one mine or factory after another were
closed…18

Similarly, ‘Leon’ lost his job in a Wałbrzych coal mine. He was not as ‘philosophical’ about
his fate in relation to Solidarity’s ‘crusade of good intentions’ as had been ‘Jan.’ Leon hated
Solidarity and all it stood for. He believed the union to be “a trick of the West,” constructed to
ruin the socialist economy. Leon believed that

…Solidarność did not accomplish any improvements in safety of the local mines…they
only managed to cause so much trouble that the mines were closed to keep peace…There
is enough coal still in the ground in Wałbrzych to last hundreds of years. But where do
they get coal from now? From Czech Republic. Why? Because they did not have the
long strikes we had here…the labor problems, the loss of production. They (the Czech
miners) were more reasonable and so they still have jobs… 19
This notion of ‘provocation and punishment,’ expressed above, by ‘Leon,’ ran through
interviewees comments in both Wałbrzych and Gdańsk. ‘Leon’ believed the Czechs to have

18

‘Jan,’ interview by author, 6/28/2012.

19

‘Leon,’ interview by author, 6/28/2012.
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retained mining jobs due to their ‘more reasonable attitudes.’ Interviewees from Gdańsk believed
that the Baltic Coast was ‘punished’ by the State for its fanatical devotion to the Solidarity
Movement. They also believed Lower Silesia to have received ‘preferential treatment’ from the
state in the form of modernized industrial infrastructure and thus more and better job
opportunities. To some degree these notions of ‘reward and punishment’ per cooperation with
the state system hold true, yet there is more at work here. 20
Stenning discusses how Lower Silesian towns were made ‘showcases of socialism’ in the
early post-WWII years through massive state investments. Planned cities, such as Nowa Huta,
were built around steel mills utilizing the latest technology. 21 Likewise, Davies discusses how
Lower Silesian industrial infrastructure continued to expand through the 1950s, ‘60s, and 70s,
the Wrocław region’s finished manufacturing enterprises accounting for a disproportionately
large share of Poland’s total GDP. 22 The Elwro electronics factory, the Pafwag Locomotive
Works, and the Domel generator manufacturing plant, all in Lower Silesia, were constructed in
the 1960s, and the Katowice Steel Works opened as late as 1972. The Baltic Coast shipyards, on
the other hand, were antiquated industrial relics that had ‘evolved naturally’ – as opposed to
having been part of a planned city – and although they were partially modernized as late as the

20

“Solidarity’s Message To The Working People Of Eastern Europe – and Soviet Response.” September 9,
1981. Original source: Radio Warsaw [radio transcript of this broadcast]. Seventeen Movements In Soviet History
(Digital Archive Collection: http://www.soviethistory.org/ General Article ID, 1980-1981, English Translations.).
The CPSU took every opportunity to inflame the situation and place blame on Solidarity, accusing the movement of
a plethora of offenses including (per this transcript); contradicting the constitution of The Polish People’s Republic,
yielding to ‘aristocratic forces,’ cultivating anti-Soviet attitudes, forgetting the liberation of Poland from fascism by
the USSR during WWII, slandering the Communist Party, breaking the bonds of fraternal proletarian solidarity,
circulating fierce and untrue propaganda about the USSR and the Communist Party, disrupting the economy,
inciting revolt and violence…and many other small and sundry offenses.
21

Allison Stenning, “Re-placing Work: Economic Transformations And The Shape Of A Community In PostSocialist Poland,” Work, Employment, and Society. Vol. 26, No. 2, 2012: 1 – 10.
22

Davies, Microcosm, 466 – 467.
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1970s, they remained ‘industrial dinosaurs.’ Likewise, their tens of thousands of workers
crammed into very limited housing, interspaced directly with heavy industrial operations, made
for highly stressed living conditions in comparison with newer, planned cities.
The State’s investment in the south, especially in creation of entirely new, planned, industrial
cities, was due in part to the relative openness of the region (compared to Gdańsk, for example,
the 1000 year old city being hemmed in between steep hills on one side and the Baltic Sea on the
other). Davies calls post-WWII Lower Silesia the ‘Wild West’ of Poland, in that it became the
primary region for new investment and new opportunities; in reality, the long-established
industrial cities of the Baltic Coast started slipping into ‘rustbelt status’ not long after their
recovery from WWII damage.23
Thus, the disparity in new State industrial investment between north and south seems to have
manifested itself in enmity between the two regions’ populations, the south becoming the
‘youngest and favorite child’ of the State; the older north was made out to be a pariah by its
embrace of Solidarity and was then ‘punished’ for its rebelliousness. That punishment, first in
benign neglect (avoidance of new investment by the State in the north), later became more
active, with police and military crackdowns, deliberate creation of shortages of consumer goods
(alleged by several interviewees), and finally in decree of Martial Law (December 13, 1981) that
punished the entire nation – mostly for the ‘sins’ of the north.24
Recently declassified and translated Soviet documents confirm that the USSR not only blamed
Solidarity for the shortages on the Baltic Coast but also withheld shipments of food and other
23

Ibid.

24

Wojciech Jaruzelski, “Announcement Of Martial Law In Poland and TASS Reaction.” December 13-14,
1981. Original source: Radio Warsaw. Seventeen Movements In Soviet History (Digital Archive Collection:
http://www.soviethistory.org/ General Article ID, 1980-1981, English Translations). Jaruzelski clearly points out
that “…lines of painful division are running through every work enterprise and through many Polish homes.”
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cargo - by necessity - due to the disruption of striking Polish dock workers. For example, a
transcript from the CPSU, Central Committee, Politburo, dated Dec. 10, 1981 states that

…124 [Soviet] ships are riding at anchor [in the Port of Gdańsk] and 480,000 tons of
bulk cargo is waiting to be unloaded. Reopening of the ports is an urgent matter…The
economic consequences of the strike, the catastrophe threatening the economy, and the
specter of hunger must not be underemphasized….get across to the population that if the
strike drags on, we will be unable to ensure supplies because our stocks are running out. 25
Documents such as this demonstrate the ‘no-win scenario’ that accompanied industrial and
shipping strikes; not only was Polish domestic production curtailed but also trade with the
USSR and other COMECON partners was held up. It is difficult to say if state authorities overtly
acted to ‘punish’ Baltic Coast cities, but as the above noted document indicates, striking dock
workers inadvertently contributed to shortages by delaying shipping. This notion of ‘good south/
bad north’ and the punishment of the whole nation for the north’s rebellious obsession with
Solidarity was expressed by several interviewees, and many citizens actually believed this to
have been the case. Again, the very ‘circular nature’ of the Baltic Coast problem must be taken
into consideration: shortages - protested against by strikes - which in turn, worsened the
shortages – hence fueled more protest. No doubt, all parties involved laid the blame on their
opposition.
Likewise, it is difficult to say for sure if Lower Silesia’s ‘favorable treatment’ by the State
came because of its ‘more reasonable behavior’ or if this ‘behavior’ was a result of ‘more
favorable treatment.’ Interviewees such as ‘Jan’ and ‘Leon’ believed that their region’s stability
and prosperity came from cooperation with the State – in maintaining the socialist economy -

25

Doc. 81, CPSU, Central Committee, Politburo Transcript, Dec. 10, 1981. In Andrezej Paczkowski and
Malcolm Byrne, From Solidarity To Martial Law: The Polish Crisis Of 1980 – 1981: A Documentary History
(Budapest: Central University Press, 2007), 447.
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and they blamed Solidarity for destroying their way of life. Most Wałbrzych interviewees
expressed some degree of longing for the ‘pre-Solidarity days,’ and some overtly expressed their
belief that Solidarity had ruined their lives and had ruined the nation. This attitude was never
observed in the Baltic Coast region in the course of three separate trips (2010, 2011, and 2012)
and in the hundreds of conversations and interviews that resulted.
However, above and beyond the common mine and mill workers, the most virulent opponents
of Solidarity seem to have been a certain type of (former) nomenklatura encountered only in
Sudaty.26 These colorful characters were known as Panowie, literally ‘gentleman,’ but in this
context more was implied. Panowie were simultaneously Communist Party ‘bosses,’ managers
of State-owned enterprises, local private business owners (both legal and illegal operations),
Polish patriots, patrons of the Church, and pillars of the local community. The closest Western
analogy seems to be the Latin American Caudillo; elaboration on the parallels between the
Panowie and the Caudillo, and on the Panowie’s contribution to daily life in Wałbrzych (per
alternative economic strategies) will help to illuminate the complex and often contradictory
nature of ‘communism as a lived system’ in its last decade in The People’s Republic Of Poland.
E. Bradford Burns describes the Latin American Caudillo as
…a folk leader. The caudillo recognized and understood the distinctive way of life of the
folk and acted in harmony with it. In the eyes of the people, he inculcated the local,
regional or national values – traditional values – with which most of the people felt
comfortable. He exuded a natural, a charismatic, leadership of the majority, who found in
him an advisor, a guide, a leader, a protector, a patriarch, in whom they entrusted their
interests. They surrendered power to him; he exercised it for their benefit. He embodied
the collective will; he incarnated authority. The fusion of leader and people had to be
nearly perfect (that is, perceived by those involved as nearly perfect) and when this
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No doubt this ‘special class’ had existed in other regions of Poland as well, where a similar cluster of
socioeconomic variables had arisen.
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interplay existed, both people and leader sensed, valued, and honored their
interdependency. 27
Burns’ description of the Caudillo is also a perfect description of the Panowie, the local szef
(chief), the głowa (headman), or the szlagon (rural squire), energized with władza (power and
authority) from the State, the Church, and the People. These charismatic and contradictory local
strongmen walked a precarious line between communism and free-enterprise, between statesanctioned atheism and ancient, sacred religious traditions, between serving the Party and
serving the People. Yet, the main interest of the Panowie seems to have been self-interest, and
many of these characters became rich in the transition from communism to capitalism.
The story of ‘The Bishop,’ as this researcher nicknamed one prominent Panowie from
Szczawno- Zdrój, will illustrate the concept.28 The Bishop hated Solidarność, Lech Wałęsa and
all things connected to the Solidarity Movement because, in his opinion, they had caused the
collapse of the mining and industrial economy of Sudaty. The Bishop had been a manager of
several local Wałbrzych coal mines (State-owned) for nearly 30 years. He felt he had treated his
employees fairly and had worked tirelessly to promote workplace safety; there had never been a
fatal mine accident under The Bishop’s watch.
Yet, after 1980, he claimed, every sort of the most minuscule safety violation, potential health
hazard, and environmental issue was ‘blown out of proportion’ by Solidarity activists. Strikes
and demonstrations so wracked Wałbrzych mines and mills, and so disrupted production, that
enterprise-to-enterprise contracts could not be fulfilled (State enterprises were interconnected by
supply chains under binding contracts just as in the private business world). The uncertainty of
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E. Bradford Burns, The Poverty Of Progress: Latin America In The Nineteenth Century (Los Angeles:
University Of California Press,1980), 91.
28

‘The Bishop,’ interview by author, 6/25-27/2012. The author stayed three days at ‘The Bishop’s’ pensjonat in
Szczawno- Zdrój, visited his home, and was shown much of the Wałbrzych region by ‘The Bishop.’

150

coal and coke deliveries from Wałbrzych caused by labor disputes provoked by Solidarity caused
major industrial centers such as Nowa Huta and Katowice to seek more dependable sources of
fuel – according to The Bishop, from Czechoslovakia (the same scenario was described by
interviewees ‘Jan’ and ‘Leon’). The Bishop and many other like-minded residents of Wałbrzych
reasoned that the shortages of consumer goods, hyper-inflation, deindustrialization, and general
socioeconomic upheaval of the 1980s all stemmed from the Solidarity Movement (these
disruptions had not affected Lower Silesia and Sudaty, to any great degree, in the ‘golden age’
prior to emergence of Solidarność).
Like all other residents of Wałbrzych, The Bishop was forced to make the transition from
communism to capitalism amid the upheaval of ‘katastroika’ (a dark-humored term playing on
Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika;’ katastroika meant catastrophic restructuring).Yet, as the
mines and mills closed, as average citizens faced unemployment for the first time in their lives
(employment had been guaranteed by the State prior to 1989), and as families were torn apart by
loss of income, relocation in search of work, by divorce and suicide brought about by the stress
of katastroika, The Bishop found his own position in the community strengthening.
Having had the foresight of the traditional Panowie, The Bishop was prepared for katastroika
– in fact, he had been preparing during his entire 30 year career as a mine manager and member
of the nomenklatura. In the contradictory world of ‘real and existing socialism,’ The Bishop had
dutifully operated both State-owned coal mines and his own private pensjonati (retreats, spas, or
tourist homes). He owned one in the spa-town of Szczawno - Zdrój (Wałbrzych and SzczawnoZdrój have grown to be interconnected municipalities) where the mineral rich water of the
Intra-Sudetic Basin had traditionally drawn upper-class tourists for over a century, and another
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across the Czech border at Jąchymov, where radon-enriched hot springs were said to cure
arthritis and rheumatism. 29
During the Communist era, Party members, their spouses and families, would visit the
pensjonati of Sudaty, as privileged guests of certain Panowie such as The Bishop. For the
nomenklatura’s convenience, ‘special stores’ for shopping only by Party members were located
near the pensjonati; The Bishop owned and operated several such stores. Beyond these
nomenklatura-only enterprises The Bishop also owned several ordinary apartment houses. In
order to maintain his real estate, his pensjonati, nomenklatura-only stores, and apartment
buildings, The Bishop had established a building, remodeling, and maintenance enterprise. Thus,
in a Communist State, where all means of production were - in theory - collectively owned and
operated for the general welfare of the People, the Bishop had carved out a small private
kingdom, enriching himself as he catered to the personal needs of fellow nomenklatura. Per
Norman Davies’ discussion of the origin of the term ‘nomenklatura,’ we see quite readily how its
application fits The Bishop:
It is a Latin term, referring to the lists of named properties of the great feudal magnates,
and by extension to the tenants who possessed these properties. Here one can see the true
cultural ancestry of Communist society. Anything further removed from socialism, as the
rest of the world imagined it, would be hard to conceive. The Party bosses treated the
state as their property, in the manner of medieval barons, and treated the common citizens
as the chattels of their fief. The gulf between the ruling elite and the masses was wide.
The existence of the ‘two nations’ was a reality. 30
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Davies, Microcosm, 460 – 461. In 1946 Stalin’s NKVD established uranium mines at Miedzianka, just north of
Wałbrzych, and Jąchymov Uranium was little more than a novelty prior to WWII, commonly used for coloring
pottery glazes; its atomic potential made it more valuable than gold in the postwar years. Davies reports that the
mines were abandoned and sealed with concrete by 1953. ‘The Bishop’ said these mines operated clandestinely
until the early 1970s; perhaps ‘informal production of uranium’ could be added to the many off-the-record
enterprises of Lower Silesia!
30

Davies, Heart Of Europe, 46.
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Communist ‘barons’ such as The Bishop acquired their kingdoms through what is known as
załatwić, “…which is a softer way of saying ‘they stole it.’ Rather, it refers to ‘public property.’
They [the nomenklatura] made use of public property – they received it – they utilized it.”31
Likewise, the personal employees of the nomenklatura (not those under their supervision in
State-owned enterprises), those who cleaned, cooked, and maintained the pensjonati, for
example, were dependent on the goodwill and favor of their master, the Panowie. Like a
benevolent Caudillo and his grateful clientes or patrons, these ‘Polish-Communist-Barons’
attempted to preserve the local established order and protect ‘their people’ from the
disintegrating forces of the outside world (Solidarity being a prime example of a ‘disrupting
force’).
And to demonstrate their spiritual kinship to their clientes, these Polish Caudillos – these Party
members who swore allegiance only to ‘scientific socialism,’ Marxist-Leninism, and by
extension, to ‘official atheism’ – were also great Patróns of the Catholic Church. ‘The Bishop’
earned his nickname by his devotion to The Black Madonna Of Częstochowa, most sacred icon
of Polish Catholicism; Her image adorned the walls of The Bishop’s home and his pensjonati,
and Her sacred icon swayed from the rearview mirror of his shining, new Ford Escalade.
Ironically, The Bishop’s archenemy, Lech Wałęsa – that destroyer of worlds and betrayer of
Polish Socialism, per the Bishop’s opinion – also wore an image of The Black Madonna Of
Częstochowa on his lapel, constantly. These two Polish Caudillos, one from the North, one from
the South, shared the same deep cultural knowledge of their clientes and used it accordingly.
31

Zofia Rudnicka, interview by author, 6/25/2012. The notion of załatwić, in this context, extends from purchase
of State property at drastically reduced prices to outright theft. Several Wałbrzych interviewees told stories of
houses and pensjonati, owned by nomenklatura, that had been built entirely from materials obtained from Stateowned building projects. Construction bosses would ‘double-order’ brick, for example, for a State building project,
which would obviously result in half-as-many brick left over at completion of the project; these left overs went into
private projects. As the ‘bosses’ were Party members, no locals questioned this practice. On the contrary, many
applauded it, as these private building projects undertaken by nomenklatura with materials stolen from the State
provided many ‘black work’ jobs. Often these private jobs paid better wages than did ‘formal work.’
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Apparently it was this ‘feudal system’ of direct, full-time employment of common citizens by
the Panowie (the ‘Polish Caudillos’) that constituted the primary source of ‘alternative income’
in Wałbrzych, and probably in all of Sudaty. As mentioned, The Bishop’s personal enterprises,
for example, went beyond the officially State-sanctioned pensjonati and ‘nomenklatura-only
stores’ to include work crews that built, operated, maintained, and further expanded his
‘kingdom.’ Church charity was also a prime source of relief during the economic and political
chaos of the 1980s – again, ironically, the Panowie saw to this. The Bishop had directed Churchbased relief projects in the ‘dark decade’ brought on by Solidarność – relief projects funded by
American, French, and Italian labor unions in conjunction with the Catholic Church. Patriarch of
‘communist feudalism,’ szlagon of Szczawno-Zdrój, The Bishop and those like him operated
from a perspective that pre-dated Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and all the ‘little Stalins’ installed across
Eastern Europe after 1945. The Bishop was Europe condensed and distilled to its most vital
essence, to its ‘basic programming’ – that is, social hierarchy derived from economic power.
Communism could no more break this most European cultural legacy than Poles and Russians
could deny their common ancestral heritage.
In summary, it seems that very few common citizens of Wałbrzych, unlike their counterparts
in Gdańsk, had experience with ‘proto-capitalism’ prior to 1989, in the form of their own
private, informal enterprises (with the exception of the ‘rural proletariat,’ already discussed).
Capitalism in Sudetenland, it seems, was the reserved domain of Communist Party members.
As Zbigniew Brzezinski observed (recalled in the anecdote that opened this chapter),
communism may take many, many forms and its ‘praxis’ (the Marxist term for practical
application in the real world) may be quite contradictory. The communist system worked in
Wałbrzych much better and much longer than it did in Gdańsk because the specific version of
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communism that evolved in Wałbrzych was, in fact, a ‘hybrid system’ in which the
‘commanding heights of the economy’ were operated under centralized State direction while
simultaneously the ‘rural proletariat’ and the ‘Polish Caudillos’ filled in gaps in employment and
production otherwise neglected by the State. Money incomes were not the sole determinant of
material well-being or quality of life in and around Wałbrzych, as many citizens owned small
parcels of property which provided some degree of a ‘means of private production’ or simply the
psychological or emotional satisfaction of independence and self-reliance. The invasion of
Sudaty by Solidarity was the beginning of the end for the local, lived system of communism, but
it also turned out to be a new opportunity for many ‘Polish Caudillos’ – although few will admit
it.
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7. Pasta Katastroika
_________________________________
Transition To Capitalism And Democracy

Synopsis
Chapter seven presents a formal history of the actual 1989 transition to capitalism, as well as
eight personal sketches derived from interview data. The formal history, gleaned from published
sources, mentions the major political and legal precedents entailed in the transition, such as the
Magdalenka Talks and the Round Table Talks, takeover of the Sejm (Polish Senate) by
Solodarność, creation of the Agency For Ownership Transformation, enactment of the
Privatization Initiatives, the workings of the Balcerowicz Plan, and the outcome and
ramifications of all such acts and events. This rather ‘sterile’ formal history is humanized by the
opening vignette and by conclusion of the chapter with eight personal sketches. Each sketch is a
brief oral history, each individual’s story representative of particular segments of Polish society.
The sketches demonstrate how social variables such as age, gender, occupation, education level –
as well as life experiences and particular circumstances – resulted in a wide range of outcomes
for all individuals living through the transition. This chapter relates to the previous one in its
recognition that as ‘communism’ was not at all a standardized or generic system (worldwide nor
within the borders of Poland), so neither was the transition from communism to capitalism a
‘standardized historical event’ as often presented per formal, document histories, which recount
only official political acts and economic decrees. Likewise, using interview data from individuals
directly involved in the ‘nuts and bolts’ of small-scale, state-to-private transitions, the chapter
gives specific details of several varieties of economic transition usually omitted in macro-level,
formal histories. These include, direct, small scale spółdzielnia transitions, sale of larger
spółdzielnia enterprises and/or properties, joint ventures, known as spolka, and voucher
transitions, called akcja. The aim of privatization was for three possible outcomes. First, the
smallest State-owned enterprises (i.e., the spółdzielnia, or workers’ co-ops) would be directly
taken over by one or more individuals (former spółdzielnia members) who world 'reinvent
them,' that is, downsize, modernize, make them more efficient. Secondly, it was hoped that
foreign investors would acquire existing Polish enterprises in joint partnerships with Polish

entrepreneurs and/or open up new enterprises. Finally, effort was made such that ‘an
entrepreneurial spirit' (in combination with financial backing and government incentives) would
sweep Poland, resulting in the opening of a plethora of new small businesses. In the long-run, all
these scenarios materialized, again, with varying degrees of success and different social
ramifications.

Pasta Katastroika
Tomasz tells his story…
In the early ‘80s all media was completely controlled by the State. It was bad before Martial
Law, but afterwards it became worse. During Martial Law [December 13, 1981 – July 22, 1983]
there were no entertainment programs on TV – just communications from the authorities;
regular programming was liquidated; it was State propaganda all day, every day. The only free
communication was bibuła [samizdat- underground publishing]. One day, Solidarność obtained
a portable TV transmitter from their friends in the West – it was smuggled in somehow. It was
very weak, but it could produce ‘ghost broadcasts’ over State TV [weak, superimposed
transmissions, simultaneously broadcast over State TV channels]. You would be watching
General Jaruzelski very seriously explaining economics and politics and all of a sudden here
comes a ‘ghost’ of Solidarity flags waving, protesters cheering, happy music playing, and Lech
Wałęsa making one of his crazy speeches! Hahahah! The police went fucking nuts! They said
they would find that transmitter and kill everyone involved! But they never found it!
They called the transmissions ‘BIPS’ [Biura Informacji Prasowej Solidarnosci; Solidarity
Press Information Bureau] and eventually this became the first free, non-State operated TV
station in Poland. I had experience with photography and video cameras, and so Solidarność
hired me as a cameraman for BIPS. I filmed protests and speeches, police violence, strikes - all
things connected to the Solidarity Movement - and BIPS used my work on their broadcasts.
There were five or six guys besides me doing this work. One day the police saw me filming and
they arrested me. I was convicted of ‘agitation’ and ‘spreading propaganda,’ and was sentenced
to three years in jail. They published my name in the newspapers and said when I get out of jail I
should never be hired for any job because I was ‘dangerous’ and ‘crazy’ and could never be
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trusted! So they call that ‘blackballing’ – you are marked and will never again get a job, rent an
apartment, borrow money – you become a ‘criminal.’ People actually become afraid of you.
Fortunately, Solidarność helped me after I got out of jail. They loaned me a little money, helped
me get an apartment, and helped me start a small enterprise. This was in 1988 and by that time
things were ‘relaxing’ and some people had legal businesses. I opened a little bar – sold beer
and snacks – and tried to survive that way. Later I opened a small shop selling household items –
cheap plastic dishes, table cloths, fly swatters, salt and pepper shakers – cheap stuff from China.
‘Perestroika’ was the word of the day, said Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow, but for us it was
‘katastroika’ – catastrophic restructuring. General Jaruzelski, we joked, would reduce us to
survival on macaroni – ‘Pasta Katastroika!’
I tried to get back into the photography business but only my close friends and family would
hire me to take pictures. So…I have survived like this, as a ‘businessman,’ for 20 years now. It
is survival, that’s all. I have no retirement fund, no pension, no savings, no insurance, no plans
for my old age. I did not make enough money on my own to pay into ZUS [Zaklad Ubezpieczen
Spolecznych; State Social Security System] so I will get no benefits from them.
My son was born just before I was arrested and put in jail [1983]. Solidarność helped my wife
and son while I was in jail; we are lucky – there were 1000s of people like me jailed in those
times. Otherwise my family would have starved. My son does not remember Martial Law, police
violence, ‘propaganda TV,’ Solidarity protests, or standing in lines all day to buy potatoes! He
grew up in a different age. He did well in school and learned English and Swedish. He went to
Sweden for a few years, worked as a waiter in a fancy restaurant, and saved his money. He
returned home and started a photography business in Warsaw – I gave him all my old
equipment. He also started making advertising videos for other local businesses. His work is
going very well. He took to free enterprise like a fish to water! That is all he knows; he does not
remember those dark days of our past. I keep kidding him, telling him to give me a job!
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_________________________________

There is a certain ‘formal history’ of the 1989 – 1991 Soviet Bloc transition - the kind found in
the last chapter of most contemporary world history textbooks published in the US. The standard
story, the one that is quickly becoming historicized, generally begins a decade earlier in Poland,
with Lech Wałęsa and the creation of Solidarność. It mentions Pope John Paul II, Václav Havel,
The Roundtable Talks, and then quickly moves on to the ‘Fall of the Berlin Wall.’ It glorifies
Ronald Reagan at the expense of Mikhail Gorbachev, then proceeds to a discussion of the
‘inevitable demise and collapse’ of the Soviet Union, that Evil Empire which enslaved Eastern
Europe until the United States finally won the Cold War. Capitalism - a specific brand of
capitalism, lately known as the Washington Consensus 1 - comes to dominate the global
economy at last, and everyone lives happily ever after. Printed in enough books and taught to
enough students, any mythology becomes ‘history.’ This realization makes one question how
true and accurate are the other ‘standard histories’ of major world events.
This thesis begs to differ with the ‘standard history’ and contends that there were as many
versions of ‘the transition’ as there were individuals that experienced it (similarly, the previous
chapter pointed out that communism was not a generic system, worldwide, nor within the
boundaries of Poland itself). The transition is not a uniform story, not a straight forward story,
not a happy story for many people, not a finished story, and it certainly is not an Americentric
story. Many of the assumed ‘losers,’ i.e., the ‘bosses’ of the Communist Party, quickly became
financial magnates and many of those who fought the hardest against communism eventually
came to despise capitalism. Some young people “took to free-enterprise like a fish to water,” as

1

Halper, The Beijing Consensus, 57. Halper describes the Washington Consensus as the current, Western
economic model, a deregulated, market-democracy with global reach.
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‘Tomasz’ put it (in the opening vignette, above), but some faltered, becoming part of Europe’s
new ‘lost generation.’
Some people were forced to become migrant workers midway through their lives; their
educational level and language skills determined their fate abroad. The migrants’ children would
grow up very differently – as minorities in a host nation, with all the challenges such a status
entails. Some middle aged migrants brought their elderly parents with them, rather than see them
suffer the confusion of navigating through the upheaval of total social, economic, and political
transition in what should have been their ‘golden years.’ Some individuals (like ‘Tomasz’) who
had been ‘blackballed’ years ago by their association with Solidarność, and who had been forced
by necessity to become small-scale entrepreneurs, and who had thus existed on the margins of
society for much of their adult lifetimes - at least, now their work-status was considered legal.
Others, who had dutifully ‘served the State’ for several decades in factories, mills, or mines,
found themselves unemployed in their 50s or 60s, their retirement funds diminished by 50% or
by 75%, or eliminated altogether. Thus, the lived experience of the transition was determined
by many variables – age, gender, occupation, educational level, geographic location, political
affiliation, and to a great degree by luck, or the lack thereof.
With the above observations in mind, this chapter will first present a very short ‘formal
history’ (that is, one gleaned from published sources), of Poland’s economic transition, in
conjunction with interview data from individuals who experienced the transition directly. It
includes also a brief description of the four basic mechanisms of transfer of State assets to
private hands. Finally, a series of brief ‘personal sketches’ will be given, these representing a
cross section of Eastern European social history in the last decade of communism. The final
chapter will include a discussion concerning ‘why’ the transition occurred.
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_____________________________
After a decade of activism, Solidarność succeeded in negotiating the first legal, competitive,
free elections in the Soviet Bloc; between 1945 and 1989 the only legal political candidates had
been from the Communist Party. In the June 4th, 1989 elections, Solidarność candidates
overwhelmingly displaced their communist rivals, taking 99 of 100 seats in the Polish Sejm
(Senate). This victory started a 'chain reaction' of peaceful democratic transitions across Eastern
Europe.2
The 'Magdalenka Talks' and the 'Round Table Talks,' had prepared the way for the June 4th
elections. The Magdalenka Talks were informal and unofficial meetings between Solodarność
and the government of the People’s Republic Of Poland, starting in spring of 1988. The right to
hold free elections was granted in the official ‘Round Table Talks,’ spring, 1989, in Warsaw.
Solodarność had gained so much momentum that it virtually controlled the nation's workforce.
With the economy spiraling out of control, hyperinflation, mass food shortages, mass social
unrest, and a general breakdown of the normal social order, the Communist Party was willing to
negotiate with Solodarność, hoping to avert ‘katastroika.’3
The 30-month span from the June 4th, 1989 Polish elections until Christmas Day, 1991,
when Mikhail Gorbachev formally dissolved the Soviet Union, set in motion the largest
economic transition in world history. All land, buildings, civil infrastructure, industry, and
services owned by the State in the various People’s Republics of the Soviet Bloc began transfer
to private ownership. This ranged from gigantic manufacturing complexes employing 50,000

2

Ash, The Polish Revolution, “Postscript To The Third Edition,” 356 – 380.

3

Ibid; ‘katastroika’ was the darkly humorous play on perestroika; it meant ‘catastrophic restructuring,’ that is,
revolution, collapse of the State, anarchy, and unknown consequences thereafter.
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workers to hair salons with two employees, from collective farms as large as the state of Rhode
Island to two-family apartment houses. The significance of this event cannot be overemphasized;
it entailed a transfer of ownership of perhaps one-third of the world’s wealth. This shift also
made possible the first true globalization of capital, in that it (the political/economic revolution)
coincided with a technological revolution, ushering in a fully integrated global economy.
Banking, stock trading, currency exchange, and real-time international business operations,
unrestricted by the former ideological differences of East and West, soon became commonplace
via the World Wide Web. 4
The official transition point from a socialized economy to a privatized economy began
January 1st, 1990 in Warsaw with the enactment of the Balcerowicz Plan by the Polish Sejm. 5 In
September 1989 the new Solidarity-led government had appointed a commission of economic
experts, led by Leszek Balcerowicz, to design a comprehensive plan for the conversion of the
Polish socialist economy to 'normal capitalism.' Below, an excerpt from a New York Times
article describes the monumental significance of the Balcerowicz Plan, which quickly became
known as 'economic shock therapy':

The Solidarity-led Government introduced a far-reaching legislative program today to
transform the centrally run economy by breaking monopolies, cutting subsidies and
turning industries over to the private sector…

4

Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York, Anchor Books, 2000) and Thomas Friedman, The
World Is Flat: A Brief History Of The Twenty-First Century (New York: Picador, 2007). These constructs are the
thesis of both of Friedman’s books. He contends that a historic convergence, unlike any other before, occurred
through 1989 – 1991. The transition of the Soviet Bloc and end of the Cold War coincided with what Friedman
terms “the democratization of technology, of finance, and of information’” on a worldwide scale (The Lexus and
The Olive Tree, 44 – 72.) Although partial forms of globalization had been operating in the unfolding of world
history for a thousand years, the 1989 – ’91 convergence of unprecedented political and technological
modernizations ushered in, for the first time, the means for complete, real-time, globalization. Friedman’s obvious
‘pro-capitalist hegemony stance,’ however, detracts somewhat from his overall historical conclusions.
5

Ash, The Polish Revolution, 376 - 377. The bill passed December 31, 1989 and went into effect the next day.
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The Government, in the biggest test of its public support to date, introduced a dozen bills
for a radical overhaul of the ailing economy...
With Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the East Bloc's first non-Communist head of
government, somberly looking on, Mr. Balcerowicz outlined a virtual dismantling of 45
years of Marxist-Leninist economic policy.
"This is a landmark change that we are making," he told an extraordinary session of
Parliament. "It is unique in history. It falls to us to be pioneers. Any delay in the
economic changes could be an unforgivable mistake...
"Poland must leave behind a system based on 19th century doctrines and embrace one
based on market mechanisms where skills, knowledge, able hands, talent and willingness
to work all count" said Mr. Balcerowicz...
He said the program should be carried out swiftly because Poland's economy was in a
"catastrophic state"...6
The plan dissolved the monopoly of the State over all enterprises and created a free-market
system. It opened doors for international trade and investment, eliminated preferential treatment
of State-owned enterprises during the transition phase, provided assistance for unemployed
workers, and attempted a general stabilization of the economy. In theory, all State-owned
enterprises were to be privatized over an unspecified period of time. The Balcerowicz Plan was a
prerequisite step prior to the ‘full unleashing of capitalism,’ per a series of state-to-private
initiatives set to begin on July 13, 1990. The six-month interim period allowed, among other
things, some preparation time for creation of an unemployment insurance system. Massive
unemployment was expected as many outdated, Soviet-built heavy industrial plants, incapable of
competition in a free-market system, were phased out. The major points of the Balcerowicz Plan
are outlined below:

6

"Upheaval In The East: Poles Hear Plan For Radical Shift In Their Economy," The New York Times, December
18, 1989. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/18/world/upheaval-in-the-east (retrieved 9/25/2011; Associated Press
article - no author given). This article describes the proposed restructuring plan. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs
was among the team of financial experts advising Mr. Balcerowicz.
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The State monopoly on internal and international trade has ended - private citizens,
private companies, and foreign investors may invest in Poland and conduct business
under a fair and unified system of rules
State subsidies to political parties (i.e. the Communist Party and all other parties) has
ended
State subsidies that have kept inefficient or unprofitable enterprises afloat have ended all enterprises must immediately become self-supporting
State-owned businesses may declare bankruptcy and be dissolved
All government price controls are ended - supply and demand will set prices
Wage increases will be limited to prevent a 'leapfrogging' process in which wage
increases are followed by price increases, ad infinitum 7
An unemployment insurance system will be established paying 70% of the unemployed
worker's regular wages for three months, then 50% for the next six months, and 40% after
nine months
State pensions will be adjusted in response to inflation
A common tax code will be established for all companies, private or public (previously a
few privately owned businesses were tolerated but they paid very high taxes)
The banking system will be overhauled - the National Central Bank cannot finance state
budget deficits - State owned enterprises will no longer receive preferential treatment
from banks - no new currency will be issued - the Złoty (the Polish 'dollar') will become a
convertible currency (exchangeable on international markets - the first such currency to
do so from a former Communist State) 8

7

Jan Kulig, "Which Way To The Market Economy: Through Stabilization Or Growth Resumption?" (Paper
presented to Institute Of Economic Science, Polish Academy Of Sciences) European Journal Of Development
Research. Vol. 2, No. 2 (1991):147 - 162. A permissible wage growth index was set at 30 % of overall price levels
in January, 1990, followed by gradual reduction each month over the next five months. Any wage increases over
the specified percentages would be taxed at 200%. This was intended to contain the wage/price spiral and bring
inflation under control.
8

Ibid.
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Polish economist Jan Kulig described the Balcerowicz Plan as ‘shock stabilization.’ It was an
attempt to arrest hyperinflation - 700% and climbing as of May 1990 - to bring prices under
control, and to avoid total government default on debts. Kulig reported the overall price index
rose 130% in the first three months of 1990; energy prices rose nearly 600%. Kulig said some
economists feared inflation rising to 1000 %, massive layoffs (800,000 + workers), possible
social unrest and "virtual chaos." Still, he praised the plan, citing its potential to stabilize the
upward wage/price spiral, open up international trade and investment, and "...pave the way to a
true market system." The second phase of the plan, once some semblance of stability was
realized, would be an attempt to stimulate new economic growth through “…wholesale
privatization of all State assets.” 9
According to Raphael Shen, the legal mechanisms for wholesale privatization of Poland’s
economy began in a group of institutions that was created in Warsaw in the first half of 1990.
These new governmental groups would be responsible for creating
...the legal foundations for transferring ownership of enterprise assets from the state to
the workers... The two main agents of ownership transformation are the Ministry Of
Finance and The National Treasury. In addition, the Bureau of the Plenipotentiary for
Ownership Transformation was created to implement the laws. The chief executor is the
Agency For Ownership Transformation. Also, the council of National Property was
created for the National Treasury, and the chief functions of the council are to preside
over the agency's initiatives in privatizing, to approve or disprove the agency's selection
of state enterprises to be privatized, to safeguard the public interest in the process, and to
arbitrate differences that many arise between an enterprise and the agency. 10
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1989. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/31/world/upheaval-in-east-poland-warsaw-s-economic-pla (retrieved
9/26/2011). Also, in regard to Kulig's mention of possible Polish default, Steven Greenhouse reported that Poland
received some relief (no specified amount) on its $37 billion foreign debt through the IMF. He also reported that
Poland received an immediate one billion dollar loan from 22 Western nations to help stabilize its currency.
Steven Greenhouse, "Warsaw's Economic Plan: Prosperity As Goal." The New York Times, December 31, 1989.
(http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/31/world/upheaval-in-east-poland-warsaw-s-economic-pla) Retrieved 9/26/2011.
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In light of the precarious nature of the Polish economy in the summer of 1990, that is,
precariously teetering on verge of catastrophic failure, the decision to begin all-out privatization
after only a six-month preparation period seems to have been an act of desperation - a 'sink-orswim' effort on the part of the new Solidarność government. New financial concepts and terms,
entirely foreign to a population that had grown up under Communism, entered everyday
conversation through news broadcasts and special TV addresses from government officials.
Not only was the new capitalist terminology confusing to Poles, the transition process itself was
complex and varied per enterprise and per situation. Some essential services (utilities and
transportation services, especially) could not be put at risk of shutdowns due to economic
reorganization. There was debate as to whether health, education, and communication services
should be privatized at all. State-owned agriculture and related enterprises - growing, processing,
packaging, transportation and marketing - all aspects of food production from farm field to table
were to undergo transition in an era when food shortages had been an everyday occurrence and a
source of major social unrest. Additionally, there was no clear plan (other than short-term
unemployment benefits) for the multitude of workers that would lose their jobs as an entire
sector of inefficient heavy industrial plants went offline. 11
The aim of privatization was for three possible outcomes. First, the smallest State-owned
enterprises (that is, the spółdzielnia, or worker’s co-ops, discussed in chapter five) would be
directly taken over by one or more individuals (former spółdzielnia members) who would
'reinvent them,' that is, downsize, modernize, make them more efficient. Secondly, it was hoped
that foreign investors would acquire existing Polish enterprises and/or open up new enterprises.
Finally, effort was made such that ‘an entrepreneurial spirit' (in combination with financial
11

Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 117. Kotkin mentions here the massive industrial shutdowns in the transition of
the Soviet Bloc which was the beginning of a ‘ten-time-zone rustbelt.’
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backing and government incentives) would sweep Poland, resulting in the opening of a plethora
of new small businesses. In the long-run, all these scenarios materialized, generally speaking,
through four separate mechanisms: 1) direct, small scale spółdzielnia transitions; 2) sale of larger
spółdzielnia enterprises and/or properties; 3) joint ventures, known as spolka; 4) and voucher
transitions, called akcja. Unlike in Russia, in Poland, the spolka and akcja transactions were
generally one and the same. 12
Small scale spółdzielnia enterprises were, perhaps, the easiest to reorganize. They involved a
simple liquidation of assets and either a direct transfer of land parcels or a lease arrangement
between the State and the new, private owner. In many cases, small enterprises were given
outright by the State to one or a few workers. In some cases, State-owned enterprises (both large
and small scale) literally could not be given away, mainly because no hope for profitability
existed in the minds of even the most optimistic 'new-wave capitalists.' 13
Of course, the opposite was true with highly profitable enterprises. A new class of 'oligarchs'
has arisen across the former Soviet Bloc territories, former Communist Party elites who took
advantage of their position during the early months of the transition, gobbling up huge
percentages of stock in the most profitable business at 'dirt cheap' prices. This was not the case
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for most small enterprises; in fact, former communist managers were sometimes rewarded for
getting rid of small operations. It was hoped the new, private owner would somehow be able to
turn a profit through sheer will, determination, and 'austerity.'14
Another transition strategy involved the outright sale of property and/or existing enterprises
to those with either hard cash or the ability to obtain bank financing. Generally speaking, this
applied to nomenklatura only, as the average Polish citizen had neither savings nor a credit
history. Many former Party members obtained valuable, small-scale investment property for
practically nothing in this manner. The ‘panowie’ (discussed in chapter six), those regional
‘Polish Caudillos,’ enriched themselves this way, buying up property at a small fraction of its
market value. The panowie used their ‘inside connections’ to ascertain if a property or enterprise
held profit potential or if it was a losing venture; this was easy to determine per past performance
of the investment in question under operation of their fellow nomenklatura. In some cases the
panowie ‘swapped’ enterprises with their fellows, centralizing their property holdings into their
preferred regional district. Sometimes, in the case of ‘marginal properties,’ the panowie might
offer it for sale – for practically nothing – to a trusted friend who was not a Party member. In this
way, some non-Party members were able to purchase individual homes or apartments. 15
Divestment of spółdzielnia-operated enterprises and of small property holdings was the first
and most complete stage of the public-to-private transition. As described above, these simple
transfers of ownership and/or management from state to citizen were directed by local
governments (mostly by city councils) under authority of the Agency For Ownership
14
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Transformation, created as part of The Privatization Initiatives, 13 July 1990.16 Basically these
were 'give-aways' of small-scale enterprises outside of the manufacturing sector. As pointed out
by Poznanski, privatization of this sector of the Polish economy was (in many cases) quite
bluntly, a 'dumping' of long-standing financial burdens on the State.17 The spółdzielnia had been
much more an ideologically driven necessity than practical economic unit. In order to remain in
line with 'Marxist Orthodoxy,' all private enterprise had been banned in Soviet-styled economies,
without regard to practicality. 18 Getting rid of these inefficient 'public burdens' was as much a
step toward dismantling the enormous government bureaucracy as it was privatizing the nation's
means of production. However, larger industrial enterprises - true 'means of production' required a more complex transition strategy.
The true industrial sector can be roughly divided into two classifications - traditional heavy
industries (steel mills, coke/coal processing plants, chemical plants, shipyards, etc.) and light
manufacturing/assembly/processing plants (assembly line operations of all types, textile
industries, food processing, etc). In the People’s Republic Of Poland, three more distinctions
could be made within both of the above categories: (1) profitable enterprises; (2) those with
"...perennial inefficiency... on the verge of bankruptcy; " and (3)
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enterprises early in 1921 (the NEP, New Economic Plan of the 10th Party Congress). It was a rational choice to
allow limited private enterprise and alleviate bottlenecks in the Russian economy. This type of pragmatic thinking
disappeared with Stalin. Ideological rigidity translated into economic policy was strangling the Soviet Bloc
economies by the late 1970s.
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...those not capable of functioning smoothly in a market system because they were
dependent on central planning for all major decisions concerning investment, production,
and distribution. In a market system these firms are not capable of competing unless they
adapt to market rules...[this entails] drastic organizational changes...in operations...in
responsibility, accountability, incentives, research and development, competitive
purchasing of resources for production, organization of production processes...and choice
of products produced.19
The general consensus was that enterprises in the first category - those known to be capable of
'holding their own' in a free market system - were liquidated by converting their capital worth
into common stocks, with preference of sale of shares (that is, reduced prices on shares) going
first to managers and secondly to hourly workers within the particular enterprise. 20 As these
enterprises were considered economically viable - and thus their stock of some relative value in
the new market system - the remaining shares were to be offered on an open capital market. A
conventional stock market was established in Poland in 1991 as part of the restructuring plan.
Newly formed corporate shares (akcja) were sold as in Western markets; as previously
mentioned, this was unlike the Russian version, акцйй or ‘stock order’ (ордер; simply ‘order’),
the relatively worthless ‘stock vouchers’ which were distributed by the State to the general
public.21
Those in the second category - 'perennial losers,' still afloat simply because the Communist
State apparatus funded them - were to be allowed to declare bankruptcy with no chance for
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reorganization. The land, machinery, buildings, equipment, etc., associated with these
enterprises were liquidated through public sale.
The final category (also the largest category in terms of relative value) were the multitude of
Soviet-era industries, some built on a monumental scale, that had been operated for decades
through standard central planning procedures. In other words, the majority of large-scale
enterprises in the Soviet Bloc were interconnected, non-competing, plan-driven (not marketdriven) operations, bearing little resemblance to Western industrial operations which survived
only in terms of 'market rules;' i.e., efficiency, productivity, quality control, and competition
with other producers. In reality, this group was for the most part 'untested' in a true market
economy. Plan-driven operations gave little concern to financial accountability, efficiency, or for that matter - the rationale of their existence altogether. The Soviet-era industrial infrastructure
had been 'willed into existence' by Warsaw and Moscow bureaucrats with no concern for
profitability (there was no such concept in Marxist-Leninist economics). Later, managers with no
understanding of market economics would be called upon to profitably operate the newly
privatized enterprises.22
It was for this reason, the inexperience of most communist-era managers, that the decision
was made by economists in the Agency For Ownership Transformation to offer shares of former
State enterprises to foreign (Western) investors. These joint ventures (known as 'spolka'),
between Polish and foreign investors would succeed, it was believed, because "...the more
resourceful and experienced foreign companies...taking advantage of low sales prices...would
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acquire a controlling stake in state enterprises in which they have an interest."23 Their freemarket expertise would guide the fledgling capitalist enterprises to profitability through
conventional Western management techniques, while simultaneously retraining the Polish
workforce (both managers and hourly workers). Foreign investors would bring the needed
capitalist management techniques to Soviet-Bloc industries, forcing them into profitability
through downsizing, streamlining, raising efficiency and quality standards, cutting costs, or
totally restructuring product lines.
The Agency For Ownership Transformation intended an infusion of foreign capital and
simultaneously (and most importantly) a diffusion of Western management and operation
techniques into the outdated, 'plan-driven,' Soviet-styled system. However, this entailed
downsizing on a grand scale. The bloated communist economy assured jobs for all - a very noble
aspiration - however, in purely pragmatic terms, this had been accomplished by over staffing and
by the sheer institutionalized inefficiency inherent in 'mega-industries.'24 Mass
industrialization projects were efficient to a point - but eventually a point of dimensioning
returns was reached - and in a modern, globally competitive economy, driven by instantaneously
available information and a constantly shifting market (in terms of demand, quality, quantity, and
variety), the 'old Soviet-era dinosaurs' (predicated on producing of planned mass quantities) had
to be reduced in scale, modernized, and in some cases, completely abandoned. In human terms,
this meant a loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs as the old industries were brought into
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'Western rationality' (competitive economic efficiency), a devastating blow to many workers
entirely unprepared to ‘reinvent themselves’ in middle or old age.
Finally, another scenario that negatively affected many Polish workers during the transition
was the overt dismantling of traditional 'means of production' by foreign investors and their
replacement with non-industrial sector enterprises. The dismantling of sections of Stocznia
Gdańska, for example, by Swedish investors, intent on replacing it with high-end, ocean front
apartments exacerbated Polish discontent (among working class people) with the new
Solodarność government's handling of the transition.25 Rules established by the Agency For
Ownership Transformation called for a minimum of five year continuity in workplace turnover
(to ensure stability during the transition) or a monetary settlement (a lump-sum termination
payment) to displaced workers. In the case of Stocznia Gdańska, as the gigantic facility was
'parted-out' to various foreign investors, many chose to pay the one-time settlement, abandon
industrial operations (and thus the jobs they entailed) as long-term property investments seemed
more profitable than attempts at reorganizing antiquated industries (the result: massive job
losses). This was an 'unintended consequence' of the 1990 Privatization Initiatives; it was legal,
but probably not anticipated (the lump-sum transition payment clause was meant as a disincentive to keep foreign investors from doing just this - buying Polish industrial infrastructure
and converting it to investment property). Again, in a mass transition of this scope (the biggest in
world history), the 'best laid plans' have a way of going astray.
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_____________________________________
As stated in the opening of this chapter, interview data adds a ‘human dimension’ to the
Polish transition entirely neglected in standard ‘document histories’ of the era. Per the contention
made in the opening, the transition was not at all uniform and was experienced in drastically
different ways according to a variety of variables – among these, age, gender, occupation,
educational level, political affiliation, and geographic location. Below, eight different ‘personal
sketches,’ derived from interview data, aptly illustrate the ‘lived experience’ of the transition
representative of several different social classes. Along with several of the stories already told in
previous chapter’s opening vignettes (‘Tomasz,’ Chapter 7, ‘Oksana,’ Chapter 6, and ‘Mrs.
Danka,’ Chapter 3), these sketches demonstrate the variety of circumstantial outcomes
experienced by individuals caught up in Poland’s transition to capitalism and democracy. To
avoid redundant footnoting, it is stated here that the following interviews were all conducted by
the author, and, per IRB protocol, anonymous names were used:

‘Anna and Mierik,’ mid 50s, from a small village north of Wałbrzych –
Anna is a high school biology teacher and Mierik is a salesman for a well known international
chemical corporation. Neither were active supporters of the Solidarity Movement, nor were they
connected in any way to the nomenklatura class; they remained apolitical, concentrating on their
education and careers. They have achieved a Polish version of the ‘American Dream,’ having
three children, two cars, and a spacious, newly built home in a rural setting. Mierik attributes his
career success to his language skills. He learned Russian in public school, as it was required
curriculum before the mid 1980s. He also acquired a functional knowledge of English and
German in school and through his own private studies. Later, Mierik’s employer paid for
advanced classes in English and German. He proudly represents his corporation in Warsaw,
Moscow, Munich, and London. In five years Anna will be eligible for teachers’ retirement which
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will come from the conventional ZUS (Zaklad Ubezpieczen Spolecznych; State Social Security
System). The State teachers’ retirement system was virtually untouched by the 1989 transition.
Their main goal is seeing their three children earn advanced college degrees. For this couple, the
transition further facilitated successful careers by the internationalization of the Polish economy
and by the general expansion of consumer culture/economy.
‘Adam and Natalie,’ mid 20s, from Kraków –
Adam and Natalie are young, successful, urban professionals. Adam works for an advertising
agency and Natalie is a medical technician. They admit that their ‘memories’ of life before the
transition are more likely the effects of stories repeated time and again by their parents. They
don’t actually remember “standing in line, on the stone sidewalk, in the snow, for eight hours
just to but potatoes,” but having heard so many stories like this, they ‘know’ what it was like
‘back then.’ Natalie actually does remember her first trip to Pizza Hut, a thrill afforded by the
transition, as Western commercial culture began its invasion. Adam knows that his mom “still
hoards canned ham like it was gold,” even though ten different varieties of ham are now
available at the local chain-store supermarket – old habits die hard. The ideological battles
between communism and capitalism, between authoritarianism and democracy, fought by their
parents’ generation are as far removed from Adam and Natalie’s life as are the Great Depression
and WWII from the lives of twenty-something Americans.

‘The Bishop,’ mid 60s, from Szczawno- Zdrój –
Discussed in the previous chapter, ‘The Bishop’ is revisited here as he best represents his
particular class. In the image of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, ‘The Bishop’ claims to be a Polish
patriot, a devout and traditional Catholic, and a true believer in Communism. He fought against
the Polish Solidarity Movement and warned his fellow citizens of the coming economic
apocalypse that would accompany transition to capitalism and democracy – now, many people
see his ‘prophecies’ being fulfilled. He still rails against the transition while simultaneously
expanding his little economic empire. ‘The Bishop’ has never known poverty; as a Party member
and mine manager he earned a good living; now as an independent businessman he does even
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better. However, unlike the class of ‘new oligarchs’26 in large cities of the former Soviet Bloc,
many of whom became rich instantly through corrupt manipulation of State wealth during the
chaos of transition, ‘The Bishop’ accumulated his little empire over many years, and through
diligent personal effort. We might say he personifies the ‘proletarian work ethic,’ a theoretical
derivative of Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic. The proletarian ethic is a “class derived value code”
which includes a certain “elective affinity” similar to those linked to Calvinist doctrines.
Dedication to Marxist-Leninism replaces Calvinism as the driving force, and ‘election’ to the
nomenklatura class is likened to being one of ‘God’s elect’ as per Calvinism’s notion of
‘predestination.’ 27

‘Józef,’ early 80s, from Gdańsk –
No one could have been more dedicated to the cause of Solidarność and more active in its
support than Józef. He was an eyewitness to history: a life-time employee of the Lenin Shipyard,
present at the 1970 massacre of workers, present at the 1980 formation of Solidarność, survivor
of Martial Law, veteran of many strikes, participant in the first free elections, friend of Lech
Wałęsa, foe of Polish Communism. But these things are ‘current events’ for Józef. He was a boy
during WWII and remembers being forced to work in a cement plant operated by the Nazis. He
remembers reconstruction after the war, the Communist takeover, collectivization, the bezpieka
terror (bezpieka security forces enforced collectivization and monitored industrial production),
Stalinism, paranoid fear, police brutality, Martial Law, and violence by the ZOMA (National
Guard). Today Józef lives on a much-reduced pension from the shipyard; much-reduced due to
the economic turmoil brought on by the transition to capitalism. By American standards he lives
in abject poverty. But it is very hard to engage Józef in ‘economic stories.’ “Yes,” he grumbles,
“of course I remember food shortages, lines, strikes. Yes – we grew gardens to survive – Yes,
26
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Yes, Yes, to all your silly questions about ‘hard times’ in Poland during the Solidarity
Movement.” The transition that Józef fought for affected him negatively, in economic terms, but
he seldom thinks of that. He was not fighting about money – he did not care about material
things, beyond what was necessary, ‘back then,’ or now. His fight was against the authoritarian
form of government that accompanied Soviet-style communism. He did not worry about
‘economic things’ in the past and certainly does not worry about them now. He has other
concerns, more pressing concerns; he relives, in his mind, everyday, Stalinism,
collectivization, bezpieka terror, police brutality, censorship, the ZOMA, paranoia, fear….

‘Vera,’ late 50s, Warsaw –
Vera was born in Vladivostok to a Russian military officer and a Polish mother. As she was
growing up, her father was stationed in various locations across the Soviet Bloc, thus affording
her a perspective much broader than that of most other interviewees. She eventually settled in
Warsaw and earned a law degree. During the 1980s Vera was part of the KOR (Komitet
Samoobrony

Społecznej; Citizens Self-Defense Committee), a group of lawyers who

volunteered their services to defend Solidarność activists accused of crimes against the State. She
represents the true inteligencja class, highly educated, financially secure, usually with some
family connections to the Party or the military – often with international connections. Two other
interviewees, both college professors, also fall into this category. As with ‘Józef’ (above), this
group seems to have visualized the transition mainly in ideological and political terms rather than
strictly concentrating on economic issues (however, unlike those in ‘Józef’s’ situation, the
inteligencja were usually financially secure already). The partnership of the inteligencja with
common workers (specifically, the KOR working with the labor union Solidarność) is a wellknown factor commonly attributed to the ultimate success of the Solidarity Movement. Many of
the inteligencja who became involved in Solidarity activism were forced to immigrate to the
West due to threats against their lives by the opposition; those who remained in Poland, like
Vera, generally had ‘connections’ who protected them. Two ironic points are evidenced here:
Firstly, the transition caused a large, inadvertent, out-migration of both the highest and lowest
economic classes from Poland (Vera represents the highest and ‘Zosia,’ below, represents the
lowest). Secondly, those of the highest class who defied the State, yet were able to remain in
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Poland, were usually ‘protected’ by family or friends who were the State, that is, the
nomenklatura.

‘Zosia,’ mid 50s, from Gdańsk –
Zosia worked as a hairdresser through a spółdzielnia collective. She has one son, now grown and
living in Warsaw. She was divorced when the boy was five years old and never remarried. She
was an active supporter of the Solidarity movement and joined the Solidarność union in the first
year of its existence (1980). She participated in many demonstrations and marches in support of
Solidarity and led her collective in several city-wide and nation-wide strikes in the early 1980s.
In 1990, when all spółdzielnia collectives were dissolved by the State, the local Agency For
Ownership Transformation offered Zosia the hair salon operation – the building and all
equipment – for the equivalent of a few hundred dollars. She had no savings at all but was able to
borrow this small sum from her father, along with a little extra for general improvements to the
operation (cleanup, paint, a new sign, some new furniture). She was excited to open her own
business, be her own boss, and she had great hopes for the future. However, in the turmoil of the
economic transition, Zosia’s new salon failed. Having struggled for three years, selling all her
possessions, and further borrowing small sums of money from family and friends, she was
finally forced to liquidate the operation. Lacking vocational skills beyond hairdressing, no
education past high school, and with unemployment near 35%, Zosia became part of the Polish
chain migration to Ireland. She found work in a hotel in Dublin, cleaning and doing laundry. She
is part of a Eastern European ‘underclass’ similar to many Mexican migrants in the US, lacking
language skills beyond their native language and having an ‘outdated education’ at best. Her job
at the hotel provides her with ‘survival level’ pay. She shares a tiny apartment with another
Polish woman and lives ‘paycheck to paycheck.’ 28
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‘Joanna,’ late 40s, ‘Kasha,’ early 70s, and ‘Marja,’ 14, all living in Bangor, Northern
Ireland, originally from Wroćlaw –
This mother, daughter, and grandmother migrated together to the UK out of economic necessity.
Joanna’s husband lost his job at a coal processing plant in 1991 as much of the Lower Silesian
coal industry was phased out. He was never able to find another job of equivalent pay in the new
economy; that is, in relation to the much higher cost of living in the post-transition era. Joanna
attributes their divorce, to a great degree, to economic problems. With equally poor job prospects
as her former husband, in Poland, Joanna made the decision to move to Bangor. She had friends
who had already moved there and offered to help in the relocation. Unwilling to leave her elderly
mother alone in Wroćlaw, Joanna finally persuaded her to accompany herself and daughter
Marja – then only eight years old – in the move to Bangor. Joanna had very basic English
speaking skills, learned mostly from an aunt who had taught English at a private school. This
basic English helped Joanna get a job at what she calls “the home for old Presbyterians,” in
Bangor (a rest home operated by the Presbyterian Church). The rest home offered Joanna free
advanced English classes and pays her a ‘living wage,’ subsidized through a government
program that aids fellow European Union citizens who migrate to the UK in search of work. The
UK also pays for ‘specialized skills upgrade classes,’ in Joanna’s chosen field of elder care; she
takes all the classes they offer. This is an opportunity she would have never had in Poland. Her
elderly mother, Kasha, does not speak one word of English, but has found a few friends in the
growing Polish migrant community. Kasha contributes to the household by caring for Marja
(although as years pass by, this role is rapidly reversing). Marja has adjusted well to school and
life in the UK and speaks English as fluently as her native language. This family is typical of the
hundreds of thousands of Polish economic migrants created as an unintentional by-product of the
nation’s transition to capitalism and democratic government. It should be noted that families like
Joanna’s are quite a bit better off than individuals in ‘Zosia’s’ class. This can be attributed, to a
great degree, in differences of treatment to migrants by the UK and Ireland (the UK has many
social programs to aid and educate migrant workers), and to Joanna’s English language skills.
The multi-generational family and the growing immigrant community, no doubt, also have
helped make Joanna’s move more successful than Zosia’s. Joanna and her daughter are
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successfully integrating into the new European Union economy; migrants like Zosia have little
chance for successful integration. 29

‘Tolek,’ early 40s, Gdańsk –
Tolek had not been a very serious student. Tolek assumed he would get a job in the agricultural
chemical plant where his father worked after he graduated from high school. Every spring ‘X
number’ of employees retired from the plant and every spring an equal ‘X number’ of local high
school graduates were hired to fill their place; this was how it was done all over Poland ‘back in
the day.’ In the Communist era, no one had ever heard of labor intensification, reduction in
force, downsizing, outsourcing, off-shoring, layoffs, or permanent shutdowns. All citizens were
guaranteed a job and most jobs were guaranteed for life. However, Tolek graduated from high
school in 1988 as ‘katastroika’ was just gearing up. That spring, at Tolek’s father’s plant, rather
than hiring the appropriate ‘X number’ to keep the status quo, no one was hired. By spring 1990
over half of the 800 employees were laid off. Needles to say, Tolek never saw the inside of any
industrial plant. He represents an ‘in between generation’ that missed out on the security and
stability of the late Communist period, but who also were not educationally prepared for the
post-transition economy. Tolek had only a ‘general education’ in a new, market-driven nation
with 35% unemployment. Yet, through personal initiative and fortunate contacts, he managed to
find an economic niche. With no job prospects in sight, he started his own ‘taxi service’ – “one
old car that ran most of the time, when I could afford gasoline,” he said. Most of his fares were
between the local airport and train station – many were German and Swedish businessmen
interested in making joint ventures with newly privatized Polish enterprises. Through one such
investor, Tolek got his ‘big break.’ Gdańsk underwent a ‘building boom’ in the late 1990s, as
Western corporations began marketization of many former Soviet Bloc nations – in other words,
Pizza Huts and MacDonald’s were springing up on every corner like mushrooms in the forests of
Sudaty. Recommended by one of his recurring taxi customers, Tolek was hired as a truck driver
29

Office For National Statistics, “ Polish Born People Resident In The UK, 2001 – 2010”
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171780_229910.pdf Poland and seven other Central and Eastern European nation
joined the European Union in 2003. “Between the year ending December 2003 and the year ending December 2010
the Polish-born population of the UK increased from 75,000 to 532,000” (p.1).
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for a local land development company, hauling sand, gravel, cement, and stone to the many new
construction sites. With this stable income, he was able to buy his own used dump truck – similar
to how his taxi business began, he now became an independent truck operator. He eventually got
several small business loans and expanded his operation. Today, his trucking business is doing
well and he makes a middle class income. Tolek believes that he is an exception rather than the
norm for his generation, and he is quick to attribute his success to ‘luck and friends’ rather than
to any exceptional skills. He says that many of his graduating high school class never ‘found
their niche’ in the new Polish economy. Some migrated to the UK or Ireland. Most are stuck in
‘dead end jobs’ – low pay, no benefits, no prospects for the future; rather than helping to build
new MacDonald’s buildings, as Tolek did as a construction truck driver, many of his cohorts are
flipping burgers there as they enter middle age. Quite a few others, he recalls, became involved
in petty crime or were consumed by alcoholism and drug abuse. Few of his age cohort, he
believes, live as well under the new market economy as did their parents – Poland’s last
Communist generation.
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Conclusion
This thesis began by giving a brief background history of the close cultural link between
Poland and Russia. This cultural link was noted in contrast to the gulf between the two nations in
terms of economic and political modernity at the beginning of the 20 th Century. The thesis then
proceeded to discuss the origins of the People’s Republic Of Poland near the end of WWII, the
source of the Communist Party’s power, and the means by which the Party assumed and
maintained that power during the Stalin era. A short description of the Soviet version of planned
economy was given, followed by a discussion of the application of this system to Poland. It then
described how the progressively dysfunctional Polish economy led to social unrest that
manifested itself in protests, riots, strikes, and finally in creation of the labor union Solidarność.
Next, oral histories in the form of extensive interview data were interwoven with published,
formal accounts of the ‘Solidarity Decade,’ the 1980s. These oral histories illuminate the ‘lived
experience’ of Solidarity’s struggle, of the transition to capitalism and democracy, and of daily
life in Gdańsk and Wałbrzych – two cities that experienced the Solidarity Decade rather
differently.
In the process of relating this story several contentions are made throughout. Generally
speaking, they are based on anecdotal evidence per interview data. None of the contentions are
derived from individual outliers – all are corroborated by multiple accounts, both per interview
data specific to this thesis project and/or in conjunction with similar published accounts. It is
recognized that quantitative research is needed to wholly validate these contentions in terms of
their strength, distribution, and efficacy. This disclaimer made, three main contentions are
generalized below:

1) Despite the collective effort and enthusiasm of some 10 million official members of
Solidarność (roughly 1/3 of the entire population of Poland), alongside millions more who
informally supported the Solidarity Movement, the ultimate transition to capitalism and
democracy was not at all a uniform experience; for many Poles the transition turned from a
dream into a nightmare. Interview data has been used to describe a few of the various outcomes
of the transition per individuals representing different segments of Polish society. A perspective
heard more than once in discussions concerning the transition can be generalized as follows:
‘Poles sick of the ugly face of communism very soon tired of the ugly face of capitalism.’ As in
the USSR, political change seems to have outpaced economic reform, and for many Poles ‘bitter
capitalist realities’ replaced dreams of a moderate social democracy.
2) Likewise, there seems to have been a ‘north-south split’ in general public perception and
experience concerning the Solidarity Movement’s drive toward national transformation through a
shift to capitalism and democratic government. Much of the economic infrastructure of Lower
Silesia was built in the post-WWII era, some well-planned as ‘showcases of socialism,’ and thus
stood in contrast to the aging rust-belt coastal cities. Some interviewees believed that the south
received preferential treatment from the State (more industrial development, more and better
housing, more leniency in ideological matters, less interference from police and State militias),
and that the north was constantly ‘punished’ for its rebelliousness and fanatical devotion to
Solidarność (although it should be noted that many of Lower Silesia’s mines and factories were
also strongholds of Solidarność). Some interviewees believed that the State intentionally
exacerbated antagonism between different regions in an effort to portray the Solidarity
Movement as the prime reason for Poland’s economic troubles. Some believed that the State
intentionally caused artificial shortages and economic bottlenecks in order to lay the blame on
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Solidarity. These regional differences in public perception and actual differences in economic
conditions were responsible for the different ‘informal economic strategies’ (or lack thereof)
which emerged in response to growing economic dysfunction. Some of these differences and
variations are revealed in discussion of daily life in Gdańsk and Wałbrzych, northern and
southern cities respectively.
3) Generally speaking, those individuals with some previous ‘entrepreneurial experience’
fared better in the post-transition economy. In this context, ‘entrepreneurial experience’ has a
very broad definition. It includes individuals who engaged in fucha czarna robota (part-time
‘black work’ or ‘under-the-table’ work), czarny rynek handlowy (black market trading), and in
all forms of informal - technically illegal - private trading of work, services, or material goods. It
also includes the nomenklatura class, who by virtue of their political orientation (i.e., Party
membership) were given the authority and privilege to manage and operate state enterprises, and
in some cases, both legal and technically-illegal private enterprises. For most of the
nomenklatura class across the Soviet Bloc their privileged status was automatically transferred in
the shift from communism to capitalism. Many of the nomenklatura had managerial experience,
and were more likely than average citizens to have savings and a credit history, thus making
them eligible for financing in the new capitalist system. Most importantly, the nomenklatura had
‘inside information’ concerning all aspects of the economic transition, ranging from the ‘nuts and
bolts’ of legalities and paperwork to speculative knowledge of the potential profitability of stateowned enterprises under liquidation. This does not necessarily mean that such individuals ‘preadapted’ to a market economy by virtue of their participation in formal or informal
entrepreneurial activities - legal or illegal - became prosperous or rich in the post-1989 economy;
most did not. It simply means that those with such experience were more likely to survive the
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transition and remain in Poland as opposed to the million-plus ‘economic refugees’ or ‘labor
migrants’ created by the transition - a new 21st Century Polish diaspora, mainly to the UK and
Republic of Ireland. It is also very apparent, per interview data, that those individuals with
advanced educations and/or foreign language skills prior to the transition fared better in the posttransition economy. Again, it should be noted that further quantitative and demographic research
could help elaborate on and clarify these general observations now based solely on interview
data.
Beyond these three contentions, this thesis provides a holistic picture of the last decade of
communism in Poland, both as ‘formal history’ and as ‘lived experience,’ per oral histories
obtained from interviewees and through several ‘lyrical narratives’ on various pertinent topics.
In a previously published sociology thesis the author has also discussed how the Polish Solidarity
Movement originated, what factors contributed to the movement’s success, and how the
movement contributed to the process of transition. 1 Yet, one final, pressing question remains:
why did the transition to capitalism and democracy occur? Short of another full-scale research
project and complete review of published transitology literature, this final chapter now turns to a
very brief discussion of the topic, and includes observations made by interviewees and by the
researcher himself which may contribute new insights to understanding why the transition took
place.
________________________________________
The standard Western explanation – and the oversimplified one - goes as follows: Economic
dysfunctions resulted in shortages of food and consumer goods which caused frustration and
dissatisfaction in the general public. The negative energy of dissatisfaction was eventually
1

Stephen Mays, A Synthetic Analysis Of The Polish Solidarity Movement: Solidarność - Ewolucja nie
Rewolucja, (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012).
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channeled into positive action; that is, violent riots and protests gave way to peaceful, organized
political action, coalescing in the Solidarity Movement, in general, and in the labor union,
Solidarność in particular. This movement grew in numbers and support to such a degree that its
collective pressure caused the existing, authoritarian, single-party-only government to concede to
open, multiparty elections. These elections ushered in a vast majority of Solidarność candidates
who enacted major, unprecedented reforms (the labor union had also become a political party).
These reforms reversed 45 years of Polish history and paved the way for a general reversal of 70
years of Soviet history – that is, the majority of property and means of production across the
Soviet Bloc was privatized, the state-planned economy was replaced by a market economy, and
multi-party politics replaced the Communist Party monopoly throughout.
This scenario is true, but it is also partial and oversimplified; as such, it easily becomes a
vehicle for implications not based in historical or social reality. The underlying political and
economic order of the former Soviet Bloc was complex and contradictory. Its political system
fulfilled universal goals of social justice for millions of citizens, while simultaneously – in some
cases, in some eras – its antidemocratic tendencies denied basic civil rights to millions of
citizens. Likewise, its economic system modernized a continent, in effect, taking multitudes from
serfdom to the space age in a single generation, while simultaneously ‘stagnating’ as the 21st
Century drew near. A simplistic, Westerncentric explanation of why the transition happened will
not do, and a distorted explanation aimed at justifying the ‘victory’ of predatory global
capitalism cannot be tolerated.
The simple explanation is sometimes made very self-serving to advocates of politically
conservative agendas, to Western-biased academics, or to proponents of Neoliberal freemarketism who aspire to privatize and commodify all dimensions of all societies. It becomes a
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justification for a Neoliberal backlash against Stalin-era notions of ‘maximum socialization of
everyday life,’ and ‘war communism’ (falsely presumed to have been continuous from Lenin to
Yeltsin across the entire Soviet Bloc), the antithesis thus becoming ‘maximum privatization of
everyday life.’ The phrase ‘all power to the Soviets’ is replaced with ‘all power to Capital,’ a
victory cry of supposed bourgeoisie triumph over working class solidarity. For Neoliberals, the
sacralized workings of unregulated world capitalism are posited to magically bring about peace,
liberty, and prosperity for all. ‘The End Of History’ arrived, per prophets like Francis
Fukuyama, some twenty years ago with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the accompanying
‘death of Marx,’ and the advent of global American Neoliberal hegemony. In reality, the process
of building such a system relies on domination, not democracy, on severe inequalities, not broad
prosperity, on powerful exploitation, not humane development, and on conflict, not peace. These
constructs were operationalized in Cold War ‘grand area planning,’ the antithesis of the ‘domino
theory,’ and were nothing less than an attempt to capture any economic development outside of
capitalist control. When the Soviet Bloc politically disintegrated, Neoliberals pounced on the
event, distorting it (or perhaps not fully understanding it) as the ultimate triumph of capitalism
over socialism, and by extension of their ideology, as good over evil. In fact, the primary goal of
the Solidarity Movement was simply to bring about a social democracy free from interference by
Moscow, not to unleash ‘Wild East Capitalism.’ 2

2

Jerzy Borowczak, interview by author, 12/18/2010. Mr. Borowczak is current director of Fundacja Centrum
Solidarności and was a leading political advisor to Lech Wałęsa throughout the Solidarity Movement. He clearly
explained that the Movement’s goals progressed from establishment of free, self-governing trade unions to full
political liberation from Moscow’s ‘paternal hand.’ This implied an end to Communist Party political monopoly,
open multiparty elections, and full civil rights for all Polish citizens (freedom of the press, freedom of speech, right
to assemble, etc.). He was also adamant in explaining that Solidarity advocated basic social welfare programs per
the old Soviet system be continued in the new democratic Poland, and that a mixed economy (i.e., a mixture of
State and private ownership) would replace State monopoly on all enterprise. In short, the aim was to create a Social
Democracy along the lines of Scandinavian models. The notion that any former Communist nation in Eastern
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The distorted Neoliberal argument becomes falsely predicated on the assumption that any
planned, rational, State intervention in a nation’s economic system for the purpose of developing
natural and human resources for the benefit of the general population, for ensuring a more
egalitarian distribution of these resources, or for guaranteeing more democratic management of
the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, is inherently flawed and guaranteed to fail.
Deconstruction of the Welfare State and labeling of all social services as ‘entitlements’
(negatively implying these as some sort of state ‘handout,’ when they are in fact investments of
worker’s personal incomes) becomes a Neoliberal policy priority. Profits from state-owned
enterprises in the Soviet Bloc - from Gdańsk to Vladivostok - were able to provide workers with
full employment, unemployment insurance between jobs, old-age retirements, free medical care,
free education, free child care, paid vacations, paid maternity leave, and affordable food,
housing, energy, transportation, and consumer goods; denial of all these socially responsible
ideas becomes a ‘cause croisade’ for Neoliberal privateers. A desperate labor surplus and
maximization of profit is the aim, along with the building of a ‘false consciousness’ in workers’
minds which justifies their own (the working class’s) degradation based on capital’s projected
conservative mythology. This mythology was created to serve the global capitalist system and to
justify its exploitation of a new class structure. The ‘service class’ becomes the most numerous,
followed by the (traditional) working class, with a new ‘creative class’ at the apex, all of which
are at the service of capital.
Furthermore, a ‘moral reversal’ is attempted by the false Neoliberal argument, which insists
that the events of 1989 – 1991 can be summed up as a plea by Eastern Europeans for social and

Europe opted for ‘free-market anarchism,’ ‘predatory capitalism,’ ‘Wild East Capitalism,’ or any other entirely
deregulated system as a backlash-rejection of Socialism is purely a fantasy of American Neoliberals.
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economic justice through total dismantlement of all the above-mentioned social programs and
investments by the State – nothing could be further from the truth. The 1989 – 1991 transition
did entail profoundly moral issues, namely, revitalization of the traditional European Welfare
State through principles of universalism, egalitarianism, worker solidarity, increased efficiency,
and technocratic management – not abandonment of civil society by its own government. Rather,
for Poland, it meant a ‘reset,’ a reform, and a liberation from conservative communist orthodoxy
which hindered economic modernization (potential ‘hybridization’ between capitalism and
socialism) by clinging to the dogmas of the Party Line-dominated past.
This is a prime example of the ‘fallacy of the single cause’ (i.e., causal oversimplification) in
conjunction with faulty cause and effect and/or confusion of cause and effect. Neoliberal
political/economic arguments and Westerncentric academic arguments based on this type of
faulty logic and utter lack of comprehensive historical understanding are often used in
descriptions of ‘The Collapse of Communism,’ followed by an inference that attempts to justify
unbounded capitalism as the answer to all economic problems and as the only system capable of
producing material wellbeing. If this is the case, how can the tremendous economic growth of
the Soviet Five Year Plans be accounted for, or the rapid reconstruction of nearly 70% of Soviet
Bloc infrastructure destroyed in WWII? How can massive post-WWII revitalization of Poland’s
industries, shipyards, and farms with infusions of capital from the USSR be explained? How
could a system labeled by its opponents as entirely unworkable have produced continued rising
standards of living throughout the Cold War years, when, as the well-worn cliché goes, the US
and Soviet Bloc were competing in ‘the space race, the arms race, and the peace race?’ Beyond
the Soviet Bloc examples, if a managed economy is guaranteed to end in failure, how can a
century of economic growth and social stability under the management of the Social Democratic
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Labor Party of Sweden be accounted for? For that matter, the success of the British Empire
came about, to a great degree, through its tightly controlled, highly interconnected network of
scientifically managed colonial administrative offices. 3 More recently, Vietnam’s vibrant
economic rebirth after a decade of destruction courtesy of the US Military, or China’s current
unprecedented economic growth under Communist Party leadership offer prime examples of
success through a planned economy.
Both the ‘wrecking’ of Perestroika (by West and East) and the ‘co-opting’ of the transition’s
meaning by opportunists have been noted by Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev remained
convinced of the superiority of the socialist system throughout the Perestroika Era, the 1991
transition, and into his retirement. In his book On my Country And The World (2000), he
clarifies this point:
One of today’s most fashionable clichés both in Russia and the West is to speak of the
total collapse of the socialist idea. Socialism has been anathematized. All the misfortunes
suffered by the Soviet people…are attributed to socialism. This is a false conclusion. The
socialism about which the great minds in the history of humanity have written and about
which millions of people have dreamed never did exist – neither in the Soviet Union nor
in Eastern Europe, Asia or Cuba…[Thus]…it simply flies in the face of history as well as
logic to assert that socialism was defeated… My own opinion is quite definite: The
socialist idea has not lost its significance or its historical relevance. This is so not only
because the very idea of socialism, which includes such concepts as social justice,
equality, freedom, and democracy, is one that can never be exhausted but also because
the entire development of the world community confirms, with new urgency every day,
that we need justice, equality, freedom, democracy, and solidarity. 4
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Britain’s scientifically managed bureaucratic capacities helped develop natural and human resources around the
globe. The analogy per this thesis is that ‘scientific socialism’ did the same.
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Mikhail Gorbachev [translated by George Shriver], On My Country And The World (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000), 67.
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It is appropriate then, in summary, and as a clarification to the ‘faulty cause and effect fallacy’
often used in both political rhetoric and in biased academic discourse, to briefly list and
categorize the reasons why Poland’s economic crisis occurred and why the closely related
economic and political transition of the entire Soviet Bloc came about.
To note the above-mentioned examples of success by socialist nations is not to deny that the
last decade of Polish communism was fraught with economic dysfunction; the range of
alternative economic strategies undertaken by average citizens, as described in this thesis, is
clear evidence of this. However, most of these problems did not originate directly from common
policies or practices associated with socialized management of an economy, nor was competition
with the West a prime factor. COMECON was a closed system; ships made in Gdańsk, for
example, did not serve the same market as ships made in Baltimore. Likewise, steel made at
Katowice and Częstochowa was under no more imperative of competition than was steel made
in Pittsburgh and Cleveland – before the rapid globalization of markets that came as a result of
the 1989 – 1991 transitions. In other words, competition with the West was irrelevant until both
East and West entered the global market in the post-transition years. When this happened, both
American and Soviet Bloc industrial belts became rust belts – Communist China displaced the
industrial dominance of the US, as well as that of Western and Eastern Europe.
As encapsulated in previous chapters, Poland’s economic problems came, firstly, from
‘internal colonization,’ as the USSR expropriated Poland’s agricultural production in lieu of
COMECON-sanctioned trades for oil, natural gas, and the iron ore needed for Poland’s steel
industry (Poland had no domestic source of iron ore and no sources of fuel except for coal).
Simultaneously, Soviet oil revenues from sales outside the COMECON community helped
maintain the system and delayed real economic reform. Shortages of food and consumer goods
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resulted from these trade imbalances. Food shortages were especially frustrating to Poles as
much of the nation’s agricultural production was earmarked for shipment east. Shortages of
consumer goods in Poland and across the Soviet Bloc were also exacerbated decades after Stalinera economic planning, as its emphasis on heavy industry created a lopsided national defense
economy. Despite attempts at trade balance Poland, and Eastern Europe as a whole, were
considered ‘drains’ on the economy of the USSR proper, thus making their ‘economic liberation’
a priority of Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to balance the Soviet budget.
Secondly, again as previously discussed, Solidarity-led strikes as protest against shortages
actually exacerbated shortages, by decreasing production and by hindering shipping; in turn, the
State ‘punished’ strike-prone regions by allowing bottlenecks in production and distribution to
go unresolved. This ‘negative feedback loop’ spiraled out of control in the 1980s, with both the
State and Solidarność blaming each other for the economic catastrophe. As this thesis has
pointed out, evidenced by interview data, regional economic differences were exploited by both
the Polish State and by Solidarność (per the ideologies ‘sold’ by both). Individual citizens’
economic strategies, as well as their political stance, often reflected these differences. As
previously stated, Poland was the only Soviet Bloc state to retain a vibrant ‘civil society’ even
under Communist Party domination, economic subjugation, and Martial Law. This is a ‘cultural
tradition’ stemming from the Partitions, reinforced by the ‘Polish Enlightenment,’ and
operationalized by such institutions as the Polish Catholic Church, ‘Flying Universities’(informal
itinerant schools), samizdat writers (bibuła), and a strong, defiant, inteligencja tradition streching
back to Copernicus and beyond. By the same token, this rebelliousness was also a constant threat
to the political integrity of the Soviet Bloc, and in 1985, when Gorbachev’s Perestroika was
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unleashed and Solidarność was re-legalized, the decades-old clamoring for independence by
Poland’s civil society spread across Eastern Europe like wildfire.
Thirdly, in the broader economic arena, the Soviet system struggled with the ‘catch-up
legacy’ from WWII infrastructure devastation, with costly Cold War military competition
(estimates range from 1/3 to 1/2 of the national budget 5), with ‘imperial overreach’ (from Africa
to South East Asia, to Afghanistan; Vietnam cost the USSR over $1.5 billion 6), with a corrupt
and exploitive nomenklatura class, with an overgrown ‘red tape laden bureaucracy,’ with a
resource-based economy, 7 and with the hindrance of ‘ideological orthodoxy’ – the worst case
scenario being that not only the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy be operated by the State
but all enterprise had to be operated by the State (resulting in creation of spółdzielnia, previously
discussed). The People’s Republic Of Poland, as the third most populous state of the Soviet Bloc
(only Russia and Ukraine had larger populations than Poland) and one of the most economically
5
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productive, found itself inextricably woven into the system’s domestic and foreign problems.
Poland and Russia were ‘forever linked in fraternal proletarian solidarity,’ to use Nikita
Khrushchev’s favorite phrase, well before Polish Solidarity added another layer of problems to
the system; for that matter, as the first chapter of this thesis pointed out, their cultural linkages
extend into the distant past along with the accompanying animosities.
Fourthly, a series of ‘legitimacy problems’ plagued the Polish and Soviet governments, and as
with the economic problems mentioned above, these too were closely intertwined. Large
dissident movements existed in Poland and the USSR, early on, aimed against ‘Gulag justice’
and ‘police-state mentality,’ and later on, aimed at censorship and state control of information.
Solidarity’s underground publishing networks linked with those of Czechoslovakia and other
Eastern Bloc nations in protest of deteriorating economic conditions, and all were further
informed by samizdat flowing out of the USSR. Bloc-wide conclusions from dissidents and
samizdat writers lay a major share of the blame on ageing Communist Party chiefs, a
‘gerentocracy’ too out of touch with the masses to understand their complaints and too
entrenched in Party Line orthodoxy to imagine creative solutions. This gradual but steady delegitimation of leaders and the systems they controlled led to what Padraic Kenney called “the
carnival of revolutions” across the Soviet Bloc and the creation of alternate, local, parallel
economies which undermined State-sanctioned economies. 8 Erosion of belief in the ageing Party
leadership’s right to rule was justified by economic decline – regardless as to the degree to which
this was true.
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Fifthly, in regard to the ultimate breakup of the Soviet Union, the system was plagued with
unresolved ‘nationality issues’ dating back to the early years of its creation. Citizens of distant
ethnic republics had few cultural ties to the leaders of the central government in Moscow. Even
those with closer ethnic ties – in the Slavic and Baltic regions – often held outright contempt for
Russian political domination. Mikhail Gorbachev’s political liberation of the entire Soviet Bloc
was meant to help address economic problems, yet when Perestroika’s full political momentum
was released secession occurred rapidly. 9 Glasnost opened the way for new political
competition, new political parties, and new leaders – Boris Yeltsin’s rise to power being a prime
example. Thus, old Party leaders within nations lost legitimacy as nations within the system itself
declared their independence.10 Gorbachev had replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine (i.e., when
Socialism is threatened in any nation, it becomes the concern of all Socialist nations) with the
‘Sinatra Doctrine’ - People of the Soviet Bloc, I give you permission to “do it your way” - and
the people did just that. Perestroika from below finally met with Perestroika from above and this
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ignited the transition, although Gorbachev had wanted reform only, not total transition. 11
Although Polish head of state General Wojeiech Jaruzelski had activated over a million Warsaw
Pact troops in 1981, placing Poland under Martial Law, the ‘Gorbachev Effect’ had gained so
much momentum by the late 1980s that fear of violent State repression seemed remote. Indeed,
the ‘old Communist lions’ seemed to have lost their teeth earlier in the USSR proper than in the
satellite nations; Ronald G. Suny reports that by the mid-1970s “…the bulk of the middleclass
[in the USSR] had no fear of political repression.” 12 Legitimacy issues, political ambitions, and
the centrifugal pull of nationalism were the final blows which broke the Soviet Union and its
hold on Eastern Europe. ‘Economic dysfunction,’ as so often incorrectly cited by Western
proponents of unbridled capitalism as the sole reason for the ‘collapse’ (more accurately,
secession of states from a union), was but one of many factors in the transition, and to a great
degree, an effect of political disintegration rather than a cause; in fact, economic revitalization
would have probably been facilitated by maintaining the union.
In a similar vein, the Neoliberal argument that the breakup of the Soviet Union and transition
of Eastern Europe were somehow due to their citizens’ ineptitude for work, avoidance of
competition of any sort, and utter lack of self-initiative is likewise grossly incorrect. As this
thesis has demonstrated, the day-to-day survival of average citizens was highly dependent on
innovation and self-initiative in lieu of overcoming a plethora of shortages and economic
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dysfunctions forced upon them by structural flaws in the system. Contention in all aspects of life
– from obtaining the basic ingredients for an evening meal to obtaining entrance to a university –
were highly competitive endeavors. ‘Socialist competition’ in the factory, the farm, the school,
and the neighborhood was both a source of positive social incentive and personal pride. For the
writer of this thesis, having visited, observed, studied, and communicated with many working
class people from Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia over the past five years, and having had
minor connections to Solidarność since the early 1980s (through participation in the AFL-CIO),
assumptions or implications of an ‘inferior socialist work ethic’ made by academics, political
pundits, or ‘armchair economists’ demonstrate only a reified echoing of Westerncentric assumed
superiority far removed from historical reality.
Finally, in assessing why the transition occurred, a group of related factors perhaps best
categorized as ‘emotional’ or ‘psychological’ constructs must be mentioned. Generally speaking,
the systems that were so effective in building modern socialized economies out of backward
agricultural states inadvertently created much later dissatisfaction with the paternalistic political
arrangements these economies functioned within. ‘Stalinist civilization,’ as described by Stephen
Kotkin, entailed goals no less than the education and modernization of a continent spanning a
dozen time zones – and this feat was to be accomplished within a decade!13 The incredible
destruction of World War II obliterated much of the progress, but through the 1950s, ‘60s, and
70s, the USSR and its Eastern European satellites rebuilt and recovered from the war and
‘second and third wave’ industrialization and technology became more and more widespread. In
the process, a large educated, urban, industrial, technological, and managerial class emerged,
far removed from the predominantly illiterate peasant mindsets of their parents’ and
13
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grandparents’ generation. As overall educational levels rose, so did living standards and material
expectations – along with awareness of ‘relative deprivation’ in relation to mythical or real
Western standards. The Soviet Bloc had some of the best educated citizens in the world, yet
many of the brightest and most creative were reduced to discussing new ideas with a handful of
trusted friends around the kitchen table. In short, a modern, educated, middle class arose, not
unlike the middle class of the US or Western Europe, except that it was governed by an
authoritarian and paternalistic political elite, steeped in values and attitudes better suited to the
era of the emergence and early creation of an industrial proletariat – not at all to that of a
sophisticated citizenry, many of which had talent and energy in search of an outlet. Awareness of
the East-West divide, in material terms and in terms of the openness of civil society, became
ever-more widespread as Soviet Bloc citizens traveled more frequently and as Western culture
filtered in through mass media as diverse as Radio Free Europe to black market books, records,
and videotapes.
Thus, there seems to have emerged in Poland and across the Soviet Bloc a ‘creeping
awareness’ that something was missing from daily life, something much less concrete than
consumer goods and reliable stores of bread and potatoes, but far more important to the dignity
of the individual and to the overall satisfaction of living. No doubt, this awareness was manifest
in different ways per different personal experiences, and no doubt some individuals did not
experience it at all. Rather than long elaboration on these abstract and highly variable concepts,
below, discussion of three final sets of very novel interview data will help clarify:

_____________________________
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While a college student in the late 1970s, ‘Anna’ received a travel visa through her “good
connections” and made a Christmastime visit to West Germany. Her story of that trip reveals
what many Soviet Bloc citizens found when they went West:
I was amazed by the things these people could buy in their shops – literally anything one
wanted! But when I returned to Wałbrzych, I kept thinking: what is so different here? I
mean, apart from the shopping, or lack of shopping! Finally it dawned on me. It was
colors. Was there a shortage of paint in Poland? Were all old Polish buildings made of
gray stone or worn brick? Were all new Polish buildings made of unpainted, gray
concrete? The colors in Berlin and Munich, I realized, were not just different building
materials, not just Christmastime decorations either. They were advertising – commercial
advertising - big, bold, colorful, lighted, decorated - nothing like that existed in Poland! 14

But there was more to Anna’s story than just the observation of a lack of Westernized
commercial culture in Poland. The ‘colors’ were an outward manifestation of a different outlook
on life (although, in a very literal sense, another interviewee had complained of Polish cities
being ‘a black and white world’ in winter; i.e., nothing but coal dust and snow). There was a
culture of openness and individualism, or perhaps of individual personal identity, lacking, or at
least repressed, under the State-imposed, authoritarian system. This realization made her aware
of the ‘paternalism’ in the Polish system and the control it had over her life:
…so one night we went to a disco. I had never saw anything like this in Wałbrzych! They
were playing records by the Swedish pop group ABBA and everyone was dancing and
drinking! We had this music in Poland too – I had heard it before and I loved it! You
could buy Western pop records in Poland at little markets or from certain people who
sold them. But we never heard them played in public. I would not think of playing such a
record loudly or openly, not because I thought it was a ‘crime’ – because most everyone
[young people] had these records… [by the late 1970s]. I mean, I would be afraid and
ashamed of what my parents or neighbors thought of such music. They would think this
very ‘decadent,’ very ‘trashy.’ Filled with Western affluence and maybe ‘criminal’
influence – wild and out of control! Years later, my husband and I were talking about
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this. We laughed, and said, if we must discover what the French call joie de vivre in a
German industrial town, what does that say about our own town? 15

Anna came to feel that she was being robbed of some part of life that was being experienced in
the rest of the world. Even though she was never active in the Solidarity Movement, and never
played Western pop records ‘loud and in public’ back home in Wałbrzych, she became acutely
aware that “something was missing” and that it was not to be found in the People’s Republic Of
Poland.16 Yet, she had no hope for a different future. She commented, “I didn’t think things
would ever change. I could have never imagined the openness we have now back in my youth.
My own kids and my students explore the world on the Internet. Of course, there was no Internet
when I was their age, but even so, we only received bits and pieces of the bigger world back
then.”

17

Similarly, ‘Vera’ mentioned a disturbing awareness of patterns of behavior - a ‘cultural
paternalism’ of sorts - that she believed stemmed from rigid ideological orthodoxy ‘prescribed’
by the Party. This was especially true, she believed, for professional women. Vera, herself a
lawyer, described the concept using an interesting example to illustrate:
Older Polish women, especially professional women, don’t walk, they ‘march.’ Have you
ever seen them on the street? Look carefully and you will see. They stare forward, serious
expression on their face, stomp their heels in stiff, rapid march! They make a lot of noise!
(laughter)…This is to signal to all, their diligence, their duty being fulfilled… they are in
15
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a hurry, and have not one second to waste on frivolous things. Profession comes first,
then husband, children, and parents. They are making known by their rigid behavior that
they are ‘good Communist women.’ I don’t think our grandmothers acted this way. No, I
don’t think they ‘marched’ to the market with the look of a professional soldier! …It
went farther than this…how one dressed, what one ate, who one associated with, how
one’s home was kept, what books one read – how one acted and thought and spoke – was
always under scrutiny if you held a professional job. 18

Of course, similar observations concerning peer judgments among professionals might have
been made in the West as well (less the ‘marching’). However, Vera added that a fearful dread,
or a paranoia, often accompanied professional life in Soviet Bloc nations. Dr. Barbara Wejnert
expressed very similar feelings about the hyper-stressed lives of professionals under the
authoritarian government of the People’s Republic Of Poland. Beyond the ‘cultural paternalism’
expressed by ‘Anna’ and ‘Vera,’ Dr. Wejnert explained the ‘intellectual paternalism’ endured
by all individuals involved in research, teaching, journalism, or any communications field. For
example, she recalled, in universities across the Soviet Bloc, all social or historical research had
to be theoretically based on approved Marxist-Leninist doctrines. To do otherwise was, at best,
to have one’s research rejected, ignored, overlooked, filed away, or otherwise dismissed; at
worst, it could mean a jail sentence. Dr. Wejnert explained that ‘ideological indoctrination’
started in elementary school and pervaded all areas of study:
The ideology of Marx and Lenin was presented to you in your school from young years
on. Everything taught had to be right with the Party ideology. History books were written
and approved in Moscow and told history from the Soviet perspective. All students
learned Russian language and studied Russian literature from second-grade on. Even if
your major was biology or medicine or engineering, you must have classes from
childhood to university graduation in Marxist-Leninism – socialist economics, Russian
literature, political philosophy. This took up a lot of students’ time and I argued against it
on the grounds that it detracted from their studies in their own specific professional
courses….
18
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…the Soviet Union was ‘colonizing’ us – there is no doubt in my mind! The Party
wanted to re-shape culture in Eastern Europe exactly as they were shaping culture in
Russia. This was no different than the ‘Russification’ during the Partitions – that has
always been their goal, to make Poland part of their empire. In the years after WWII,
when the Communist Party took control, they killed Polish leaders and intellectuals who
defied them, or they sent them to some work camp in Siberia. This went on for twenty
years, until that entire [WWII] generation was either silenced or dead….Without
[independent] intellectual leadership, new generations [in Poland and across the USSR
and its satellites] were educated and indoctrinated just as the leaders in Moscow
prescribed. 19

Thus, per the above interview statement, we come full circle, returning to the opening chapter
of this thesis and the notion that ‘you cannot understand Poland without understanding Russia.’
The thoughts expressed by the three interviewees, above, capture the deeper reasons for the
transition. Beyond economic dysfunction, which is the cause most often stated for the transition,
many people of Eastern Europe, of Central Asia, the Baltic States, the Caucuses – across the
Soviet Bloc – felt the ‘cultural paternalism’ described by ‘Anna’ and ‘Vera.’ Others felt the
‘intellectual paternalism’ and all-out ‘colonization’ as described by Dr. Wejnert. This helps
explain the powerful urge for ‘perestroika from below,’ that is, the desire for restructuring the
system as held by average citizens.
But perestroika from below is nothing new. It is the age-old reaction to the Russian drive to
create a ‘Pan-Slavic Super State,’ as mentioned in this thesis’s opening paragraphs. After the
chaos of WWII, that ‘Super-State’ reached its zenith. It was not all that different from the ancient
Roman Empire, the British Empire, or Britain’s successor, the United States – except that it was
predicated on the singular, exclusive, and messianic doctrine of Marxist-Leninism. Similar to
Britain’s obsession with ‘the white man’s burden,’ this empire’s social mission was creation of
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‘New Soviet Man’ throughout its realm. Resistance to this idea was nothing new either; it took
forms as varied as individual dissident publishing (‘samizdat,’ as described by ‘Mrs. Danka’ in
chapter three), to creation of the ten million-member labor union, Solidarność, to ‘Anna’s’
‘Western idolatry,’ to ‘Vera’s’ condemnation of ‘Polish women marching.’ The thing that was
new – the thing that ultimately made the Polish transition and transition of the entire ‘Super
State’ possible – was that, for the first time, from 1985 onward, the desire for perestroika ‘from
below’ began meshing with the desire for perestroika ‘from above.’ What drove the many
different versions of these ‘desires’ was as varied as the individual lives of those who
experienced them.
But the transition is not finished. A new generation is coming of age in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, a generation without the heavy historical burdens and ideological
constraints of their parents. The ultimate triumph of the transition will be to unleash the energy
and creativity of this generation, so that they may reclaim what worked in the former system and
discard what failed, making possible a synthesis of old and new, of East and West. In broadest
philosophical terms, this means a synthesis and refinement of Marx and Jefferson; it means a
merger of the collectivist and individualist branches of Enlightenment thought in creation of a
new world system that will facilitate the attainment of the full potential of all human beings.
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Literature Review
There is an enormous amount of published material relevant to this thesis and this review is
by no means complete. It covers a variety of historical, sociological, and economic treatments
of the Polish People’s Republic in its last decade, the Solidarity Movement, and the broader
context of political and economic transition in Eastern Europe and Russia which characterized
this period. In general, most works can be classified under one of six themes: 1) historical
accounts, 2) journalistic accounts, 3) participant accounts, 4) accounts that focus on one or a
few main factors that facilitated the transitions of the era, 5) accounts that focus on specific
individuals or groups that influenced the Solidarity Movement, and 6) macroeconomics studies.
A good source of general background history for Dolny Śląsk (Lower Silesia) is Microcosm:
Portrait Of A Central European City, by Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse.1 Known over
time by a dozen different names by the shifting dominance of the capital city’s populations,
Wrocław (Breslau, Vraclav, Бреслау, Vretslav,  ורוצלבetc.) is the ancient hub of a multiethnic,
multicultural region deep in the heartland of Europe. A major principality in the Hapsburg era,
Wrocław has been shaped by a profusion of languages, religions, cultural constructs, and
political ideologies. Poles, Jews, Russian, Germans, Czechs, Hungarians, and Italians have
contributed to the cultural landscape of this most cosmopolitan microcosm of East Central
Europe. By extension, the small mining town of nearby Wałbrzych (along with Gdańsk,
Wałbrzych being the focal points of this thesis), even more so typifies Davies and Moorhouse’s
‘microcosm of Europe’ construct; in addition to the main ethnic groups of Wrocław, the town of
Wałbrzych became a refuge for Greek Communists, and through chain migrations, became
1

Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse, Microcosm: Portrait Of A Central European City (London: Random
House, 2002).

linked to Belgium and France. Davies and Moorhouse’s Microcosm provides a major portion of
the documented history into which the lived history of contemporary Poles interviewed for this
research project is couched.
The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, written by Timothy Garton Ash, was first published in
1983 and updated in 1991, 1999, and 2002.2 Ash, a British historian, gives a first-hand
journalistic account of the Solidarity Movement from its beginnings in the summer of 1980 to
the declaration of martial law in December 1981. The book also includes an historical
background and the later editions bring the reader up to date with events that occurred after Ash's
initial account. The book focuses on the main events that occurred at the Lenin Shipyard in
Gdańsk: the strikes, negotiations, agreements, formation of the labor union Solodarność, and its
eventual demise under martial law. Much of it is written in the first person as Ash was an
observer at the shipyard strike and was a witness to the signing of the Gdańsk Agreements. The
book includes a chronology, appendix of Polish abbreviations (for the many political, labor, and
government groups involved), and is extensively documented as to the sources of its data. This
book may be considered the ‘definitive story’ of Solidarity, as many other publications cite it in
the retelling of the general history. Ash's account emphasizes the Polish peoples' dissatisfaction
with the dysfunctional and hypocritical Soviet system that emerged in Poland after WWII, and
cites this as the primary cause for the revolution of the 1980s.
Padraic Kenney's A Carnival Of Revolutions: Central Europe 1989, was published in 2002
and gives an historical view of the diversity of opposition groups and resistance styles swirling
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around Central Europe in the late 1980s.3 Kenney is an American historian and made extensive
use of Polish, Czech, and Ukrainian samizdat literature, citing nearly 100 different samizdat
publications, as well as extensive interviews with Polish, Czech, Ukrainian, Hungarian, German,
Slovenian, and Western European informants. Most of the interviews were conducted in the late
1990s.
Whereas Ash focused on the mainstream events specifically in Poland, such as the Gdańsk
shipyard strikes and the official meetings between Solodarność and the Polish government,
Kenney's main focus is on detailing the more eclectic opposition groups throughout Central
Europe. He describes the workings of artists, musicians, grassroots groups, students, and
environmental activists in the late 1980s. His thesis is that ‘a carnival of revolutions’ occurred
across a wide geographic area, which in their totality caused the democratization of Central
Europe. Kenney prefers the term ‘Central Europe’ over ‘Eastern Europe,’ as his term includes
the former western republics of the USSR. Most other authors simply use the term ‘Eastern
Europe.’
Lech Walesa's book, A Way Of Hope, provides a first-hand account of events in Poland from
the 1970 massacre of shipyard workers at the gates of the Lenin Shipyard, to the Gdańsk
Agreements of 1980, through the years of martial law.4 It is written out of the experiences of the
main leader of Solodarność, and provides a wealth of detailed information about conditions that
lead to the strikes on the Baltic Coast, the birth of the Solidarity Movement, details of the
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negotiation of the Gdańsk Agreements, life under martial law, and details of Walesa's private
life.
Whereas the above-mentioned accounts of the Solidarity Movement credit a wide array of
participant groups in facilitating its success, Roman Laba's book, The Roots of Solidarity, is
steadfast in its ‘anti-intellectual thesis,’ and seeks to credit only ‘the working-class’ with the
movement's success.5 Ash credits a combined effort on the part of workers, the Church, and
intellectual groups, Walesa credits the same, and Kenney credits an even more eclectic
assortment of influences. In agreement with the findings of most researchers, all individuals
interviewed in this thesis project, four of whom had been high-level participants in the daily
workings of the movement, attributed many diverse groups with Solidarity's success. Laba's
research, however, seems to be intent on denying this reality and concerned mainly with
polarization.
Shana Penn's book, Solidarity's Secret, details the contribution of women and the production
of samizdat as prime facilitators in Solidarity's success. 6 Penn conducted many interviews in
Poland with former and current Solodarność members, most of them women. Thus, Penn also
gains a unique perspective on the ‘forced emancipation’ of women in Sovietized countries.
Polish women, according to Penn, identify feminism with certain policies and goals of the
Communist Party which were exploitive and humiliating. For example, due to post-WWII labor
shortages many women had little choice but to take dirty and demeaning jobs in heavy industrial
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works, but the ideologically correct notion of equality with men - when it came to wages and
hours spent on the job - amounted to little more than lip service.
Thus, Penn found that Polish women had a cynical conception of the Western term
‘feminism,’ as in their reality it had been a negative thing. However, the dedicated and
courageous work of women, especially in the work of maintaining the Solidarity movement
through samizdat publishing, was as progressive and liberating as any Westernized feminist
undertaking. As most of the vocal leaders of Solodarność were men, the outlawing of the group
under martial law meant that many of these men were sent to jail. This left many women activists
to maintain the movement underground by clandestine publishing. These were ‘liberated’
women, in Western terms, independently pursuing societal goals of their own accord. Gender
equality was evident in the important role these women played, but ‘official’ feminist discourse
was not trusted by them as it was identified with Soviet intentions to ‘use’ women. This unique
and insightful perspective makes Penn's book a valuable resource in terms of understanding
gender roles under Communism in Poland, and by extension, gender roles of the interviewees in
this research project.
Maryjane Osa's book, Solidarity And Contention (2003), also gives a unique focus on the
movement by showing how prior attempts at organizing opposition against the government in
Poland left an ‘organizational residue’ that cumulatively facilitated the ultimate success. 7 In each
failure at resistance, over a long period of time (from the 1950s onward), according to Osa,
dissenters learned valuable lessons and formed networks of opposition that eventually facilitated
the final victory.
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Another unique perspective on the Solidarity Movement is found in Kubik's The Power Of
Symbols Against The Symbols Of Power.8 Kubik analyzes the movement from an
anthropological perspective, concentrating on the role of symbols in the building of political
power and legitimacy. The book is an elaboration on Kubik's doctoral thesis, "The Role of
Symbols In The Legitimation Of Power: Poland, 1976 - 1981." He argues that the Solidarity
Movement was much too complex to be categorized into a single genre such as a trade union
movement, a social movement, or a political movement. As an eyewitness to the 1980 events in
Gdańsk, Kubik was taken by what he describes as "...a gigantic pageant of images and symbolic
performances,” which he eventually condensed into the construct of "Solidarity Culture."9
According to Kubik, by considering holistically this construct - supported through, expressed in,
and legitimated by symbolism - one can best understand the complexities of social, political,
economic, and cultural arenas that constituted late Communist-era Poland and the central theme
that dominated it – The Solidarity Movement.
Kubik used a vast amount of data in producing his study. The bibliography section, for
example, is twenty-two pages long, but he also includes interview data, his own direct
experiences in Gdańsk, public accounts of events in Poland connected to the movement,
samizdat accounts, and a review of an archive of photographs taken during the movement. The
result is a very complex and detailed study, invaluable to any researcher of the Solidarity
Movement and/or Poland in the 1970s and 1980s.
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Neal Ascherson's book, The Book Of Lech Wałęsa, does not attempt an holistic analysis of the
movement as does Kubik.10 Instead, Ascherson uses memoirs, letters, interviews, and
manuscripts of Polish authors to describe the charismatic leadership of Lech Wałęsa. Through
these personal, first-hand accounts, he creates a biography of the Polish leader, revealing, for
example, how Wałęsa’s simple and sometimes chaotic speeches appealed to the crowds, or how
personal acquaintances of Wałęsa perceived him and his self-appointed leadership role in
Solodarność. The basic thesis of the book is that Solidarity was greatly facilitated by the
charismatic appeal of Lech Wałęsa.
Two books by Gale Stokes were often referred to in writing the background history for this
thesis: From Stalinism To Pluralism: A Documentary History Of Eastern Europe Since 1945 11
(1996), and The Walls Came Tumbling Down (1993).12
The first provides copies of historic documents covering events ranging from the 1945 Yalta
Conference to the 1991 resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev. Stokes also includes memoirs and
essays written by first-hand observers and participants in the course of events affecting Eastern
Europe stretching from the end of WWII to the collapse of the Soviet Union. It includes many
documents directly pertaining to Solodarność in Poland, such as a letter written in a Gdańsk
prison by Adam Michnik, a reprint of the Gdansk Agreement, a transcript of General Wojciech
Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law, and a speech given by Pope John Paul II in Warsaw. It
10
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also includes items from Hungary and Czechoslovakia which capture the essence of these
nations' involvement in the Solidarity Movement.
The second book by Stokes takes a detailed look at the collapse of Communism in Eastern
Europe from political and ideological perspectives. It begins with the 1968 Prague Spring
events and carries on through the early 1990s and the turmoil in Yugoslavia that resulted from
democratization. Both of Stokes’ books provide comprehensive histories of the regions and the
era in which the transformation to democracy in Eastern Europe emerged. They thoroughly
discuss the role of Solodarność in facilitating the transformation as well as the later role of the
Solidarity Movement in shaping Eastern European politics.
The Polish August, edited by Oliver MacDonald, similar to Stokes' comprehensive
documentary history, is a compilation of documents specific only to Poland. 13 Many were taken
from the British journal Labor Focus. MacDonald also includes transcripts of interviews with
Gdańsk Shipyard workers, samizdat newspaper articles, shipyard bulletins, and copies of
specific factory and shipyard agreements made between Solodarność and the government
representatives of these facilities. This book provides very specific details on the contracts
themselves and also provides background material on the events and circumstances leading up to
the agreements, mostly through other documents, letters, and reports from negotiators.
MacDonald offered this compilation as a first-hand account of Polish/English translated material
which documents, as he puts it, "…one of the greatest events of the Twentieth Century... in
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which the people of Poland are attempting nothing less than to take full control of their modern
industrial society... that they built but do not control."14
Barbara Wejnert's book, Transition To Democracy In Eastern Europe And Russia, likewise,
is a compilation, not of historical documents, but of academic articles on the subject. 15 This book
moves past the events of the 1980s in Eastern Europe and focuses on the overall societal shift to
democracy in this region. It includes sections concerning the shift in terms of political,
economic, and cultural change, and in terms of social problems and policy issues. In many cases
dysfunction and eventually disillusionment came out of the hopeful expectations that Solidarity,
and the Solidarity movement in general, had promised. The democratic shift in governments,
while restoring many human rights and the ability of individuals to attempt to make their own
destinies in life, also left many people without the social safety net of Communism. Thus, greater
economic inequality, joblessness, homelessness, crime, drug and alcohol abuse, and other
societal problems have increased in some parts of the former Communist world. The articles in
this book detail the problems encountered in the rapid changes that followed Communism's
downfall.
Václav Havel's lyrical book, The Power Of The Powerless, gives a philosophical and
ideological argument against the Communist system in Eastern Europe, and a critique of the
dysfunctional political systems that maintained it. 16 In his book, Havel was speaking not only to
Czechoslovakia but to all activists in Eastern Europe and to all who believed in the human rights
14
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agenda of the Solidarity Movement. His message was for all who imagined a better future to
unite in solidarity and to maintain that solidarity until the Leninist/Stalinist ideological era was
finally put aside. He begins with a reference to Marx, saying that, "a spectre is haunting Eastern
Europe...", not of communism but of dissent against communism. His observations proved
historically accurate.
Raphael Shen's The Polish Economy: Legacies From The Past, Prospects For The Future,
concentrates on the role of specific governmental policies in facilitating the Polish transition. 17
Shen describes the various agencies established by the new Solidarność government and how
specific legislation targeted potential pitfalls. Shen's conclusion is that foreign investment,
regulated by domestic legislation, was the key factor in Poland's successful transition.
Kazimierz Z. Poznanski's Poland's Protracted Transition is a macroeconomic analysis which
concentrates on the liquidity crisis, inflationary spiral, productivity and efficiency problems, and
indebtedness as major obstacles which economic planners had to first overcome in order to 'jump
start' the new economy. 18 This book provides a thorough explanation (in purely economic terms)
as to how Poland's economy failed and how it was reconstructed.
Stephen Kotkin discusses the collapse of Soviet Bloc in general and does so from a structural
perspective in his book titled Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse.19 His analysis spans the
30 years between 1970 and 2000, as this period encompasses the peak, decline, and early
regeneration of Soviet Bloc economies. In summary, Kotkin likens the system's problems to
those of the US Rustbelt (aging infrastructure, inefficient operations, over investment on 'mega17

Raphael Shen, The Polish Economy: Legacies From The Past, Prospects For The Future (New York: Praeger,
1992).
18

Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, Poland's Protracted Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

19

Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970 – 2012 (London and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
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sized' heavy industrial facilities, and creeping competition from Asian producers). Yet, the
Soviet system was even more hindered than the US system by ideological rigidity and a highly
entrenched bureaucracy. Failure was as much a result of socialist political conservativism as
regeneration was a result of capitalistic liberalism. In classical Marxist-Weberian terminology,
the 'ideological superstructure built on the material base' did a reversal; acceptance of new
ideological culture allowed for creation of new material culture (whereas prior to the collapse of
Communism there existed an ideological strangulation of the economy).
Two books written about the Russian transition provide easily generalizable accounts, in that
all Soviet Bloc economies were basically 'clones' of the Russian system. Anders Aslund gives a
very instructive overview of Russian privatization, quite similar in content to the personal
interview data collected by the author of this paper in Gdańsk.20 Aslund’s Economic
Transformation In Russia also includes a chapter titled “The Conditions Of Life,” which gives
some details of the transition's effect on individuals’ daily lives. Although this chapter is also
highly quantitative it is one of the rare English language accounts that consider the transition
beyond purely economic terms.
Finally, Steven Rosefielde gives a long-term historical perspective on the Soviet transition,
again generalizable as much of Eastern Europe was incorporated into the unified system at the
end of WWII.21 The Russian Economy From Lenin To Putin traces the interaction between
historical processes and economic outcomes throughout the 20th century. Rosefielde sees both
the collapse and the regeneration of Socialist economies in terms of macro level systems. He
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Anders Aslund, Economic Transformation In Russia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.)
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Steven Rosenfield, The Russian Economy From Lenin To Putin (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell
Publishing, 2007).
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offers interpretation of the causes of the system’s failures and recommendations for its
rebuilding.
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Appendices

Note On Methods

This project began in 2009 with a series of formal, closed-ended interviews specifically
designed for a sociology thesis. However, during the next four years, what started as a sociology
project evolved into an oral history project as well, with trips to Poland each year and collection
of data in towns and villages on the Baltic Coast and in Lower Silesia. Every personal history
contributed to better understanding of Polish history and the course of Soviet Bloc history in
general. It soon became clear that many interviewees were thinking well beyond the simple,
formal questions of the interview schedule; they were relating elaborate oral histories of the
entire Solidarity decade (the 1980s) and previous decades. In addition to their experiences of
political activism through Solidarność, they included detailed accounts of daily life – of work in
the Lenin Shipyard, and of alternative means of economic survival in an increasingly
dysfunctional economy. They told stories of how the Solidarity Movement was outlawed, of
how activists were imprisoned, how Martial Law was declared, and how the Movement was
maintained through underground publishing and clandestine operations. In some cases, the
stories extended decades into the past, to the 1970 massacre of shipyard workers, to the paranoia
of Stalinism in the 1950s, to collectivization in the late 1940s. A few interviewees remembered
WWII, the Nazi occupation, the liberation of Poland by the Red Army, and the establishment of
the People’s Republic.
The interviews followed the protocol set by Marshall University Office of Research Integrity
for the original Gdańsk project in 2009, and were updated and modified for continued use in
through 2012 in both Gdańsk and Wałbrzych (IRBNet ID # 146051 – 6). A copy of the consent
form and general interview schedule are included below. The questions served as an outline only
and as a prompt for eliciting open-ended oral histories from interviewees. In many cases,
interviewees’ responses ranged far beyond the artificial limits of a formal questionnaire – again,
access to this of wealth of historical data and realization of its value, is what suggested the
extension of the original project.
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Marshall University
Informed Consent Template267
Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study
An Analysis of The Polish Solidarity Movement

Richard Garnett PhD, Principal Investigator

Introduction
You are invited to be in a research study. Research studies are designed to gain scientific
knowledge that may help other people in the future. You may or may not receive any benefit
from being part of the study. Your participation is voluntary. Please take your time to make
your decision, and ask your research investigator or research staff to explain any words or
information that you do not understand.

Why Is This Study Being Done?
It is being done to learn more about the Polish Solidarity Movement.

How Many People Will Take Part In The Study?
About 30 people will take part in this study. A total of 50 people are the most that would be able
to enter the study.

What Is Involved In This Research Study?
You will be answering some questions about your participation in the Polish Solidarity
Movement and/or about your life in Poland prior to 1989. If you are an American you will be
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answering some questions about your participation in a labor union and about your experiences
at your place of work. These questions will allow the researcher to compare and contrast the
experiences of workers in American and Polish labor unions. If your answers are recorded on
tape or digital recorder all of the recordings will be erased or destroyed at the end of the study.

How Long Will You Be In The Study?
You will be in the study for about one year. There may be a follow-up interview that you can
participate in if you wish.
You can decide to stop participating at any time. If you decide to stop participating in the study
we encourage you to talk to the study investigator or study staff as soon as possible.
The study investigator may stop you from taking part in this study at any time if he/she believes
it is in your best interest; if you do not follow the study rules; or if the study is stopped.

What Are The Risks Of The Study?
There are no known risks to those who take part in this study.

Are There Benefits To Taking Part In The Study?
If you agree to take part in this study, there may or may not be direct benefit to you. We hope the
information learned from this study will benefit other people in the future. The benefits of
participating in this study may be that the information you are contributing will help us better
understand social movements.

What About Confidentiality?
We will do our best to make sure that your personal information is kept confidential. However,
we cannot guarantee absolute confidentiality. Federal law says we must keep your study records
private. Nevertheless, under unforeseen and rare circumstances, we may be required by law to
allow certain agencies to view your records. Those agencies would include the Marshall
University IRB, Office of Research Integrity (ORI) and the federal Office of Human Research
Protection (OHRP). This is to make sure that we are protecting your rights and your safety. If
we publish the information we learn from this study, you will not be identified by name or in any
other way.
If audio recordings of your interview are made they will be erased as soon as the researcher
reviews them and records any pertinent data from them in the form of a written transcript. Any
written transcript of your interview will be kept in a locked file cabinet accessible only by the
researcher. If any of the information you give us is used in writing up a research report your
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name will not be used, nor will any details be used that would allow any reader of the report to
identify you.

What Are The Costs Of Taking Part In This Study?
There are no costs to you for taking part in this study. All the study costs, including any study
tests, supplies and procedures related directly to the study, will be paid for by the study.

Will You Be Paid For Participating?
You will receive no payment or other compensation for taking part in this study.

What Are Your Rights As A Research Study Participant?
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part or you may leave the
study at any time. Refusing to participate or leaving the study will not result in any penalty or
loss of benefits to which you are entitled. If you decide to stop participating in the study we
encourage you to talk to the investigators or study staff first.

Whom Do You Call If You Have Questions Or Problems?
For questions about the study or in the event of a research-related injury, contact the study
investigator, at (304) 696-2800 or (304) 696-6700. You should also call the investigator if you
have a concern or complaint about the research.
For questions about your rights as a research participant, contact the Marshall University IRB#2
Chairman Dr. Stephen Cooper or ORI at (304) 696-4303. You may also call this number if:
o You have concerns or complaints about the research.
o The research staff cannot be reached.
o You want to talk to someone other than the research staff.
You will be given a signed and dated copy of this consent form.
SIGNATURES
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You agree to take part in this study and confirm that you are 18 years of age or older. You have
had a chance to ask questions about being in this study and have had those questions answered.
By signing this consent form you are not giving up any legal rights to which you are entitled.

________________________________________________
Subject Name (Printed)
________________________________________________
Subject Signature

_________________
Date

_______________________________________________
Person Obtaining Consent (Printed)
________________________________________________
Person Obtaining Consent Signature

_________________
Date
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Marshall University
Szablon oświadczenia świadomej zgody268

Świadoma zgoda na uczestniczenie w badaniu naukowym
Analiza Polskiego Ruchu Solidarność

Doktor Richard Garnett, Główny Badacz

Wstęp
Zapraszam do udziału w badaniu naukowym. Celem badań klinicznych jest zgromadzenie
wiedzy naukowej, która w przyszłości może pomóc ludziom. Uczestniczenie w badaniu może
Panu(i) przynieść korzyści lub nie. Uczestniczenie w badaniu jest całkowicie dobrowolne.
Proszę spokojnie przemyśleć swoją decyzję i poprosić badacza naukowego lub personel
prowadzący badanie o wyjaśnienie wszystkich słów bądź informacji, których Pan(i) nie rozumie.

Dlaczego prowadzimy to badanie?
Badanie jest prowadzone w celu uzyskania większej wiedzy o polskim ruchu Solidarność.

Ile osób weźmie udział w tym badaniu naukowym?
W tym badaniu weźmie udział co najmniej 30 osób. W badaniu będzie mogło wziąć udział
wyłącznie włącznie 50 osób.
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Co obejmuje to badanie?
Odpowie Pan(i) na kilka pytań dotyczących Pana(i) udziału w polskim ruchu Solidarność i/lub
swoim życiu w Polsce, przed 1989 rokiem. Jeśli jest Pan(i) Amerykaninem/Amerykanką
odpowie Pan(i) na kilka pytań dotyczących swojego udziału w związkach zawodowych i o
doświadczeniach w miejscu pracy. Pytania te umożliwią naukowcowi porównanie i
przeciwstawienie doświadczeń pracowników w amerykańskich i polskich związkach
zawodowych. Po zakończeniu tego badania, odpowiedzi nagrywane na taśmie lub w nagrywarce
cyfrowej zostaną zniszczone.

Jak długo będę uczestniczyć w badaniu?
Pana(i) uczestnictwo w badaniu potrwa około jednego roku. Może też być przeprowadzony
wywiad uzupełniający, w którym może Pan(i) wziąć udział, jeśli wyrazi Pan(i) taką wolę.
W każdej chwili można się wycofać z badania. Jeśli postanowi Pan(i) wycofać się z badania,
prosimy jak najszybciej porozmawiać z badaczem naukowym lub z personelem prowadzącym
badanie.
Badacz naukowy może w każdej chwili przerwać Pana(i) udział w tym badaniu, jeśli uważa, że
będzie to w Pana(i) najlepszym interesie; jeśli nie będzie Pan(i) przestrzegać regulaminu
badania; lub jeśli badanie zostanie przerwane.

Jakie ryzyko jest związane z badaniem?
Brak znanego ryzyka dla osób uczestniczących w tym badaniu.

Czy udział w badaniu wiąże się z jakimiś korzyściami?
Jeśli wyrazi Pan(i) zgodę na uczestnictwo w tym badaniu, może Pan(i) na tym skorzystać lub
nie. Jednakże, wiedza uzyskana z uczestnictwa może w przyszłości pomóc innym ludziom.
Korzyści płynące z uczestnictwa w badaniu mogą być tego rodzaju, że przekazana wiedza
pomoże lepiej zrozumieć ruchy społeczne.

A co z poufnością?
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Uczynimy wszystko, co w naszej mocy, aby zapewnić zachowywane danych osobowych
uczestników. Nie możemy jednak zagwarantować pełnej poufności. Przepisy federalne nakazują
nam zachowanie poufności danych uczestników. Pomimo tego w nieprzewidzianych i rzadkich
okolicznościach, ma mocy obowiązujących przepisów możemy być zmuszeni pozwolić pewnym
instytucjom przejrzenie Pana(i) danych. Do takich instytucji należy Marshall University IRB,
Office of Research Integrity (ORI) oraz federalny Office of Human Research Protection
(OHRP). Ma to na celu zapewnienie chronienia przez naspraw i bezpieczeństwa uczestników.
Jeśli opublikujemy wiedzę zdobytą w tym badaniu, nie ujawnimy żadnych nazwisk ani innych
danych.
Jeśli wywiad będzie nagrywany, takie nagranie zostanie skasowane po zapoznaniu się z nim
przez badacza i po zapisaniu wszystkich danych związanych z badaniem w formie transkrypcji.
Wszelkie transkrypcje z wywiadów będą przechowywane w zamkniętej szafie na akta, do której
dostęp będzie mieć wyłącznie badacz. Jeśli jakakolwiek podana przez Pana(ią) informacja
zostanie wykorzystana podczas pisania sprawozdania, Pana(i) dane nie zostaną użyte, tak samo
jak i nie zostaną użyte żadne dane, które umożliwiłyby odbiorcy sprawozdania w
zidentyfikowaniu uczestników badania.

Jakie są koszty związane z uczestniczeniem w tym badaniu?
Uczestnicy badania nie ponoszą żadnych kosztów. Wszystkie koszty badania, w tym za wszelkie
testy wykonane w badaniu, materiały i procedury bezpośrednio związane z tym badaniem
poniesie to badanie.

Czy otrzyma Pan(i) wynagrodzenie za uczestnictwo?
Nie otrzyma Pan(i) wynagrodzenia ani innej rekompensaty za udział w tym badaniu.

Jakie prawa ma uczestnik badania?
Udział w niniejszym badaniu jest dobrowolny. Może Pan(i) zdecydować nie wziąć udziału lub
każdej chwili zrezygnować z uczestnictwa. W wypadku odmowy lub rezygnacji z udziału w
badaniu nie poniesie Pan(i) żadnej kary ani nie utraci przysługujących świadczeń. Jeśli
postanowi Pan(i) wycofać się z badania, prosimy najpierw porozmawiać z badaczem lub z
personelem prowadzącym badanie.
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Do kogo należy zadzwonić w przypadku pytań lub problemów?
Pytania na temat badania lub w wypadku odniesieniu obrażeń w związku z badaniem, należy się
kontaktować z badaczem pod numerem telefonu (304) 696-2800 lub (304) 696-6700. Do
badacza należy również dzwonić w przypadku problemów lub skarg w związku z tym badaniem
naukowym.
Pytania dotyczące praw uczestników badania naukowego należy kierować do Przewodniczącego
IRB nr 2, doktora Stephena Coopera w Marshall University lub do ORI pod numer telefonu
(304) 696-4303. Pod ten numer można też dzwonić, jeśli:
o ma Pan(i) obawy lub skargi w związku z tym badaniem naukowym;
o nie może się Pan(i) skontaktować z personelem uczestniczącym w badaniu;
o chce Pan(i) porozmawiać z kimś innym niż personel uczestniczący w badaniu
naukowym.
Otrzyma Pan(i) podpisany i datowany egzemplarz niniejszego formularza świadomej zgody.
PODPISY
Zgadza się Pan(i) na wzięcie udziału w tym badaniu naukowym i potwierdza, że ukończył/a
Pan(i) 18 rok życia. Miał/a Pan(i) możliwość zadawania pytań na temat uczestniczenia w tym
badaniu i uzyskał/a Pan(i) na nie odpowiedzi. Podpisując ten formularz świadomej zgody, nie
ceduje Pan(i) przysługujących Panu(i) żadnych praw.

________________________________________________
Imię i nazwisko (drukowanymi literami)
________________________________________________
Podpis

_________________
Data

________________________________________________
Imię i nazwisko osoby pobierającej zgodę (drukowanymi literami)
________________________________________________
Podpis osoby pobierającej zgodę

_________________
Data
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Questionnaire in English

General Topics:
1. Solidarnosc
2. Daily life in Gdansk or Wałbrzych during Solidarity Movement
Martial Law
Work
Economy (alternatives?)
Communication (alternatives?)
Education
Religion
3. Comments about: Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Jaruzelski,
General comments about any other person or topic
General comments comparing pre-1989 to current times
General comments about future of Solidarnosc, of Gdansk, of Wałbrzych, of Poland

Solidarnosc:
Were you a member of the union?
Were you an activist?
Did you participate in strikes, marches, protests? Any other activities? What were these
experiences like?
What do you remember most about those days?
How was Solidarnosc funded? Were resources scarce? Did members pay dues?
Were people encouraged to join or participate in Solidarnosc? Were some people opposed to the
movement?
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Were there other unions...State sponsored unions? What were these like?
Why did you join or participate?
Did you receive any education or training from Solidarnosc?
How did Solidarnosc get its message or agenda out to the public?
What was the main message or agenda?
Why was the movement so successful?
What has the movement accomplished?
Is the union still active?
What are the most important lessons the world can learn from this historic era?

Daily Life In Gdansk During The Solidarity Movement: Martial Law, Work, Economy
What was life like in Gdansk during the movement? What memories stand out most clearly?
What was life like during Martial Law?
Were their shortages? What kind? How severe?
Was housing in short supply? Did you have a house or apartment? Was it affordable?
Did you own a car? Were there restrictions on travel?
How does the pre-1989 economy compare with today's economy?
Were there alternatives to the regular economy? Did people, for instance, raise a garden or raise
any livestock to supplement their income? Were items available on the "black market?"
Did people help each other by trading work or trading services or skills?
Were there any other innovative ways of supplementing income?
Where did you work during this time? What was your job like? Can you describe your place of
work and your particular job?
Did you feel a sense of loyalty or obligation to your place of work...to your union (union before
Solidarnosc)...to your co-workers...to your craft, or profession?
What kinds of benefits did your job have? Medical care? Retirement? Vacation? Sick leave?
Maternity leave?
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Were you paid well?
Were you ever unemployed?

Communication:
To what extent were TV, radio, newspapers, journalism, etc. controlled by the State before 1989?
Did this change under martial Law?
Was there access to news from external sources...Radio Free Europe, BBC, or any other source
outside Poland?
Were personal communications censored? For example, were letters censored? Phone calls
monitored? Did people freely communicate?
Was news about Solidarnosc censored? How was Solidarnosc portrayed by the news?
What was the most important method of communication for Solidarnosc?
Did Solidarnosc publish its own newspapers?
Were samizdat or bibula papers common? Did you read them? What were they about? Did they
help to organize and spread the movement? Did they help hold the movement together while it
was outlawed?
Were you ever involved in writing, printing, or distributing samizdat papers? Did you know
anyone who was involved?
What kind of personal communications and printing devices were available in Poland during the
1980s...regular telephone service? Copy machines? Word processors? Typewriters? How was
samizdat publishing done? How was it distributed?
What were "Uniwersytet Latajacy?" ("Flying Universities?") Were these important to the
Solidarity Movement?
After 1989, did free and open communication begin immediately?

Education:
What was education like in Poland before 1989?
Do you believe that you got a good education?
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Did the Soviet Union and Communist Party influence education? In what ways?
Were the ideas of Marx, Lenin, or Stalin presented in school? Were alternatives to these ideas
presented?
Was Russian language mandatory?
Did you learn about the capitalist economy or democratic government in school?
Were there business management classes in schools? Were these based on State Economics or
private enterprise?
How were Western nations - The USA, United Kingdom, Western Europe, portrayed in school?
How was Poland and Polish history presented?
Was general education free? Could everyone get college education? Was it expensive?
Did college students have considerable academic freedom? Were there ideological standards to
meet?
In what ways has education changed since 1989?
Was Solidarnosc discussed in colleges and schools? Did many students support the movement?

Religion:
Did you regularly attend church during the Solidarity Movement? Still attend?
Was the Solidarity movement ever discussed in church?
Did the Church, in general, support Solidarnosc? In what ways?
Do you believe the goals of Solidarity were in-line with the teachings of Catholicism - with the
general message and teachings of Pope John Paul II?
Do you believe that Pope John Paul had a supernatural or divine mission in supporting or
promoting Solidarnosc? Did many people believe this?
Did Solidarnosc connect itself with the Church...that is, was the Church mentioned in
publications or messages of any kind produced by Solidarnosc?
Did you ever see sacred images of the Church, such as The Black Madonna (Our Lady of
Czestochowa) or Our Lady of Fatima, connected to Solidarnosc in any way?
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Comments about famous people of the Solidarity era:
Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul, Mikhail Gorbachev...how important were these people to the
success of the movement?
Would the Solidarity Movement have succeeded without these people?
Other important individuals?
Comments about General Jaruzelski? Any other influential people?
General comments about any other person or topic?
General comments comparing pre-1989 to current times?
General comments about future of Solidarnosc, of Gdansk, of Poland in general?

General interview schedule for individuals who had previously (or still are) worked
industrial jobs (this section used only in US interviews.)
Were you (or are you) a member of an independent labor union?
In what kind of trade or industry did you work while in the union?
What was your job like? Can you describe your place of work and your particular job?
What were your relations with your co-workers like?
Did you feel a sense of loyalty or obligation to your co-workers...to your union...to the company
you worked for?
Do you believe that your fellow workers would stand up for you or come to your aid in a time of
trouble...let's say, if you had a grievance against the company, or if you had an injury or lay-off
and could not work.
Are you working now? Is your new job unionized? How do you feel about your fellowemployees, your union (if unionized) and the company you now work for in terms of loyalty or
obligation?
Were you ever involved in a strike while unionized? What was that like? Was the strike
successful in terms of achieving its goals? Why or why not?
Why, do you believe, did your plant or industry shut down? Why, in general, do you think that
so many plants are closing?
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Questionnaire in Polish

Uwagi na temat edukacji w Polsce przed rokiem 1980
Gdzie uczęszczałeś do szkoły podstawowej lub średniej? W jakich latach chodziłeś do szkoły?
Jakie miałeś przedmioty?
Czy, ogólnie, ideologia Maksa, Lenina lub Stalina bądź komunistyczna była przedstawiana w
szkole?
W jakim zakresie były te ideologia przerabiane?
Czy możesz podać konkretne przypadki?
Czy te ideologie były w programie nauki lub lekcji?
Czy możesz opisać, jak te informacje były przedstawiane – przez kogo? Jak? Na lekcjach, w
książkach, na obrazach, w symbolach, muzyce?
Czy uważasz, że twoje doświadczenie było typowe w twoim pokoleniu? Jak to było u innych
osób? Jak to było u innych pokoleń?
Jaką miałeś o tym opinię? Krytyczną?
Gdzie chodziłeś do college’ W jakich latach chodziłeś?
Jak można opisać zakres wolności naukowej w college’u?
Czy istniały normy ideologiczne, które musiały być spełnione w twoim programie nauki?

Uwagi na temat organizacji Solidarności
Gdzie mieszkałeś i pracowałeś w 1980 i 1981 roku?
W jaki sposób byłeś zaangażowany w działalność Solidarności? Jaką miałeś rolę?
Jak zostałeś pozyskany? W jaki sposób przystąpiłeś?
Dlaczego przystąpiłeś?
Czy zachęcano ludzi do przystąpienia?
Czy ludzie wszystkich, różnych klas lub zawodów byli zainteresowani Solidarnością?
Czy różne klasy ludzi przystępowały z różnych powodów?
Czy konieczne było płacenie składek miesięcznych?
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Jak dobrze była Solidarność finansowana? Czy wydawało się, że środki były niewielkie?
Czy wiesz, jakie skąd się brały główne środki finansowe Solidarności?
W jakiego rodzaju działalność w Solidarności byłeś zaangażowany?
Czy możesz podać konkretne przypadki? Jakie masz inne doświadczenia? Inne role?
Czy otrzymałeś w Solidarności jakieś przeszkolenie? Jakie? Kto cię szkolił?
Czy było to szkolenie ideologiczne? Jaka była jego treść? Czy możesz je opisać?
Czy szkoliłeś lub nauczałeś innych ludzi z tematu Solidarności? Jaka była jego treść?
Czy dotyczyło ideologii? Czy była to próba rekrutowania ludzi?

Uwagi na temat informacji w Polsce przed rokiem 1980
W jakim stopniu w Polsce do 1980 roku były kontrolowane przez państwo środki masowej
informacji – tzn. TV, radio, dzienniki, czasopisma? Czy to się zmieniło w stanie wojennym?
Czy wiadomości na temat Solidarności były cenzurowane? W jaki sposób była Solidarność
przedstawiana w wiadomościach?
W jaki sposób przekazywała Solidarność swoje komunikaty społeczeństwu?
Czy był dostęp do wiadomości ze źródeł zewnętrznych – wiadomości z Radia Wolna Europa lub
BBC, na przykład, lub ze źródeł niekontrolowanych przez państwo?
Czy Solidarność publikowała własny dziennik? Czy było to zgodne z prawem?
Czy publikacje podziemne były powszechne? Czy je czytałeś? Jaka była ich treść?
Czy publikacje państwowe były powszechne? Czy je czytałeś? Jaka była ich treść?
Czy byłeś zaangażowany w pisanie, drukowanie lub dystrybucję wydawnictw podziemnych?
Czy znałeś kogoś, kto był?
Czy uważasz, że publikacje podziemne odgrywały ważną rolę w utrzymaniu zainteresowania
Solidarnością w czasie stanu wojennego?
Czy uważasz, że publikacje podziemne były najważniejszym środkiem przekazywania
informacji o Solidarności w stanie wojennym?
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Uwagi na temat roli Kościoła w Solidarności

Czy w czasie istnienia ruchu Solidarności regularnie chodziłeś do kościoła?
Do którego Kościoła chodziłeś?
Czy w Kościele rozmawiano o ruchu Solidarności?
Czy twój Kościół, albo inny znany ci kościół, angażował się we wspieranie Solidarności? W
jaki sposób Kościół to robił?
Czy uważasz, że cele Solidarności były zgodne z nauką Katolicyzmu – powiedzmy, w zgodzie
ze słowem papieża Jana Pawła II?
Czy uważasz, że papież Jan Paweł II miał „nadnaturalną” lub „boską” misję w związku z jego
współpracą z Solidarnością? Czy wiesz, czy wielu ludzi tak uważa? Czy Solidarność
kiedykolwiek wspomniała o tym związku w swoich publikacjach lub innych informacjach?
Czy kiedykolwiek widziałeś obrazy świętych Kościoła, jak na przykład Czarnej Madonny lub
Najświętszej Maryi Panny Fatimskiej bądź Najświętszej Maryi Panny Częstochowskiej w
jakikolwiek związane z Solidarnością?

Pytania ogólne
Dlaczego według ciebie Solidarność odniosła taki sukces?
Dlaczego przystąpiło do niej tak wielu ludzi?
Jakie wpływy miał Lech Wałęsa, papież Jan Paweł II i Michaił Gorbaczow na ostateczny
rezultaty działalności ruchu Solidarności?
Czy uważasz, że wynik byłby inny, jeśli jedna lub więcej z tych osób nie zajmowałaby swojego
stanowiska?
Co postrzegasz jako największe osiągnięcie Solidarności?
Wymień najważniejsze rzeczy, jakie tamta epoka historyczna niesie światu jako lekcję?

Ogólny harmonogram wywiadów z osobami, które poprzednio (lub w dalszym ciągu)
pracowały na stanowiskach w przemyśle.
Czy byłeś (lub jesteś) członkiem niezależnego związki zawodowego?
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W jakiej branży lub w jakim przemyśle pracowałeś, gdy byłeś członkiem związku zawodowego?
Jaką miałeś pracę? Czy możesz opisać swoje miejsce pracy i pracę jaką wykonywałeś?
Jakie miałeś relacje ze współpracownikami?
Czy miałeś poczucie lojalności lub zobowiązania wobec współpracowników...związku
zawodowego...firmy, w której pracowałeś?
Czy uważasz, że koledzy z pracy stanęliby w twojej obronie lub czy pomogliby ci w trudnych
czasach...powiedzmy, gdybyś miał skargę przeciwko firmie lub gdybyś odniósł obrażenia lub
zostałbyś zwolniony i nie mógł pracować.
Czy obecnie pracujesz? Czy w nowej pracy istnieją związki zawodowe? Jakie masz obecnie
uczucia, jeśli chodzi i lojalność i zobowiązania, wobec swoich kolegów z pracy, związku
zawodowego (jeśli w zakładzie istnieje związek zawodowy) i wobec firmy, w której obecnie
pracujesz?
Czy będąc członkiem związku zawodowego brałeś kiedykolwiek udział w strajku? Jak to
wyglądało? Czy strajk wywalczył zrealizowanie jego celów? Dlaczego tak lub nie?
Dlaczego według ciebie twój zakład został zamknięty lub przestała istnieć twoja branża? Ogólnie
mówiąc, dlaczego według ciebie, tak wiele zakładów jest zamykanych?
Czy uważasz, że na twoim, lokalnym, obszarze dojdzie kiedyś do ożywienia gospodarczego?
Dlaczego tak lub nie? Co według ciebie można zrobić, aby ożywić lokalną gospodarkę?
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Map Data ©2014 Google

Map of Central Europe
Gdańsk is located on Poland’s Baltic Coast
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Map Data ©2014 Google

Map Locating Wałbrzych
Wałbrzych is approximately 50 miles southwest of Wrocław and
5 miles from the Czech border.
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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/Poland.html

Poland’s Major Cities
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Afterword: Poland’s Rat-Hole Miners
One final Polish alternative economic strategy must be mentioned. Unlike the strategies
discussed in this thesis which sustained Poles during times of economic dysfunction under the
socialist system, this alternative has evolved in response to deindustrialization and
unemployment in the new post-1989 capitalist economy.
On March 29, 2014, the small town of Wałbrzych made the New York Times in an article
titled The Mines Have Shut Down – The Miners Haven’t.269 The article was accompanied by a
video about Poland’s Rathole Miners. What are rathole miners? They are individuals who
illegally mine small quantities of coal from abandoned or otherwise non-operating mines.
According to the article, some 3000 individuals are estimated to be involved in rathole mining in
Lower Silesia. The town of Wałbrzych, which literally sits on rich seams of coal, is ‘rathole
mining central.’ With a 15% unemployment rate, sale of illegally mined bags of house coal
supplements incomes for the producers and offers a cheap heating alternative for cash-strapped
buyers. The 1989 transition to market economy forced most Lower Silesian mines out of
business as cheaper coal from the Czech Republic took over commercial markets.
The main reason for the Czech’s competitive advantage is their ability to utilize large-scale
mechanized mining equipment, as their coal seams are large and run in level bands.
Wałbrzych’s coal seams are smaller, irregular, and run at steep angles, making underground
mechanized equipment difficult or impossible to operate. Thousands of Polish miners lost their
jobs in the economic transition but there is still plenty of good quality coal under Wałbrzych, and
a few dedicated and desperate miners aim on cashing in on it. Rathole mining is done with
makeshift equipment: car batteries power portable lights, picks and shovels are used in lieu of
any other mechanization, and the coal is hoisted to ground level in buckets tied to ropes. Cars or
pickup trucks arrive at night - often with their lights off to avoid being spotted by police - to haul
away bagged coal. If caught, rathole miners are fined 550 zlotys (around $180), about what they
make in a week of mining. However, this seldom stops them from returning to the ratholes, as
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there are few local employment alternatives for unskilled laborers and no legal opportunities for
experienced miners. Obviously, rathole mining is dangerous, and there are many injuries and a
few deaths each year among the miners.

Per request of a Wałbrzych interviewee who wishes to remain anonymous, the article below is
included in full English text from the site Wirtualny Sztetl www.sztetl.org.pl in dedication to
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Wałbrzych’s Jewish population. They are the sons, daughters, and grandchildren of the survivors
of the Gross-Rosen concentration camps, forced labor in the Sudetenland during WWII.

Before The Multilingual Hum Quietened: The Birth Of Polish Wałbrzych
By Marek Malinowski and Paul Wieczorek
http://www.sztetl.org.pl/ru/article/walbrzych/16,-/8651,before-the-multilingual-hum-quietenedthe-birth-of-polish-walbrzych/?print=1
Администратор приложил все усилия, чтобы материалы были достоверными и
актуал ными и не нарушали права трет их лиц, в том числе, авторские права, но не может
этого гарантироват . Поэтому ошибочные данные на сайте не могут быт основанием для
претензий. В случае каких-либо сомнений просим обращат ся по адресу:
sztetl@jewishmuseum.org.pl
"The city, at the time it was taken over by the Polish authorities, had a population of over 46,000, Germans
employed mainly in the coal industry and several hundred Poles, mostly Jews, survivors from local and regional
concentration camps. In addition, about 15,000 Soviet troops were stationed here. Wałbrzych was spared the
consequences of war, leaving it without any major signs of damage and, so, life continued here at a normal tempo."
This was the description of the balance by the Polish Government's Plenipotentiary and its first President, Eugene
Szewczyk, at the beginning of Polish activity in Wałbrzych in his "Report of Annual Activity in the City of
Wałbrzych." For this part of Europe and for this time, it was a unique and paradoxical situation.
Prior to May 28th 1945, when Szewczyk, with a team of a dozen staff, took control of the city and issued Order No
1 in which, on one sheet of paper and a few sentences, the city was given a Polish name, a valid currency and an
official language were decreed, as well as fixing exchange rates and taking care of several other issues of equal
importance, hundreds of Polish Jews were already in Wałbrzych, not of their own volition - working in local mines
and factories during the final phase of the War. There were also many Jews from other European countries and, of
course, as many Poles, who were were in many branches of the Gross-Rosen concentration camp as forced labor in
the Sudetenland. People, who have somewhere to return to immediately they were liberated, scattered themselves
throughout Europe. But those "several hundred Poles, mostly Jews", who knew that there was nowhere and no one
to return to, stayed in Wałbrzych - the capital of the Sudeten Industrial District, which, after their years of past
experience, seemed a paradise on earth to these survivors.
At the time, Dr. Frederic Liberman described it as being "born again". As he says, in a city where one could freely
walk the streets, green and white dominated the Wałbrzych landscape, silence and stillness prevailed broken only by
birds and the bells of empty trams. Witnesses from that time are unanimous: The Germans were very polite,
everything operated like clockwork. Despite the fact that the entire old world had collapsed, the coking plant was
not extinguished for one moment. Crews also worked the mines, which had only experienced a day or two of
interruption. The sulfuric acid plants, porcelain, glass, iron foundries - everything functioned. Telephones operated,
there water in the taps and order on the streets were patrolled by German police. Order had to be, naturally,
maintained. In the empty Szczawno spa park, the orchestra regularly played, and the spa baths awaited patients.
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Only, in Wałbrzych and other cities and on farms, there no longer were tens of thousands of slaves transported from
across Europe (although, mostly, from Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and the Czech Republic). While estimated
numbers vary, it is known that in Lower Silesia, several thousand Jews emerged from the camps.
Whatever their nationality, all of these slaves were mostly young, had some skills and a huge motivation to live.
French, Hungarians, Belgians, Danes, without any regret. chose to leave the beautiful and rich Sudetenland. Those
who had nowhere to return to, remained and explain why statistics, compiled on 30th June 1945, reported that 879
Poles lived in Wałbrzych, together with 57,691 Germans (then written in small letters) and hundreds of people of
other nationalities. Among those of other nationalities, Jews were not mentioned and that is the way it has remained
until today. Both the statistics and in various official documents, no minority ethnic group was designated. In the
late 1950's, municipal authorities comprehensively and regularly dealt with the situation of the national minorities:
Germans, Czechs, Gypsies (in those years, the word "Roma" was not yet in usage), and later the Greeks. Within
official records, analyses and evaluations of the Jewish population did not exist.
As a result, identifying actual data pertaining to the Jewish community is difficult. In any event, according to
S.Bronsztejn, in 1946 the Jewish population of Poland was approximately 100,000, half of whom lived in Lower
Silesia. In December 1946, 10,200 Jews lived in Wałbrzych, comprising 17.9% of the population (the largest
population of Jewish people lived in Dzierzoniow - 16,000, comprising 28.1% of the population of that city).
From the outset, Jews actively involved themselves in the public life of Wałbrzych. The rapid establishment of
functioning Jewish social, cultural, political organizations or cooperatives was generally regarded by the Polish
settlers as an expression of unity and solidarity. The existence of three Jewish schools, two semi-boarding schools,
dormitories for young people, a common room, library, kitchen, folk, canteens, Health Care Society, the
"Renaissance" theatre, numerous readings, concerts, literary meetings and other cultural events, including economic
activity evoked, in outside observers, the gradual impression of Jewish omnipresence. This resulted in a little
jealousy. As seen from the outside, the Jews exhibited a conformity and unity of views - something which was so
lacking in Polish society.
Some Jews actively participated in the postwar political life of Wałbrzych. All Jewish political parties were
operating: the Union of Democratic Zionists in Poland, "Ichud", Jewish Socialist Workers' Party "Poale-Zion" (later
the United Jewish Workers' Party "Poale-Zion"), Polish Workers' Party Jewish Circle (unique nationally), Socialist
Labour Party "Hitachdut", Socialist Workers' Party "Bund" and many others. This does not mean that the number of
organisations, the number of their members or their level of activity testified to the actual role and impact they had
on politics in the city.
Supporters of the changes taking place in the Polish state tried, in many ways, to involve the rest of the Jews. For
example, before the referendum, the slogan: "Democracy is ours and we must vote for 3 x YES" was propagated
throughout the Jewish community. The same was true in the pre-election period: "18th January 1947 - the Jewish
Committee has taken an active part in public demonstrations in honor Marshall M. Rola-Zymierski in Wałbrzych;
Jews appeared with various banners in the Polish and Jewish; the march provoked a very positive impression.
"There were plenty of Jews on election day", organised in all districts of the "troika" election. Agitators were active
in all 400 districts. Jewish participation in the elections was 100%."
The number and the activity of Jewish organizations influenced public opinion within the Jewish community for
widespread support of change taking place in Poland, of the participation of Jews in the creation of this new reality.
However, several incidents within the Jewish community do not fit this view, providing an illusory image.
According to the Heroes of the Ghetto academy (in 1948), "policy changed such that every party representative
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sought to present his party's program" or the May 1st parade during which "in opposition to a resolution of the
Jewish Committee which stated said that every Jew should particpate as part of his workplace group, the Poale-Zion
attracted a number of workers from their jobs and, instead, marched within the ranks of the party; and Hashomer
Hatzair youth marched under their blue and white banner."
In fact, contrary to popular opinion of the role, significance and views of the Jews in those days, usually viewed
through the prism of leftist unity, they were internally divided politically. Often there were incidents contradictory to
solidarity. In 1948, one of the Wałbrzych Jewish Committee activists said: "The current period is characterised by a
tendency towards organisational unity among Polish workers. This is not the same as between the Jewish and Polish
workers. The Jewish worker must first go through an internal consolidation, in order to later show organisational
unity." As life in the new reality displayed, the combination of events on the international stage and their
acceleration, does not allow time for this "organisational consolidation". It was not really just about the workers
themselves, but about all Jews living in Walbrzych, and unity was dictated by the growing strength of the
Communist Party. In this context, one can get the impression that politicians lived in a totally different reality to that
of ordinary Jews. The words of Fischbein, Chairman of the Wałbrzych Jewish Committee and also a member of the
Workers' Party, must have sounded ominous to the Jews when he said, in December 1948, that "the PPR must have
an impact on everything that happens on the Jewish street, nor can there be any workplace not influenced by the
PPR". Another Jewish Committee activist, Gluza, supported Fischbein saying: "The work of Comrade Fischbein is
the work of the PPR and everything he does is in the PPR's interests. So far, the representative of the Jewish PPR
was the representative of the Jewish community. Today, Fischbein man, thus the PPR is what counts!"
The resultant situation Wałbrzych was reflected in the numerous memoirs. Albert Mrozowski, poet, hero of
"Common Peace" and then a Wałbrzych journalist,. described the situation in the first months after the war: "One
encounters (in Walbrzych) many Jews. Most of them are survivors of concentration camps - mainly fromy GrossRosen. They are wretched, but very well dressed. They occupied a good flats with all their belongings. It's a just
revenge for their ordeal of occupation."
This generalization, however, concerns only a part of the Jewish community. Wałbrzych, probably like many other
Sudeten towns it was overcrowded even before the end of the war. However, this was not due to these tens of
thousands of slaves, but to German refugees from the Russian front and the manpower transferred to Sudetenland
defense establishments from industrial centres of the Third Reich which were exposed to bombing by the Western
allies.
As a result, the housing situation in Wałbrzych was exceptionally difficult at first and was then aggravated by the
tens of thousands strong Soviet garrison for whom there were simply no barracks in Wałbrzych. By the 1950's, Jews
who remained in Walbrzych had normalised their housing conditions. Not without reason was the poorest district,
located by the Sobięciński slag heaps (today known as "Palestine"), inhabited mainly by Jews.
Poles and Jews coming to Walbrzych did not have pre-arranged flats and they could not occupy them themselves.
Mostly, they were billetted with German families. An exception to this, to some degree, was the housing prepared
for returnees from France and Belgium which was negotiated with the housing authority by the Presidents of PKWN
- in France, miner Tomasz Piętke and Belgium, miner Edward Gierek. They managed to arrange a few thousand
flats, but implementation of these arrangements was varied.
Polish and foreign journalists, who at that time often came to Walbrzych, emphasised with pleasure that, in
Wałbrzych trams one could hear many languages spoken. Today, the city no longer has trams and, even in the
markets, one can no longer hear foreign languages because the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Mongolians
and Russians, according to the laws of the market, try to speak Polish.
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In those days everyone was amazed and surprised by the great social dynamics of the residents of Wałbrzych speaking different languages, emanating from different cultures, coming not only from different parts of the world,
but also from different parts of the old country. It was a real melting pot in which people sought for themselves a
new place on earth, a possibility of realising their big and small ambitions. They tried to achieve the difficult things
but, if it didn't work out, they carried on.
These early returnees (Poles, Germans, Jews, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians) and those repatriated from
France, Germany, Belgium, Yugoslavia and China - regardless of how they're called today, started all over again.
Today, it is variously estimated that, just like the Jews for whom Lower Silesia was just a stop on the road to the
Promised Land, the Poles also sought something similar in this region. These pioneers usually ended up in places
different from those which they intended. After all, they were all removed from their environments, their customs
and their traditional culture.
They adapted to their new conditions or tried to adapt these conditions to fit their requirements and customs. This
was true of people from different socio-professional backgrounds and social classes. Landowners and workers,
office-workers and peasants had to start functioning in completely new conditions. Humble communal officials
before the war, such as E.Szewczyk, now had to quickly deal with issues that were previously the domain of the
great leaders and reformers. Count Ignacy Potocki (a geologist) and Count Wojciech Dzieduszycki (a miller), two
officials of Jewish origin, created and organised the Duszniki Chopin Festival in Szczawno which, today, is the
oldest Polish event of its kind and, this year, took place for the 56th time. Fryderyka Liberman, who also
participated in this venture, held a doctorate in Germanic Studies from the Jagiellonian University and, before the
war, was active in the artistic and intellectual circles of Kraków. Starting a new life as diretor of a cultural
organisation, she was extremely active and effective. One can say that many of today's cultural institutions and
significant artistic events began from nothing at that time. One needs a strong will to live and a vivid imagination,
within a month of being liberated from a Nazi concentration camp and having survived by sheer chance, to establish
the first Polish nespaper in Lower Silesia ("The Polish Weekly"), which was first published when there were less
than 1,000 Poles in Wałbrzych. (she was helped in this by a Dutch Jew, a fellow prisoner, who later became her
husband and the first non-German doctor to treat Poles in Wałbrzych - he treated them despite not knowing the
Polish language). Despite having only 13 books in Polish left by the first Polish inhabitants of the city, they
established the first public library, headed by the outstanding poet Marian Jachimowicz, a friend of Bruno Schulz
from Drohobycz.
One needs good relationships with artists to, together with Prof. Eugeniusz Geppert, organise the first exhibition of
Polish paintings in Wałbrzych and to instantly attract performances by Ludwik Solski. She founded a music school.
On behalf of the Polish and Soviet authorities, she held discussions with Gerhardt Hauptmann whom she knew from
before the war and about whom she wrote a book. She co-founded a literary centre and a base for the weekly
"Walbrzych". With the doyen of Polish photographers, Jan Bułhak, she established a Wałbrzych photography
program. She was the first Polish author who, after the war, wrote about Książ castle (before it was named as such).
She rapidly moved on to Wrocław where she co-organised the Congress of Intellectuals. After that, she quite
unexpectedly left for the newly-established State of Israel. It was not until fifty years later that, for her contribution
to the life of the city, she was made an Honorary Citizen of Wałbrzych.
In the late 1940's, a section of the Jews registered themselves and decided to stay. This was still treated as a
"transitory" affair by the Jewish Committee as evidenced from its own records. Jewish Committees sought to extend
their coverage to embrace activities of the entire Jewish population. Very often, however, they were regarded only
as an agency though which to find employment and housing, and to locate relatives or friends. The Wałbrzych
Committee Chairman stated that the Jews came to them "for chairs, Committee orders and work permits. And for
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whatever troubles the Jews have, they hold the Committee to be responsible too." There were isolated cases where,
when Jews found it difficult to settle down, they moved on in search of better conditions. Quite often, being
constantly on the road, they registered themselves with several Jewish Committees. A separate category were those
Jews who were professionals, intellectuals and personnel in the militia, the army and Security Service (UB), and
who did not admit to their Jewish roots. It is widely believed that the number of persons be registered is too low.
Jewish Committees activists, based on knowledge of the environment of the time, thought that at least 10% of the
total number of Jews were unregistered.
In the period 1945-1948, most Jews worked in key areas of industry. It is not, in fact, surprising that few were
among the miners which were outnumbered by those among the artisans, merchants and office workers (and, of
course, professionals, many of whom probably have not been included in these reports). Intensive activity from the
Communist authorities to pressure Jews to contribute to workers' state and to popularise the image of the Jewishworker failed to produce the expected results. In most cases, within these key industries, young people or those
without qualifications in other professions were employed - or also those who had no option. The rest of the Jews
continued to adhere to the traditional occupations and the problems, to some extent exaggerated by the Productivity
Program (in particular, the rebuilding of Jewish economic life in Poland) led by the government and by, almost
without exception, all Jewish organizations, brought fairly good results, even though, as reported in autumn 1948 by
J. Bein: ''The economic reconstruction of the Jews in Poland has only been superficial."
Changes in occupational structure of Jews occurred only as far as were dictated by the circumstances in which they
found themselves. The Jews did not easily adapt to the new conditions. Many of them did not wish to live any longer
in the land where their families were exterminated, in the shadow of the concentration camps and ghettos and in
close proximity to the German nation and among some of their anti-Semitic Polish neighbours. In reality, the
majority chose to leave Poland. Those who stayed, after suffering further humiliation over a period of time, followed
in the footsteps of their compatriots and also left. Jewish participation in economic life lasted only as long as there
was no real chance of starting life anew in their own country. Many also left Wałbrzych for larger cities - Wrocław,
Łódz, Upper Silesia or Warsaw.
A letter dated 19th April 1947 sounded quite odd. A Jewish couple, returning from Palestine, found themselves in
Wałbrzych, in a city where Jews were moving in the opposite direction, wrote: "We, re-emigrants after several years
in Palestinian, appeal to the Commission to arrange productive work for us. We also ask that adequate housing be
allocated to us. We believe that the Commission will fully understand our request and that, as idealists and working
people, we will find suitable work."
Jews made a great contribution, in all areas, to the development of Lower Silesia. Among them were many
intellectuals, lawyers, economists and artists. Jews such as F.Liberman, who compensated for her lost year through
her great activity. Her contribution was not just in culture. She could write, knew languages (not only Hebrew and
Yiddish) and people from all walks of life. Not surprisingly, she was the "right hand" of President Szewczyk and
solved the most difficult problems.
As with other Polish regions, successive waves of Jewish emigrants also left Wałbrzych. As a precedent, one can use
the situation that prevailed after the Kielce pogrom. At that time, during the course of only a few days, a great many
people of Jewish origin left Lower Silesia, including Wałbrzych. And, surprisingly, at the same time, Jews dirfted to
this region from eastern and central Poland Europe, reagrding it as safe. From that moment, when the situation had
settled down and around 5,000-6,000 Jews lived in Wałbrzych, there were no further population shifts until 1956.
The upheaval in Poland in 1968 led to mass legal and illegal departures from the city which left only about 100-200
Jews remaining in Wałbrzych to this day.
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It must be admitted that the Jews did not take bad memories with them. For that reason, they gladly return here.
Louis Hofman is one of the oldest senior citizens of Wałbrzych (from the Płaszów camp, he was taken to to GrossRosen in 1944 and began his career in Wałbrzych at a in the sulphuric acid plant). Now retired, he is leader of the
small Jewish community in Wałbrzych. When asked by a journalist of examples of anti-Semitism (on the occasion
of a visit to Wałbrzych by 37 American rabbis) replied with a verse, when plied with questions by researchers
looking for signs of Polish anti-Semitism:
"Dear Madam, the whole
Issue of anti-Semitism
To me is rubbish..
And that American grant
Is for me
One big con."
Of course, not all Jews think so but, in Wałbrzych, there actually were instances of anti-Semitism, but much less
than elsewhere even though there were more Jews here than in most others places. The number of Jews here were
such that, after the war, one of the leaders of the Lower Silesian Jewish Committee accepted with great caution an
idea, little-known today, of Jewish autonomy in Lower Silesia.
How is this to equate with the claim by Jewish historian E. Mendelsohn that "Jews are almost always ready to
support the existing system of power, especially if that power treats them well"? 34 / How does it to equate to the
opinion of J.Lasockiego, Editor of the weekly "Wałbrzych", who wrote, in 1948, that there exists a "general
situation of political stability in the country, thanks to the victory of the democratic camp" in which "the Jewish
population continues to work, intensively and with enthusiasm, in the fields of productivity and employment and
Wałbrzych Jews, on a par with Jews from across Poland, will follow the path of constructive work according to the
Three Year Plan for the good of the Polish state "? In retrospect, it is known that such programmatic statements,
regardless of who made them or by whom they were written, did not come to fruition in Poland.
Jews, like other ethnic minorities, added colour to post-war Wałbrzych. They played a specific role. Their activity
proved that they still remained a people and , despite previous tragedies and current troubles, they were capable of
not only surviving, but also building a state. Except not a Polish one, but one of their own - a Jewish state - Israel.
Their time in Wałbrzych for the Jews remains treated as a "temporary stop" on the road to themselves ...
Did the Jews leave anything behind other than just memories and names of places where they once lived (for
example, "Palestine" in the Sobiecin District), membership of the Jewish Social-Cultural Society in Poland (TSKŻ)
and synagogue visited by a handful of Jews? One of the first of these visits to Wałbrzych was by Prof.Szewach
Weiss, who looked for traces of a Jewish presence here from the 1940's and who found friends from Borysław who
helped him survive. Louis Hofman, in order to pray, must now travel to Wrocław because, in Wałbrzych, it is not
possible to gather together ten Jewish men.
In April of this year, the Polish-Israeli Friendship Society was founded which has a constant influx of new members
- of course, for obvious reasons, the vast majority are Poles. Regular meetings take place, devoted to Jewish culture,
literature and music. When celebrating anniversaries Wałbrzych schools play host to their past graduates - among
them, Jews. And yet, Wałbrzych, though not visible to the naked eye, to this day, is regarded as a place which brings
together many nationalities. It's not complaining about it origins.
It should be noted here that Wałbrzych of the 1940's forties with all the negative phenomena arising from massive
migrations, however, was a city of advancement for of its inhabitants who had come from all backgrounds. Even
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though it was a city primarily settled by ordinary workers, as well as people from the countryside, this clash of
cultures proved extremely fruitful. The numerous examples of brilliant careers in all areas of life confirm the high
communal dynamic and the prevailing climate of development. This applies not only to political careers, but also to
scientific, artistic and all professions. It created the raw material for a new Wałbrzych Polish society which, from the
outset, provided higher-level personnel to a diverse range of institutions. This also applied to Jewish members of this
society.
Since the beginning of its Polish history, Walbrzych was a city with great problems. In this melting pot, a dangerous
mixture boiled which forced the creation of various "release valves". Today, the city is in a difficult recouperation
period, recovering from serious operations connected with restructuring. Many functional bodies have been
"amputated". Major change has proved that the city can live without the coal industry, without the tradition of "Red
Wałbrzych" and even without its once sizeable Jewish community. The city has changed much and new books need
to be written about it. The Jewish part of its history is slowly closing.”

Vita
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